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KNOWLEDGE INPUTS, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FIRM STRUCTURE
ABSTRACT

Corporate scholars rely on traditional theories of the firm to analyze corporate
organization and corporate contracting. Traditional theories of the firm, however, have long
neglected the role of knowledge in shaping the internal structure of firms. Current analyses of
firm structure that rely on these theories therefore suffer from serious shortcomings. This paper
begins to address this gap by analyzing knowledge resources and investigating their influence on
internal corporate governance structures. We propose a new typology that explains firm internal
governance structure based on the types of knowledge used in the production process. We
analyze the interaction of law and knowledge management. We investigate how firms can bind
knowledge by means of patents, trade secrets and private contracting, such as covenants not to
compete. We propose a principle of efficient knowledge allocation, which holds that
organizational structures result from the necessity to maximize the use of knowledge resources.
We discuss specific hazards that emerge from transactions with knowledge inputs. We discuss
particular applications of the typology.
We show how the management of knowledge resources required in mass
production, high tech and law firms differentially affects the decisional hierarchies of these firms
and also their compensation structure in certain instances. We argue that knowledge resources
drove the change in the organizational structure of mass production firms from the U-form to the
M-form, affecting decision making rights. We show how the adoption of stock options plans in
high tech firms aims at constraining knowledge hazards. Stock options prevent leakage by
retaining individual knowledge and discouraging hoarding of knowledge. We argue that the
model of profit splitting and the hierarchy between partners and associates in law firms are also
explained by the necessity of maximizing the use of knowledge resources. We then examine
how the change of knowledge types used in law firms is affecting their organization. Finally, we
investigate how certain business transactions like mergers, joint ventures and licensing contracts
are shaped by knowledge inputs. We show that knowledge considerations provide a positive
explanation for firm structure and a normative view in that the principle of efficient knowledge
allocation should be an important concern of policy makers concerned with corporate reform.
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KNOWLEDGE INPUTS, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FIRM STRUCTURE

“An explanation of when, why, and how managerial hierarchies developed
in certain industries and rarely appeared in others remains a challenge to
economists, sociologists, practitioners of management science, and
economic and business historians.”
- ALFRED CHANDLER & HERMAN DAEMS,
MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES
“Considering the acknowledged importance of
knowledge and competence in business strategy and
indeed the entire system of contemporary human
society, it is striking that there seems to be a paucity
of language useful for discussing the subject . . . .
there seems to be a serious dearth of appropriate
terminology and conceptual schemes.”
- Sidney G. Winter, Knowledge and Competence as
Strategic Assets

I. INTRODUCTION
The literature on the theory of the firm and corporate organization has treated
extensively several variables that affect firm boundaries and internal corporate structure.
Management and economic scholars have thus accounted for firm boundaries and internal
corporate governance patterns by explanations based on transaction costs,1 agency costs,2 and
property rights over physical assets.3
One very important variable, however, has been largely ignored by this literature,
and certainly by legal scholars. This variable concerns perhaps the core ingredient that firms use
to achieve their corporate objective, namely to generate the products or services they will sell on
the market: The knowledge resources that firms use in the production process. This ingredient
is tantamount to the whole business enterprise. First the entrepreneur must come up with an
idea, which, in turn, requires the application of additional knowledge and skill to develop a
product or service that can be sold in the market.
1

Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 115 (FEB. 1937); OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM; FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTS (1985).
2
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
3
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: a Theory of Vertical and
Lateral Integration, 94 J. POLIT. ECON. 691, 693-694 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the
Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POLIT. ECON. 1119 (Dec. 1990).
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A theory of the firm that focuses on knowledge resources required in the
production process, and their differential effects on internal firm organization, is absent in the
legal literature. And yet, knowledge resources affect internal corporate governance. And the
reverse is also true in that internal corporate governance can affect knowledge management and
production.4 Internal organizational practices can promote or inhibit the efficient use of
knowledge resources within the firm. Moreover, largely absent from the corporate organization
literature is a discussion of the effects that intellectual property rights mechanisms and private
contracting involving knowledge resources exert over firm internal governance structures.5 To
be sure, while recent literature has pointed out the importance of human capital and capabilities
for corporate governance practices,6 there has been no consistent attempt to explain how
knowledge requirements of the production process, more generally, affect internal corporate
governance in concrete and specific ways, and vice-versa.7
This paper begins to fill this gap. Economists and management scholars have
increasingly pointed to the special nature of knowledge resources as an explanation for firm
boundaries.8 Knowledge resources can explain both why firms exist, and why firms develop a
4

ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., INVENTING THE ELECTRONIC CENTURY 85-86 (2001), for example, attributes the
failure of Remington Rand in the computer business to its failing in built an integrated learning base. So, a problem
in the management of knowledge resources led to the failure of the business.
5
The study of Gilson provides an exception in this regard for it makes the connection between intellectual
property and corporate structure. Ronald Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999). Gilson analyzes the impact of legal structure on the development of high technology
industrial districts. Gilson, however, looks at the high tech industry from an aggregate perspective and does not
develop the consequences of knowledge resources for firm internal governance structure . We pursue his insight
further in this paper and complete his story by looking at how high tech firms in Silicon Valley have a different
governance structure from high tech firms on Route 128. See also Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 4 (2004) (doing the reverse, that is, “considering intellectual property in light of the theories of
the firm.”) The author proposes to examine “whether existing intellectual property law provides for efficient
allocation of intellectual property rights within firms in a manner that comports with property-based theories of the
firm.”) There is an increasing awareness in intellectual property and employment law literature that the regulation
of knowledge resources impacts the financial and organizational structure of firms. See Robert P. Merges, The Law
and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. L. J. & TECHN. 1 (1999); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property
Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857 (2000); Catherine L. Fisk, Working
Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property,
1800-1920, 52 HAST. L. J. 441 (2001); Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over Ownership of
Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 271 (2002).
6
Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe, eds., Brookings Institution Press, 1999), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=167848; Thomas F. McInerney, Implications of High Performance Production and Work
Practices for the Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, _COL. BUS. L. REV_. (2004).
7
Blair, supra note__, at 86 reviews the economic literature on firm-specific human capital and argues that the
law and economics literature has fixated for too long on the relationship between shareholders and managers (the
principal-agent approach) to model corporate governance. However, she concludes with a very general proposal:
“arrangements for governing the relationships among employees, and between employees and the firm, can no
longer be treated as something separate from corporate governance.” And she does not explain how the corporate
governance literature should take human capital into consideration.
8
See, e.g., ASHISH ARORA, ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND
CORPORATE STRATEGY (2001); Kathleen R. Conner & C.K. Prahalad, A Resource-Based Theory of the Firm:
Knowledge Versus Opportunism, 7 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 477 (1996); Jack A. Nickerson & Todd R. Zenger, A
Knowledge-Based Theory of Governance Choice- A Problem-Solving Approach, 1, available at
http://www.olin.wustl.edu/workingpapers/pdf/2002-06-006.pdf. Robert M. Grant, Toward a Knowledge-Based
Doc #:NY7:262178.1
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particular internal organizational structure.9 The corporate law literature, however, has not yet
recognized these developments in economics and organizational theory. And, in turn, these
theories have not fully recognized the role of legal institutions in shaping knowledge transactions
and firm structure.10
In this paper, we argue that the organization of business firms cannot be explained
entirely without reference to the knowledge structure of the firm. We advance the thesis that a
firm’s internal governance structure is influenced by the type of knowledge required by its
production process. Knowledge that individuals bring to bear on production affects firm
organization, while firm organization can also affect the production of new knowledge during the
course of work. Knowledge-based transaction costs can help explain both why firms exist – that
is why firm organization vs. market contracting is preferred in the production process – and why
the firm has a particular organizational form.
The structure of the firm in a competitive environment can be viewed as a result
of three imperatives: (1) A firm must produce knowledge within the firm; (2) A firm must
transfer and diffuse knowledge within the firm;11 (3) A firm must bind knowledge to the firm,
that is, prevent the transfer of knowledge outside of the firm. How a firm produces knowledge,
transfers and diffuses it within the firm, and binds it to the firm is intricately related to the
organizational structure of the firm. The organizational structure varies accordingly, which
variation, we imagine, is capable of being described as a complex function. The type of
knowledge that is used in a firm’s production process is a crucial variable in this function
(though by no means determinative). We therefore propose a revision of current theories of the
firm suggesting that a key element in firm organization is the type of knowledge that it deploys to
accomplish its goals.
Theory of the Firm, 17 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 109 (1996); Richard N. Langlois & Nicolai J. Foss,
Capabilities and Governance: the Rebirth of Production in Theory of Economic Organization (Druid, Working
Paper No. 97-2, 1997), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=77668.
9
Some scholars have lamented the insufficiency of the traditional theories of the firm to account for the way
production is organized within the firm. See, e.g., Bengt Holmströn & John Roberts, The Theory of the Firm
Revisited, 14 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 73, 90 vol. 14, note 4 (Fall 1998) (advocating a broader view of
the firm and its boundaries: “...it is surprising that the leading economic theories of firm boundaries have paid
almost no attention to the role of organizational knowledge.” (citation omitted); see also, id. at 75 (“[Firms] have to
deal with a much richer variety of problems than simply the provision of investment incentives and the resolution of
hold-ups. Ownership patterns are not determined solely by the need to provide investment incentives, and
incentives for investment are provided by a variety of means, of which ownership is but one. Thus, approaches that
focus on one incentive problem that is solved by the use of a single instrument give much too limited a view of the
nature of the firm, and one that is potentially misleading... Our examples suggest that ownership patterns are
responsive to, among other things, agency problems, concerns for common assets, difficulties in transferring
knowledge, and the benefits of market monitoring.”). See also Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited,
in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM 185 (OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER eds., 1993).
10
ASHISH ARORA ET AL., supra note __, at 14 (“Intellectual property are the means for defining the object of the
transaction and the property rights in the markets for technology.”). Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna, The
Structure of Licensing Contracts, 48 J. OF INDUST. ECON. 103, 128 (Mar. 2000) (discussing the failure of the
literature in distinguishing properly how legal institutions protect knowledge in different industries).
11
The extent of knowledge diffusion or knowledge sharing will of course depend on the strategy of each firm
aiming to maximize the use of its knowledge resources in the face of the knowledge hazards that it may face and the
characteristics of legal institutional environment to which it is subject. A firm may adopt a strategy of restricting its
knowledge to but a few top employees, or may want to share it as much as possible in order to provide an
environment suitable to innovation.
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We show that law and contract affect knowledge management and knowledge
production in complex ways thereby ultimately influencing corporate structure. We analyze how
law or contract affect the creation of organizational structures suitable to knowledge production,
diffusion, and conservation, such that the relevant knowledge is efficiently collocated with
decision-making authority within the firm. We propose a principle of efficient knowledge
allocation according to which firms will try to maximize the use of knowledge resources in the
coordination of their activities. Finally, we examine what organizational mechanisms emerge to
meet the objective of efficient knowledge allocation.
Firms build less or more hierarchical structures, establish particular
decision-making procedures, and design specific compensation packages and incentives because
they are compelled to maximize the value of their knowledge resources in highly competitive
environments. Different types of relevant knowledge resources will require different corporate
strategies to maximize their value. We therefore explain the use of intellectual property
protections, restrictive covenants, and features of compensation systems as responses to a firm’s
need to manage knowledge efficiently.
By taking such a “knowledge-based” approach, we are able to shed light on some
internal organizational features of mass production, high tech, and law firms, as well as certain
business transactions. Thus we show how the management of knowledge resources required in
mass production and high tech firms differentially affects their decisional hierarchies, and in
certain instances also their compensation and ownership structure. Further, we explain the role
of more hierarchical decision-making structures in mass production firms and of flatter
hierarchies in high tech and law firms, as means for achieving an efficient knowledge allocation.
We show how particular characteristics of the compensation policies in high tech and law firms,
such as the use of stock options and the sharing model, serve to maximize efficient knowledge
allocation in these firms. We investigate how certain business transactions like mergers, joint
ventures and licensing contracts are shaped by knowledge inputs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Part II, we discuss some of the major
economic theories of the firm and show their shortcomings in providing a convincing
explanation of a broad range of firm production organization. We then introduce an alternative
view of the firm proposed by knowledge theories developed by economists and management
scholars.
In Part III, we propose a typology that distinguishes between three types of
knowledge resources used in the production process.
In Part IV, we explain how legal rules impact firm organization, by a) binding
knowledge to the firm, b) permitting its diffusion within the firm among employees who need
access to this knowledge and c) preventing knowledge transfer outside the firm. We show that
certain intellectual property protections can shape firm organization, affecting knowledge
production and firm organizational structure. In doing so, we begin to make use of the typology
introduced in Part III.
In Part V, we present a principle of efficient knowledge allocation and discuss
some specific knowledge hazards.
In Part VI, we then show that different organizational structures rely on the
different types of knowledge resources. We show how knowledge inputs shape their
organizational structure. We focus on mass production, high tech and law firms. We also
Doc #:NY7:262178.1
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discuss some business transactions such as mergers, joint ventures and licensing. We explain
some of the internal governance features in such organizations as responses to the necessity of
achieving an efficient knowledge allocation and management.
Part VII concludes.
II. THEORY OF THE FIRM
In the following, we examine some of the most important economic theories that
try to explain firm boundaries and governance structure. In order to understand the contributions
of the knowledge-based theory of the firm we must revisit at least some of the most basic
assumptions of the more traditional theories of the firm.
A. Traditional Theories of the Firm
1. The Neoclassical Theory of the Firm
Firms are characterized by technological transformations. In neoclassical theory,
firms are, in a sense, seen as repositories of productive knowledge. Orthodoxy does not,
however, engage in detailed inquiry as to the role of knowledge in the firm’s organization.
Sidney Winter has pointed out this shortcoming of orthodox economics:
By taking production sets or functions as given ... [orthodoxy]
fails to provide a framework for explaining why society’s
capabilities should be packaged at a particular time in one
particular way and not some other way. By treating the storage of
a particular knowledge as costless – the analogue in this context of
the assumption of costless and perfect contracts- it forecloses to
economic analysis the performance of the very role that it claims is
central.12
Neoclassical theory posits that all firms have the same knowledge, know-how or
capacity to produce. All firms in an industry are assumed to have the same production function
in the long-run. But as Winter suggests capabilities and organizational knowledge may vary
even among firms that produce in the same industry and rely on similar technologies.13
2. The Transaction Cost Theory of the Firm
In The Nature of the Firm, Coase proposed a transaction cost explanation of the
existence of the firm and its boundaries. The theory was ground breaking and it remains an
12

Sidney G. Winter, On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, 185 supra note
__, at 185.
13
See also Richard R. Nelson, Production Sets, Technological Knowledge, and R & D: Fragile and
Overworked Constructs for Analysis of Productivity Growth?, 70 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 62 (1980)
(criticizing the economic theoretical constructs of production sets, technological knowledge, and research and
development). Nelson argues that orthodoxy assumes that technological knowledge is in the form of codified howto knowledge as if contained in a “blue print book” which provides sufficient guidance to any firm that has access to
the book. However, there is no logical reason why this book should be available to all firms, as if it were in a public
library. Furthermore, each firm will learn largely on its own, in an inimitable way, according to its particular
organizational features and human capital.

Doc #:NY7:262178.1

Gorga & Halberstam

9

extremely compelling account of governance structures in the developed form that it has
assumed through the work of Williamson. Coase, however, subscribes to an account of the
employment relationship that obscures the effects of knowledge resources on firm structure and
boundaries.
Coase noted that the distinguishing feature of the firm is the allocation of
resources by the entrepreneur, rather than the price mechanism. Coase argued that production
takes place in the firm whenever transaction costs involved in firm production are lower than the
transaction costs would be for that same type of production on the market. For example, in order
to produce a coat on the market, one would have to seek out and contract separately with a tailor,
a cloth supplier, a supplier of buttons, perhaps a furrier, and so forth. Each such transaction
involves transaction costs from contracting in the form of information costs, negotiating costs,
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. By vertically integrating these activities a firm can
economize on transaction costs and produce more efficiently. While contracts are not eliminated
within the firm, they are greatly reduced by the authority of the entrepreneur.
Central to Coase’s explanation of the firm is an understanding of the employment
contract as an open-ended commitment by the employee to obey the direction of the entrepreneur
over the long term (within certain limits). According to Coase, the existence of the firm can be
explained by reference to the transaction cost savings associated with the employer’s fiat-control
over the employee.
We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in practice by
considering the legal relationship normally called that of “master and servant” or “employer and
employee…. it is the fact of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of “employer and
employee” . . .14
Coase thus explains how the organization of production within the firm reduces
transaction costs that would otherwise occur in the market. But his explanation relies on a very
narrow understanding of firm organization, as one that is based on the fiat control of the
entrepreneur. Coase uncritically adopts this view of firm hierarchy by generalizing from 19th
century conceptions of the relation between employer and employee which indeed obtain in
certain types of firm production, as we shall discuss below.15 But Coase thereby fails to
appreciate what characterized the fundamental shift between the 19th and 20th century
organization of production in firms, namely the emergence of a new class of salaried managers,
who were both employees (i.e. non-owners) and decision makers.16
According to Alfred Chandler, the new type of business enterprise brought the
separation of ownership from management: “The enlarged enterprises came to be operated by
teams of salaried managers who had little or no equity in the firm.”17 These salaried managers
were employees, usually with engineering degrees, hired largely by the families who owned and
ran large firms to exert control over a firm’s organization and coordination of production.

14
15
16
17

Ronald H. Coase, The Theory of the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM supra note __, at 29.
Coase, supra note __, at 30 (citing treatise by BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT).
CHANDLER, supra note __, at 1.
CHANDLER, supra note __.
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History shows that while hierarchy was crucial to the rise of the modern industrial
enterprise, entrepreneurs (owners) did not exercise fiat control over their most important
employees. As Chandler points out:
In production the new middle managers – both line and staff –
had to learn intimately the technology of the products made and
the processes used in the different factories under their control.
So, too, in marketing and distribution middle managers had to
come to know the similarities, differences, vagaries, and
opportunities of different regional markets. In both production and
distribution the line managers had to recruit, train, and motivate
their own staffs as well as the lower-level managers under their
command – the managers of plants, branch sales and purchasing
offices, and laboratories. And even more than these lower-level
executives, the middle managers had to learn to administer; that is,
they had to learn to coordinate, to evaluate and act on such
evaluations, in addition to recruiting, training, and motivating
subordinates. For top managers such administrative duties were
paramount. They not only had to learn to coordinate and monitor
the activities of the functional departments but also to plan,
allocate resources for, and implement long-term programs to
maintain the enterprise’s facilities and skills, if they were to retain
their share of existing markets and to move into new ones.18
What is striking about the emergence of this new institutional form, as Chandler’s
widely accepted account of the managerial revolution describes, is the significant discretion that
was given to salaried managers in coordinating production within the firm. The salaried
managers were accorded considerable discretion, because of their technical knowledge and their
training in the coordination and organization of production; in other words, because of their
ability to make decisions as opposed to merely following orders. Coase’s theory that the fiat
relationship between employer and employee was the key organizational feature of the firm thus
does not square well with the historical evidence.
It is true that rigid hierarchical relations frequently existed between employees at
lower levels of the firm’s hierarchy and were indeed necessary. More careful analysis, however,
shows that the firms in which rigid, top-down authority became the defining feature of the
employment relationship engaged in certain types of production. The paradigmatic example of a
firm characterized by such authority relations is the Taylorist manufacturing firm that
spearheaded assembly-line mass production. In firms that adhered to Frederick Taylor’s
principles, production was entirely restructured by the decomposition of the production process
into isolatable, repetitive motions. Taylor’s science of production conceived of employees as
slightly more complex mechanical instruments, or machines.19 As we further develop in Section
III, Taylorism involved a process of embedding knowledge in the production technology. It is
this type of production, in which employees are treated like replaceable assets, that displays

18
19

CHANDLER, supra note __, at 598.
See FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1916).
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authority relations most resembling those that Coase describes.20 Indeed, the very purpose of
Taylorism was to eliminate the entrepreneur’s reliance on the judgment of his employees
concerning every aspect of the production process, including the movement of their own
bodies.21
Such fiat relations in firm hierarchy, however, hardly obtain in the context of
other types of firm organization. Take, for example, high-tech firms. High-tech firms are
characterized by shared decision making among highly specialized employees, who exercise
considerable control over their work agendas and project development.22 High tech firms depend
on employees exercising significant discretion in their work. And employees could not, and
would not, engage in productive cooperation if their reasoned judgments and their thoughtful
approaches to problem-solving were supplanted regularly by appeals to authority.23 Coase’s fiat
theory, therefore, does not supply a universal account of firm structure, although it may account
for the organization of a particular type of firm – that engaged in the Taylorist organization of
mass production.
Even firms that organized their production according to Taylor’s principles,
however, were only partially characterized by fiat relations of authority. As already described, at
the level of managerial employees such firms depended on expanding the discretion of
non-owners.
As has been pointed out by others, a further shortcoming of Coase’s theory
consists in his too general account of transaction costs.24 Coase fails to sufficiently specify the
nature of the transaction costs that he has in mind. Any variable can thus be invoked as a
determinant of firm boundaries, as long as it is defended as a transaction cost.25 In order to
20

See also Richard Adelstein, Knowledge and Power in the Mechanical Firm: Planning for Profit in Austrian
Perspective (2003) (working paper at __, on file with authors.
21
See Taylor, supra note __, at __.
22
See e.g., Nicolai J. Foss, Coase vs Hayek, 5-6 (Copenhagen Business School, Working Paper No. __, 2001),
available at http://www.cbs.dk/departments/ivs/wp/wp01-08.pdf. (“Overall, a consensus seems to be emerging that
tasks and activities in the knowledge economy need to be coordinated in a manner that is very different from the
management of traditional manufacturing activities, with profound transforming implications for the authority
relation and the internal organization and boundaries of firms” ... “[t]he increased reliance on knowledge networks
tends to erode authority-based definitions of the boundaries of the firm, because authority increasingly shifts to
expert individuals who control crucial information resources …”).
23
In a study of the retention of human capital in acquisitions of high-tech firms, Ranft and Lord find that
granting autonomy and relative status to the management and employees of acquired high tech firm’s enhanced
retention of key employees, but that economic incentives did not. Annette L. Ranft & Michael D. Lord, Acquiring
New Knowledge: The Role of Retaining Human Capital in Acquisitions of High-Tech Firms, 11 THE JOURNAL OF
HIGH TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT RESEARCH 295 (2000). See also Julia Porter Liebeskind, Amalya Lumerman
Oliver, Lynne Zucker, Marilynn Brewer, Social Networks, Learning and Flexibility: Sourcing Scientific Knowledge
in New Biotechnology Firms, 7 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 428, issue 4 (Jul./Aug, 1996) (describing decentralization
of management in biotech firms).
24
Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, supra note__, at 164 (arguing that the lack of specification of
what are transaction costs deprives transaction cost theory from any predictive content).
25
Coase himself has admitted that his theory is too general to provide specific applications. See Coase, The
Theory of the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note __, at 73 (“in that article [The Nature of the Firm] I
emphasized the comparison of the costs of transacting with the cost of organizing and did not investigate the factors
that would make the costs of organizing lower for some firms than for others. This was quite satisfactory if the main
purpose was, as mine was, to explain why there are firms. But if one is to explain the institutional structure of
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explain firm boundaries and organization, however, we must identify the most relevant types of
transaction costs.
Accordingly, we argue that the cost of coordinating knowledge turns out to be a
significant transaction cost that affects firm boundaries and structure. In consequence, we focus
exclusively on such knowledge costs and inquire their effects by holding constant other
transaction costs in our analysis.26
Coase himself had a sense of how crucial knowledge requirements are to firm
organization, even as he failed to explicitly develop this variable in his analysis of firm
boundaries. In explaining why all production is not carried on by one big firm, Coase appears to
have identified the costs of organizing production within a firm, as primarily the result of
bounded rationality27: “It may be,” Coase speculates, “that as the transactions which are
organized increase, the entrepreneur fails to place the factors of production in the uses where
their value is greatest.”28 And “[o]ther things being equal … a firm will tend to be larger …[t]he
less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes and the smaller the increase in mistakes with an
increase in the transactions organized.”29 Coase here appears to suggest that firm size is a
function of the problem solving capabilities of the entrepreneur who directs production and of
the organization’s ability to provide an effective conduit for the entrepreneur’s problem solving,
rather than an impediment to it.
Pursuing this insight further than Coase does himself, we advance the hypothesis
that the knowledge required in the production process imposes limits on firm size, because a
single firm cannot coordinate infinite types of knowledge. Each firm has command of a specific
body of knowledge that it deploys in its production process. For a firm that produces food
products to engage in activities in the pharmaceutical industry would be inefficient as this would
require marshalling entirely different knowledge sets, i.e. those appropriate to developing
chemical products and drugs. That, we suggest, is also the reason why firms tend to expand the
scope of their activities to fields in which the firms’ already accumulated knowledge can afford a
competitive advantage.30 It seems clear from this that even if all other transaction costs that
Coase sets forth were zero, not all production would be carried out exclusively in the market31 or
production in the system as a whole it is necessary to uncover the reasons why the cost of organizing particular
activities differs among firms.”) (emphasis added).
26
This is not to say that opportunism is not an important factor for it can raise many hazards in knowledge
exchanges as we will see.
27
Adelstein, supra note __, at 7.
28
Coase, The Theory of the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note __, at 23.
29
Coase, supra note at __.
30
See Sidney G. Winter, On Coase, Competence and the Corporation in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note
__, at 190-91 (“Of course, when a firm grows by vertical integration, it is not just a question of “more of the same.”
But it is more of something closely related, something about which the firm already has some degree of relevant
knowledge.”)
31
Transaction costs economics tends to argue that if transaction costs are zero, there is no firm as a collective
entity. This is because it is assumed that each individual will act as a firm. However, Demsetz already highlighted
the weakness of that argument. See Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, supra note __ at 163: “the
inference…that all production is individualized if transaction costs is zero, is wrong. Multiperson firms are fully
consistent with zero transaction cost if management is subject to scale economies. Zero transaction cost inform us
only that these cooperating efforts will be organized with greater reliance on explicit negotiations than would be true
if transaction cost were positive.(…). ...the substance of the firm is reflected in the style of cooperative behavior that
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exclusively by one big firm,32 because the cost associated with possessing and coordinating the
relevant knowledge for organizing every type of transaction within the firm would be
prohibitive. No entrepreneur could have enough knowledge to manage every type of production
within a single firm.
Knowledge costs are, therefore, an important determinant of firm boundaries and
must be studied separately. They cannot simply be subsumed within the general concept of
transaction costs advanced by Coase.33
3. Nexus of Contracts and Agency Cost
In A Theory of the Firm, Jensen and Meckling treat the firm as a nexus of
contracts subject to agency costs. The firm is viewed as a “nexus of a set of contracting
relationships . . . mak[ing] clear that the . . . firm is not an individual . . . [but] is a legal fiction
which serves as a focus for a complete process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals
(some of which may ‘represent’ other organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a
framework of contractual relations.”34 Agency costs are those transaction costs of contracting
that result from the irreducible difference of interest between the principal(s) and the agent(s).
Agency costs can be reduced through monitoring (and enforcement) mechanisms.
Monitoring is necessary to limit the agent’s pursuit of his own interest to the detriment of the
principal’s interest. As such, monitoring costs count as agency costs. Similarly, the agent
herself incurs costs that arise solely from the inability of the principal to fully control her agent.
The agent must bond herself in order for the principal to entrust her with her interests. Thus
obtains.” We argue that knowledge gained through the coordination process within the firm will make production
within the firm efficient even if transaction costs were zero.
32
See Coase, supra note
at . (“Why is not all production carried on by one firm?”; see also Demsetz, The
Theory of the Firm Revisited, supra note __ at 173 (arguing that “[t]he process of product …refinement is halted
when the next version of the product will be put to many multiple uses downstream that rely on different bodies of
knowledge. A single firm if it was vertically integrated would have difficulty acquiring and maintaining the stocks
of knowledge necessary to control cost and quality and to make good managerial decisions when downstream uses
are multiple in this sense . . .. Roughly speaking . . . the vertical boundaries of a firm are determined by the
economics of conservation of expenditures on knowledge.”) (emphasis added).
33
We can find more passages where Coase implicitly admits the importance of knowledge for determining firm
organization structure: “Apart from variations in the supply price of factors of production to firms of different sizes,
it would appear that the costs of organizing and the losses through mistakes will increase with an increase in the
spatial distribution of the transactions organized, in the dissimilarity of the transactions, and in the probability of
changes in the relative prices. As more transactions are organized by an entrepreneur, it would appear that the
transactions would tend to be either different in kind or in different places…All changes which improve managerial
technique will tend to increase the size of the firm.” (citations omitted) (25). Coase also realized, footnote 31, that
inventions will not always make the size of the firm bigger. Giving the example of the telephone, Coase argues that
if it reduces the costs of using the market, more than it reduces the cost of organizing production in the firm, then it
will contribute to firms be smaller and not larger. And we believe this conclusion derives directly from a knowledge
economizing strategy. A firm will not need to produce a telephone, if it wants to use one. This would increase the
organization costs of a firm that doesn’t have knowledge or capabilities to produce a telephone to start to producing
it. This cost would be prohibitively high. So the firm can buy the telephone in the market. See also the
correspondence of Coase with Fowler in Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, (“There may be technical
advantages in increasing complexity but it is decreasing returns to managerial ability which seems to set the
limit.”) (emphasis added). In our opinion, therefore, Coase appears to understand the cost of organizing knowledge
as a crucial cost in determining firm’s size.
34
Jensen & Meckling, supra, note __, at 311-12.
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monitoring, bonding, and residual costs are defined as agency costs and are used by Jensen and
Meckling to explain the organization structure of the firm.35
It is important to note that by focusing on agency costs, Jensen and Meckling
actually do not, in fact, explain why firms exist. Instead, they analyze how firms constrain
agency costs, making production within the firm possible, and they explain some aspects of the
financial structure of firms.36, 37 Agency cost is the result of a conflict between the agent’s
self-interest and the will of the principal. The agency cost framework suggests that the greater
the “gap” between the agent and the principal, the greater the agency costs. Greater autonomy
for groups or individuals within an organization, on this logic, results in increased agency costs –
all else being equal. If containing agency costs is viewed as the most important feature of
successful business organization, then the following prescription would appear to follow:
Concentrate decision making authority in the hands of as few agents as possible, who are closely
monitored and directed by the principals.38
Interestingly, recent developments in management strenuously question this
conclusion. Contemporary CEOs and management theorists champion the value of decentralized
decision making. “Traditional industrial corporations concentrated power in top management,”
writes Peter Senge, “yet many of the most successful corporations in recent years have
implemented radical changes in governance systems.”39 These changes attempt to capture the
gains of localism. The core dilemma, according to Senge is “how to gain the advantages of local
autonomy and decision making while increasing the ability to understand and manage
interdependence.”40
Shell Oil, for example, engaged in an abrupt, full-scale shift from centralized to
decentralized governance beginning in 1994. It chose a federalist governance model in which
“power was held as much as possible by independent entities with profit-and-loss
accountability.”41 The separate entities would still have interaction and responsibility to one
35

Jensen & Meckling, supra, note __, at __.
The criticism of C.K. Prahalad & Gary Hamel, The Core Competence of the Corporation, supra note __,
applies. (“How strange that SBU managers, who are perfectly willing to compete for cash in the capital budgeting
process, are unwilling to compete for people – the company most precious asset. We find it ironic that top
management devotes so much attention to the capital budgeting process yet typically has no comparable
mechanism for allocating the human skills that embody core competencies. Top managers are seldom able to look
four or five levels down into the organization, identify the people who embody critical competencies, and move
them across organizational boundaries.”) (emphasis added).
37
In an article not well-known in the corporate law and economics literature, however, Jensen and
Meckling,have recognized the crucial role of collocating relevant knowledge with decision making authority in the
firm. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Specific and General Knowledge, and Organization Structure, in
CONTRACT ECONOMICS 251-274 (Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander eds., 1992) (“Knowledge considerations are one
cause for the emergence of firms.”).
38
This is not necessarily what agency-cost theory posits, but note that this is the logic behind some current
proposals for strengthening shareholder power, that is, let’s contain agency costs by making the principals have
more power in business decisions. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833 (2005).
39
PETER SENGE, THE DANCE OF CHANGE, 361 (
).
40
SENGE, supra note __, at 363.
41
Senge, supra note __, at 385. But see, Shell Structure Has to Change, Investor Says, NEW YORK TIMES,
February 9, 2004 at C3 (reporting that investors called for greater centralization of Shell’s organizational hierarchy).
36
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another and to the center, but they had their own capital structures and internal debt levels, and
could make their own investment decisions. Shell created internal boards of directors for advice
and oversight and for sharing ideas. These boards were linked through interlocking membership.
Further structures were put into place to ensure business alignment and overarching mission. In
this way Shell Oil “pushed decision making, including capital decisions, down to four newly
formed autonomous business units.42
This development does not square well with traditional proposals that rely on
agency-cost theory. How can a firm contain its agency costs by devolving decision making
authority down onto an increasing number of agents with local autonomy? Would this not raise
agency costs? Would opportunism not increase? The most plausible explanation that agency
cost theorists could come up with for whatever success such organizational structures produce
would be a cost-benefit argument. If the benefits of such a decentralized organization outweigh
the resulting agency costs, the outcome will still be desirable. But such an answer begs the
question why decentralization encompasses such benefits.
Agency cost theory does not provide a sufficient theoretical framework to explain
why granting agents greater autonomy is a good idea at all, without a proportional increase in
ratification and monitoring mechanisms.43 Clearly, however, greater dispersion of decision
making authority within firms is a result of the increasing knowledge intensity of productive
activity, forcing companies that want to remain competitive to make use of their human capital at
every level of the company hierarchy. This development away from traditional hierarchical
governance structures by companies like Shell cannot be fully understood without reference to a
knowledge-based theory of the firm.
4. Property Rights Theory
Property Rights Theory explains firm boundaries based on the ownership of
physical assets. A firm “consist[s] of those assets that it owns, or over which it has control.”
Property Rights Theory, therefore, does not distinguish between ownership and control, but
defines ownership as the capacity to exercise control. Control is thus achieved through the
ownership of physical assets.
Property Rights Theory derives its appeal from its elegant mathematical
formalizations that shed light on the firm structure of certain types of firms. For example, Hart
and Grossman’s theory may be most useful in explaining the structure of mass production
systems, and specifically those engaged in Taylorist production. In a Taylorist firm, the physical
42

SENGE, supra note __, at __.
Eugene Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. LAW & ECON. 301, 301-302
(June 1983). In trying to explain the survival of organizations in which agents make important decisions but do not
bear a significant share of the wealth effects of such decisions, Fama and Jensen state: “We contend that separation
of decision and risk-bearing functions survives in these organizations in part because of the benefits of specialization
of management and risk bearing but also because of an effective common approach to controlling agency problems
caused by separation of decision and risk-bearing functions. In particular, our hypothesis is that the contract
structures of all these organizations separate the ratification and monitoring of decisions from initiation and
implementation of the decisions.” Nonetheless, when we nowadays observe the decentralization trend in some
organizations, it is not clear that the process of separation between initiation and ratification occurs at all levels
where important business decisions are taken. In many instances, agents may have enough power so as to initiate,
implement and ratify decisions which will not even reach, for example, the board of directors, which is the organ to
which Fama and Jensen attribute the ratification and monitoring authority.
43
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ownership of machines is very important; but employees are replaceable. But this circumstance
is very particular to a type of production that permits that the knowledge necessary to produce is
embedded in the production process, or rather in the machines themselves.
The theory assumes that ownership gives the owner all rights to dispose of
physical asset that the owner hasn’t given away, or that the government hasn’t taken by force.
However this theory fails to perceive that, as we know from law, ownership does
not necessarily afford legal control to dispose of the property. As property law tells us,
ownership consists of a bundle of rights. For example, I may own an easement on a property.
But suppose that easement was donated to me, with some clause that does not give me the right
to dispose of the property as I wish. If I inherited the easement, it is also not some right that I
have shaped on my own terms. This is clear in corporate law, in that the shareholders own the
corporation, but do not have the legal right to control the everyday business decisions of the
corporation. The average shareholder also never gave away such right! Moreover, even if the
shareholder wanted to retain the right to make everyday decisions, or ask that it be returned to
him, he would not be so entitled under corporations law.44 Ownership, therefore, does not
always provide the right to exercise control.
Hart and Grossman define the firm “as being composed of the assets (e.g.,
machines, inventories) that it owns.”45 Their entire focus is on physical assets. They fail to
recognize that in many situations physical assets cannot be used independently of expertise.
Assume that an entrepreneur owns a chemical laboratory. What is the purpose of owning such a
physical asset without the knowledge required to develop drugs and thereby extract value from
these assets? In the pharmaceutical or chemical industries, one may thus buy lots of physical
assets, but if one does not have the knowledge capabilities to use the assets, one is making an
irrational investment.
In his later work, Hart has argued that the property rights approach can explain
how the purchase of physical assets will lead to control over human assets.46 He has defended
the position that a worker will better pursue the objectives of a principal, if that principal is the
worker’s boss. The reason for this, according to Hart, is that the boss controls the assets the
worker works with. Hart believes the logic underlying his result is different from the Coasian
explanation: Coase thinks a boss can tell a worker what to do, while Hart argues that it is in the
worker’s self-interest to obey his boss, because this will put the worker in a better bargaining
position with his boss later on. “[T]he employer can deprive the employee of the assets he works
with and hire another worker with these assets.”47
44

Hart has admitted that the property rights approach cannot account for the separation of ownership and control
of large publicly held corporations. Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1757, 1173 (1989).
45
Grossman & Hart, supra note __ at 692.
46
Hart, An Economist’s Perspective, supra note __, at 1170-1771.
47
Id. at 1771. See also, Hart & Moore, supra, note __, at __; Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the
Theory of the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note __, 151 (“Authority and residual rights of control are
very close and there is no reason why our analysis of the costs and benefits of allocating residual rights of control
could not be extended to cover human, as well as physical, assets. In fact, residual rights of control over employees
and over physical assets are likely to be related. In particular, an important difference between an employment
contract and a contract between independent parties is that the former allows the employer to retain the use of assets
used by the employee on the event of a separation (he can hire another employee to operate them). In contrast, an
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According to Hart, the control over physical assets can lead to the control of
human assets that are part of an organization’s capital. We believe that this constitutes a serious
shortcoming of the property rights theory. There are many cases where the employees
themselves are the most important assets for firm production. If employees are the most
important assets, as for example in law firms or high tech firms, the physical assets are largely
irrelevant to control. If the employee leaves, he may potentially take with him the main asset
required for the development of a firm’s products or services.48 Hart’s theory is therefore
incomplete, because it can only explain the type of relationship that exists between a boss and his
employees in a Taylorist firm.
B. The Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm
In the previous section we have examined gaps in traditional theories of the firm,
concerning their ability to account for human capital-intensive production. Proponents of the
knowledge-based theory of the firm point out that the literature has unreflectively relied on a
dichotomy between production costs and exchange costs. In analyzing exchange costs the
literature recognizes that exchange itself is not costless, but involves transaction costs from
imperfect information and opportunism. But in analyzing production costs, there has been an
implicit assumption that price theory tells us all we need to know about production.49 However,
it is very likely that knowledge about how to produce and that knowledge about how to link
together one person’s (or organization’s) productive knowledge with that of another are
imperfect.50 These issues of capabilities and coordination are distinct from the hazards of
contracting that traditional theories have focused on. But these costs of production have been,
until recently, largely neglected.
As Demsetz states:
Economic organization, including the firm must reflect the fact
that knowledge is costly to produce, maintain, and use. In all these
respects there are economies to be achieved through specialization.
…. [W]e generally identify industries, and firms in these
industries, as repositories of specialized knowledge and of the
specialized inputs required to put this knowledge to work. Steel
firms specialize in different stocks of knowledge and equipment
than do firms in investment banking or industrial chemicals, and
even firms in then same industry differ somewhat in the knowledge
and equipment upon which they rely.51
Both knowledge resources and production costs can be said to differ depending on
the attributes of a production process, in the same way that transaction costs differ depending on

independent contractor would typically own some of these assets and would be able to decide how they should be
used if the relationship terminates.”).
48
We refer here to situations where there are no intellectual property protections that could bind the knowledge
to the firm.
49
Langlois & Foss, supra note __, at 4.
50
Langlois & Foss, supra note __, at 4.
51
Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, supra note __, at 171-172.
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the asset and exchange attributes of investment projects.52 Thus, instead of holding technology
constant across alternative modes of organization as a useful strategy for explicating, for
example, the influence of transaction costs on the decision to integrate, or on monitoring
structures and control, we suggest holding transaction costs constant as a strategy to assess the
differential impact of production costs on firm organization.
With the rise of the knowledge economy, organizational structures and relations
of production have been undergoing significant changes. There has been an increasing demand
for education and skill since the mid-twentieth century.53 Scholars have been discussing the shift
of economic paradigms from scale-based competition to knowledge-based competition.54
The financial structure of “knowledge companies” can differ dramatically from
the financial structure of more traditional industrial companies. Microsoft and IBM provide an
interesting example. IBM, “the talismanic corporation of the fifties, sixties, and seventies,”55 has
sales more than fifteen times greater than those of Microsoft, and its fixed assets at the beginning
of 1996 (net of depreciation) were $16.6 billion worth of property, plants, and equipment, with a
market capitalization of about $70.7 billion. In contrast, Microsoft’s net fixed assets totaled just
$930 million. But Microsoft’s total capitalization was $85.5 billion, despite its much lower
sales. As Thomas Stewart points out, “an investor who buys Microsoft is clearly not buying
52

See, e.g., Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note __, at
90, 97 (1993); Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, supra note __, at 174. (“Two firms facing the same labor
transaction costs may choose different employment arrangements because the benefits they derive from these
arrangements differ. Particularly important in determining these benefits are knowledge-based considerations.
Continuing association of the same persons makes it easier for firm-specific and person-specific information to be
accumulated (see the large literature on specificity of human capital). Knowledge about the objectives and
organization of the firm is learned “cheaply’ through continuing association, and so is knowledge about the
capabilities and limitations of the persons involved in this association. Continuing association, however, implies
commitment, and commitment has the disadvantage of inflexibility. The benefits to be derived from continuing
association must be set against the cost of inflexibility in determining the best manner in which to acquire the talents
and services of many persons.”) (Emphasis added).
53
Kelvin M. Murphy & Finis Welch, Occupational Change and Demand for Skill, 1940-1990, 83 THE AMER.
ECON. REV. 122, (1993) (arguing there was a huge increase in the demand for skill and education between 1940 and
1990). See also Chinhui Juhn, Kelvin M. Murphy & Brooks Pierce, Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns to
Skill, 101 J. POL. ECON. 410 (1993) (finding a consistent increase in wage inequality favoring the most skilled
workers).
54

Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., & Takashi Hikino, The large industrial enterprise and the dynamics of modern
economic growth, in ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., FRANCO AMATORI & TAKASHI HIKINO, BIG BUSINESS AND THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 33 (1977). We don’t provide an exhaustive bibliography of scholarly work that has addressed
the special features of the knowledge economy, but some of the important references include: FRITZ MACHLUP,
KNOWLEDGE, ITS CREATION, DISTRIBUTION, AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE __ (1980); THOMAS STEWART,
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL __ (____); Joseph Stiglitz, Public Policy for a Knowledge Economy, World Bank, January
1999 at 1 ( “the movement to a knowledge economy necessitates a rethinking of economic fundamentals.”); PETER
F. DRUCKER, POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 39 (____) (“far too few people realize that the application of knowledge to
work created developed economies by setting off the productivity explosion of the last hundred years.
Technologists give the credit to machines, economists to capital investment. Yet both were as plentiful in the first
hundred years of the capitalist age, before 1880, as they have been since. With respect to technology or to capital,
the second hundred years differed very little from the first one hundred. But there was absolutely no increase in
worker productivity during the first hundred years – and consequently very little increase in worker’s real incomes
or any decrease in their working hours. What made the second hundred years so critically different can only be
explained as the result of applying knowledge to work.”); THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Dale Neef ed., 1998).
55
STEWART, supra note __, at __.
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assets in any traditional sense. For that matter, he is not purchasing much in the way of assets if
he buys IBM or Merck or General Electric. A dollar invested in a corporation buys something
different from the same dollar invested in the same corporation a few years ago.”56 In other
words, in many industries ownership of physical assets has become less and less important while
the significance of human resources has increased tremendously. This predominance of
“intangible assets” in a firm’s market value calls for a revision on traditional theories of the
firm.57
Production in a competitive economy requires different use of knowledge
resources. Knowledge resources are both purchased on the market and produced by the firm.
The particular nature of knowledge resources presents unique characteristics that provide
powerful reasons for differentially structured firm production. The way a firm develops the
knowledge it will use in its production process and the extent that the firm can bind this
knowledge to its structure will influence its organizational structure.
The theory we advance distinguishes between three basic knowledge inputs.
Based on different forms of knowledge applied in the production process, we can offer a more
complete explanation and fulfill the gaps left by the traditional theories described above. As we
will explain in the next part, knowledge can be embedded in 1) physical assets such as machines,
2) in the organization itself, and 3) in individuals. When knowledge is embedded in physical
assets, our explanation has many similarities with Coase’s and Hart’s account of the Taylorist
firm described. Where physical assets are important for firm production, the control of physical
assets can lead to control of human assets, at least to some extent, because the knowledge
necessary to the production process is embedded in the physical assets. Therefore, both Coase’s
fiat notion and Hart’s physical asset control explain a part of the story. However, when
knowledge is embedded in individuals, as it happens in law firms and high tech firms, a boss
cannot “control” in the traditional terms an employee even if he is the owner of the physical
assets, for these assets will not be the determinant assets for firm production. The type of
knowledge important to the production process explain important features of law firms
organizational structure and why high tech employees have much more discretion over the
production process when compared to their mass production employees counterparts. In these
knowledge intensive settings, both Coase’s and Hart’s theory do not make much sense. So, we
argue that the particular type of knowledge applied in the productive process (being it Kp, Ko, or
Ki) will shape firm governance and organization, as we further develop in the next section.

56

STEWART, supra note __, at 33.
Human capital is now widely regarded as a significant factor in developing and nourishing a firm’s productive
knowledge. In the organizational management literature, an increasing emphasis is placed on knowledge
production. Books on “the learning organization,” “intellectual capital,” “human capital” and “knowledge
management” abound. Firms are considered repositories of productive capabilities. Langlois and Foss’ interpret the
capabilities perspective “as reaching for a distinct theory of economic organization, one that is based on a
conceptualization of the firm as a repository of productive knowledge with certain non-standard characteristics, . . .
.In this story, incentive issues are suppressed in favor of a focus on problems of coordinating knowledge and
expectations.” Richard Langlois & Nicolai Foss, Capabilities and Governance; the Rebirth of Production in Theory
of Economic Organization ____, available at www.isnie.org/ISNIE98/Langlois-Foss.doc.
57
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III. A KNOWLEDGE TAXONOMY

A. The Location of Productive Knowledge (Kp, Ko, Ki)
Firms depend on knowledge resources.58 Knowledge formation within the firm is
crucial to production in competitive markets. Firms that compete in mass production, however,
have different knowledge requirements than firms that compete in high-technology fields.59 In
order to analyze how knowledge requirements affect firm structure, we distinguish between
different forms that knowledge resources take. We use a typology that distinguishes three types
of knowledge structures.
We use the term KP to designate knowledge embedded in physical assets, such as
machines or products. Taylorist production provides perhaps the best example of this type of
knowledge structure. In assembly-line production, the knowledge required in the production
process is embedded in machines. Assembly-line workers are largely “de-skilled.” The
employee is easily replaceable in this sort of production. The machine is the principal asset that
makes production feasible and embodies the knowledge required in the production process.
Products also embody knowledge, allowing consumers to extract knowledge benefits without
themselves having to master the knowledge. For example, most anyone can operate a computer
through software that performs highly complex and/or labor-intensive procedures without
knowing all the stages necessary to produce either the tool or the specific output the tool
supplies.60 In other words, products and machines embody useful knowledge that performs key
functions in any production process.
Such products of machines are vehicles of
“knowledge-substitution” in that they permit the application of knowledge embedded in the
machine (including the knowledge necessary to build the machine), by the mere use of the
58

We distinguish between information and knowledge. Knowledge that is transferable readily and almost
without cost is information. Knowledge is the processing and understanding and processing information to some
means. Information can be processed into some input. This is what knowledge does. The mere knowledge of facts
is likely to be information. The data we currently find in our days is mostly information. But this information can be
processed and become knowledge of an individual.
59
J. Rogers Hollingsworth, Continuities and Changes in Social systems of Production: The Cases of Japan,
Germany, and the United States in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 265, 268
(1998) (arguing that “firms that successfully employed a mass production strategy had to engage in a particular form
of industrial relations, use specific types of machinery, and relate in particular ways to other firms in the
manufacturing process”); Harold Demsetz, Comments on Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Specific and
General Knowledge, and Organization Structure, in CONTRACT ECONOMICS, supra note__, at 276, (advancing that
different types of firms rely on different types of knowledge “because their activities are so dissimilar,
biotechnology firms, steel firms, and retail establishments, by design, inventory different stocks of knowledge.
Generally, these stocks are “housed” in the people employed. These firms locate control within their organizations
in ways that are appropriate to these different distributions of knowledge.”) See also, CHANDLER, SCALE AND
SCOPE 45 (____) (arguing that the rise of the multidivisional modern industrial enterprise was limited to “those
industries where technologies of production had the potential for extensive economies of scale and scope and where
product-specific marketing organizations provided further competitive advantages).
60
See Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, supra note __, at 173 (“Because it is uneconomical to educate
persons in one industry in the detailed used in another, recourse is had to developing or encapsulating this
knowledge into products or services that can be transferred between firms cheaply because the instructions needed
to use them do not require in-depth knowledge about how they are produced…The economical use of industrial
chemicals by steel firms does not generally require knowledge of how these chemicals are produced; similarly, the
use of steel by industrial chemical firms does not require transfer of knowledge of how the steel is produced. A
production process reaches the stage of yielding a saleable product when downstream users can work with, or can
consume, the “product” without themselves being knowledgeable about its production.”).
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machine. An employee performing routine work typically relies heavily on knowledge
embedded in machines and other products in performing her work. In many instances, her
technical expertise may be crude and limited to the ability to operate the machine. We call this
knowledge embedded in machines and other products KP.
We term KO knowledge embedded in the organizational structure, in the group of
individuals that constitute the firm.61 It comprises the habits, practices and routines of a firm’s
organizational structure and organizational culture.62 Generally this asset is transferable only by
selling the firm or a part of it.63 The knowledge, in this case, is embedded in a “production
team,” that can operate and be maintained in the absence of the owner or any one specific
member.64 Individual employees are replaceable because knowledge resources are dispersed
across many different co-workers and individuals. In contrast, KO is collective knowledge
created through, and residing in, patterns of interaction among individuals within the
organization.65
We term KI knowledge embedded in the individual. The skills of a craftsperson,
an artist, or a professional athlete are paradigmatic examples of such knowledge.66 Knowledge
of this sort cannot be transferred costlessly from one person to another.67 And often the cost of
61

Nelson and Winter identified this knowledge location in their evolutionary model of economic institutions.
RICHARD NELSON & SIDNEY WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982).
62
Sherwin Rosen, similarly, refers to such knowledge as knowledge vested “in the firm.” Sherwin Rosen,
Learning by Experience as Joint Production, 86 Quarterly J. Econ. 366, 367 (1972). See also, Ranft & Lord, supra
note __, at 298 (discussing the acquisition of knowledge sets that are “embedded in relationships among individuals,
or in a firm’s more general social and organizational fabric, rather than in any particular person.”).
63
There is, of course, an overlap between knowledge embedded in the individual employee and knowledge
embedded in the organizational and organizational structure. See Ranft & Lord, supra note __, at 298 (“Critical
organizational competencies are often embedded in relationships among individuals, or in a firm’s more general
social an organizational fabric, rather than in any particular person. A significant portion of a firm’s knowledge may
be located in the formal and informal networks of relationships within the organization and even across
organizational boundaries. In other words, a firm’s valuable knowledge-based resources may reside not only in
particular individuals, but also in socially complex relationships among different individuals and organizational
subunits. Socially complex knowledge ‘resides primarily in specialized relationships among individuals and groups
and in the particular norms, attitudes, information flows, and ways of making decisions that shape their dealings
with each other’. In the case of socially complex knowledge, no single person has the full set of skills and
capabilities required to create a commercially viable product or service. This social complexity makes knowledge
difficult to manage because critical interrelationships can be easily disturbed, such as when key individuals or teams
leave the firm. Consequently, retention of key employees is not only a critical issue for retaining individual
knowledge, but also for preserving valuable types of knowledge that are socially complex.”) But increasingly firms
that acquire certain productive capabilities have also served as vendors of their own know-how. STEWART, supra
note __, __.
64
Id. In the corporate law literature, from a somewhat different perspective. Margareth Blair and Lynn A. Stout
have contributed to the development of this idea. See, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VIRGINIA L.
REV. 247 (1999).
65
An actual problem of mergers and acquisitions is maintaining Ko, that it, the production team responsible for
knowledge development in the organization ex post. See Ranft & Lord, supra note __ at __. We assume for reasons
of simplification that collective action costs are high and employees cannot organize themselves to leave the firm in
a group, which will conserve Ko in the firm even if a certain amount of turnover exists.
66
Individuals accumulate such knowledge “of the particular circumstances of time and place” through personal
experience in the Hayekian sense.
67
Sherwin Rosen, Learning by Experience as Joint Production, 86 Quarterly J. Econ. 366, 367 (1972). Rosen,
for example, refers to knowledge completely vested in the owners (or managers) of the firm. Knowledge has to do in
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knowledge transfer between persons is very high because the relevant knowledge is based on
experience and is tacit.68 Where knowledge is tacit, relocating individuals to the site where such
learning takes place may be necessary to achieve knowledge transfer. KI is defined as
specialized knowledge. Its loss has a measurable effect on firm structure.69 Knowledge that has
been formalized, standardized and is thus easily transferable generally does not qualify as KI.
But the capacity of an individual to assimilate such specialized knowledge due to formal or other
education is considered KI.
Note that the bright line categories we have created here are fluid and can blur in
reality. Knowledge of the KO and KI types is most likely to overlap. This occurs, for example,
where the knowledge possessed by one individual is also possessed by other individuals that
comprise the organization. In this situation, KI will be similar to or overlap with KO to a
considerable extent. One important difference between KI and KO is the length of the
horizon/time required for rational decision making. KI implies a finite horizon, as the capital
will vanish when the owner of the knowledge departs (retires, or passes away). KO implies an
infinite horizon, since the knowledge can be preserved within the structure of the firm and
transferred with the firm.70 Note also that these variables are interdependent to some extent. Ko
may depend on Kp, for certain routines arise in order to manage certain machines and products.
KO is not readily transferable from firm to firm. Routines that work in some environments may
not work in other environments. Furthermore, KI may vary depending on different experiences
that individual have with the same products or machines. This will be further developed in the
next section.

this case with pure “entrepreneurship”. The asset is not salable, though the owners may rent the services of their
knowledge to the firm and elsewhere. This is what we mean by Ki, the knowledge is embedded in the individual,
whether she be the owner of the firm, a manager or an employee.
68
See POLIANYI, supra note _.
69
As Ron Gilson points out in his discussion of interfirm knowledge spillovers in the high tech industry, “[t]acit
information associated with an employer’s technology is embedded in the human capital of its employees. When an
employee changes jobs, that tacit information is available to the new employer.” Gilson, supra note __, at 585. See
also, id. at 595 (“This [tacit] element of the employer’s intellectual property is embedded in the employee’s human
capital, and can be most effectively transferred through proximity and, in particular, by an employee changing
jobs.”).
70
Rosen, supra note__, at 368.
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Below we present a table that systematizes these concepts.
TABLE __: KNOWLEDGE TYPES

General
Description

Examples

KNOWLEDGE TYPE
KP
KO
Knowledge Embedded
Knowledge Embedded In
In Machines And
A Firm’s Organizational
Products.
Structure (Not Codified)
• Codified Production
Technology
• Machinery
• Products
• Legal Opinions

Structuring Of
Decision-Making
Processes.
• Coordination And
Division Of Work
• Knowledge
Management Practices
• Monitoring Structures
• Quality Control
Procedures
•

KI
Specialized, Technical,
Particular Knowledge
And Skills Embedded In
Individuals
• Scientific Training
• Professional Training
• Craft And Skill
• Acquaintance With
Professional Networks
• Personal Experience
• Knowledge Concerning
A Firm’s Customers,
Clients, Or Markets.

Source: authors’ elaboration

B. Tacit versus Standardized Knowledge
In the development of our taxonomy, and throughout this paper, we make
reference to a crucial dimension of knowledge or competence assets: the degree to which
knowledge can be articulated, codified or standardized on the one hand, and the degree to which
it is tacit or uncodifiable, unstandardizable and unarticulable on the other hand. The distinction
has been put in different ways. Some have spoken of the difference between knowing-that and
knowing how. A prime example of tacit knowledge is an individual skill, such as a local pilots
ability to safely bring a ship into the harbor and to its berth. “What the pilot knows are local
tides and currents along the coast and estuaries, the unique features of local wind and wave
patterns, shifting sandbars, unmarked reefs, seasonal changes in microcurrents, local traffic
conditions, the daily vagaries of wind patterns off headlands and along straits, how to pilot in
these waters at night, not to mention how to bring many different ships safely to berth under
variable conditions.”71 This know-how supercedes the general rules of navigation, cannot be
codified or standardized, but depends upon sense and long experience working within a
particular local context.
The point for our purposes is that individual knowledge, or Ki, is often highly
tacit in the sense that “the aim of a skillful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of

71

JAMES SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE __ (1998).

Doc #:NY7:262178.1

24

KNOWLEDGE INPUTS, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FIRM STRUCTURE

rules which are not known as such to the person following them.”72 While all knowledge
(including perhaps the most formal knowledge) originated with tacit knowledge (witness
Pythagoras’ contemplation of geometric figures drawn in the sand) some types of knowledge
remain hard, or even impossible to articulate or codify. As Polanyi has said: “we can know
more than we can tell.”73 Such inherently tacit knowledge is hard to transfer. A person with
tacit knowledge will not be able to provide a useful explanation of the rules that he is applying in
the pursuit of his skillful activity.74
Once knowledge is codified, standardized and rendered explicit, however, it is no
longer embedded in the individual, but “can be communicated from its possessor to another
person in symbolic form, and the recipient of the communication becomes as much ‘in the know’
as the originator.”75 Such knowledge may take the form of manuals, blueprints, books, etc, that
permit the ready dissemination of knowledge. Knowledge embedded in products, Kp,
necessarily has to have been standardized and rendered explicit at some point before it was
creatively deployed in a product.
Because codified and standardized knowledge is readily communicable, it is also
much more susceptible to the public goods problems and the related opportunism that we discuss
in Part V of this paper, which, without certain external protections, may render market
transactions of this sort of knowledge more costly.
While tacit knowledge is hard to transfer and is thus less susceptible to
opportunism, this does not necessarily render market transactions of tacit knowledge less
complicated or costly. The very difficulty of describing tacit knowledge raises special
difficulties. Tacit knowledge may not be readily transferred through an exchange, but may
require context-specific learning. The non-communicable character of tacit knowledge76
suggests it is best obtained by integrating individuals, who possess it, into a firm’s production
process as employees, rather than seeking to acquire such knowledge inputs through market
transactions. The production of knowledge resources may require extensive communication and

72

M. POLYANI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 49 (1962) cited by Sidney Winder, Knowledge and Competence as
Strategic Assets, in __________________, 170-171.
73
MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 4 (1966).
74
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 21-22
(1975) (“Language limits refer to the inability of individuals to articulate their knowledge or feelings by use of
words, numbers, or graphics in ways which permit them to be understood by others. Despite their best efforts,
parties may find that language fails them (possibly because they do not possess the requisite vocabulary or the
necessary vocabulary has not been devised), and they resort to other means of communication instead.
Demonstrations, learning by doing, and the like may be the only means of achieving understanding when such
language difficulties develop.”).
75
Winter, supra note ___, at 170-171.
76
See Richard R. Nelson, Production Sets, Technological Knowledge, and R & D: Fragile and Overworked
Constructs for Analysis of Productivity Growth?, 70 The American Economic Review 62, 65 (1980) (“What if
whatever it is that permits a firm to operate a technique in a particular way and with particular outcomes is only in
small part describable in a blueprint, or teachable by example, or purchasable in the form of a machine? Then the
fact that firm A can operate a particular technique with a particular outcome does not mean that firm B or firm C
can, even if firm A helps out their learning in every way it can. The presence of particular and rather special
personal talents, or important organizational features, signals that codified aspects of technique may only be a part of
the story.”)
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exchange of ideas and personal experience,77 and therefore we suggest that tacit knowledge can
be better shared in the structure of a firm, as opposed to the market. We develop these ideas
further below.
C. The Dynamics of Productive Knowledge
The typology of knowledge structures given so far presents a static picture.
Knowledge structures, however, change over time and we must, accordingly, incorporate such
dynamics into our analysis.
Such transformations will depend, among other things, on the standardization
process that knowledge deployed by organizations and individuals typically undergoes.78
Standardization is the process through which tacit knowledge is made explicit, formalized, and
then codified or instantiated in physical processes and products.79 For example, standardization
takes places, where knowledge previously embedded in an individual (Ki) is formalized,
reconfigured, and embedded in a newly created machine or product (Kp). In the mature stage of
the industry life cycle, “most of the technical aspects of the product have become standardized,
and the nature of demand is well known.”80 The focus of the industry becomes standardized
production.81 In such circumstances, tacit knowledge becomes relatively less important to the
production process and in the organization of the firm.
proximity,

82

77

The transmission of tacit knowledge both within and between firms benefits from
while explicit or codified knowledge renders the cost of transmitting information

Kenneth J. Arrow, Classificatory notes on the production and transmission of technological knowledge.
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, vol 59, issue 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-first Annual Meeting of the
American Economic Association (May 1969), 29-35. See C.K. Prahalad & Gary Hamel, supra note __, attributing
significant importance to communication in their concept of “core competence” (“Core competencies are the
collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple
streams of technologies....Core competence is communication, involvement, and a deep commitment to working
across organizational boundaries. It involves many levels of people and all functions.... The skills that together
constitute core competence must coalesce around individuals whose efforts are not so narrowly focused that they
cannot recognize the opportunities for blending their functional expertise with those of others in new and interesting
ways”).
78
See, e.g., Robin Cowan & Dominique Foray, The Economics of Codification and the Diffusion of Knowledge,
6 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 595, 604-05 (1997) (discussing the process of codification of tacit knowledge). But see
MARYANN P. FELDMAN, THE GEOGRAPHY OF INNOVATION 53 (1994) (“Some aspects of knowledge have a tacit
nature and cannot be completely codified and transferred through blueprints and instructions.”).
79
For one attempt to theorize knowledge creation dynamics in firms, see Ikujiro Nonaka, et al., Managing and
Measuring Knowledge in Organizations: Three Tales of Knowledge Creating Companies, in KNOWING IN FIRMS
(Georg von Krogh, et al, eds. 1998) 146, and Ikujiro Nonaka & Hirotaka Takeuchi, A Theory of the Firm’s
Knowledge-Creation Dynamics, in CHANDLER, ET AL., EDS., THE DYNAMIC FIRM 214 (____). Nonaka et al. focus
on the effects of organizational structure on knowledge creation and try to understand the constraints (and
opportunities) that the dynamics of knowledge creation represent for structuring organizations. Their focus is thus
somewhat different from ours. They also do not isolate standardization as a distinct process, preferring instead to
talk about “externalization” (from tacit to explicit) and “combination” (from explicit to explicit), and, more
generally, a “knowledge spiral.” Id., at 220-224.
80
David B. Audretsch & Maryann P. Feldman, Innovative Clusters and the Industry Life Cycle, 11 REV. INDUS.
ORG. 253, 259 (1996).
81
Gilson, supra note __, at 585.
82
See Nelson & Winter, supra note __, at 76-82, 115-116 (describing tacit nature of skills).
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over geographic space trivial.83 One result of codification and standardization of knowledge in
products (Kp), for example, is that constraints on the production and distribution of products
across large geographical areas (and internationally) are thus significantly reduced, enabling
reproduction of this knowledge on a much greater scale.
The reverse transformation may also occur. The creation of a new machine or
product, such as a software, may educate the worker/user, slowly weaning her from reliance on
help screens, aids and by-the-book routines to a more efficient and sophisticated deployment of
the tool’s core functions by means of user-defined short-cuts and creative applications.
Employees may develop routines to operate the machine in a way that avoids depreciation and
affords it a longer life cycle. Kp can thus give rise to Ki, and probably to Ko, as this knowledge
is spread from a single employee to others within the firm through the refinement of the firm’s
organizational routines.
In addition, engagement with physical assets will yield entirely new knowledge in
the form of Ki that was not initially contemplated by the creator of the machine or embedded in
the product. Such a transformation occurs where, by observing how the machine operates, an
employee conceives of new ideas for the creation of a different type of machine or process.84 In
other words, the employee develops ideas for new technologies, which, at this stage, will still be
tacit and thus knowledge embedded in this particular employee. Hence Kp gives rise to Ki.
In the following, we discuss the possible types of knowledge transformation.
1. Ki Can Be Transformed Into Ko
A routine or a process developed by an individual or small team can spread to the
entire organization and beyond, if others find this knowledge useful. An example in this case is
the Japanese system of “just in time”. Because of its efficiency, this process was soon
transmitted to other organizations and became embedded in the structure of organizations.85
2. Ko Can Give Rise To Ki
A new employee will come into contact with organizational knowledge which is
dispersed in the firm structure. She will have formal and informal orientation sessions, learn
organizational routines and receive specialized training in the use of communication technology
and the division of work. As she begins to share work experiences in the firm, this employee
will assimilate a lot of organizational knowledge which will become Ki, knowledge embedded in
83

Robin Cowan & Dominique Foray, The Economics of Codification and the Diffusion of Knowledge, 6 INDUS.
& CORP. CHANGE 595, 604-05 (1997).
84
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., & Takashi Hikino, The large industrial enterprise and the dynamics of modern
economic growth, in ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., FRANCO AMATORI & TAKASHI HIKINO, BIG BUSINESS AND THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 33 (1977) (“Just as the capabilities that were learned by exploiting the physical economies of
scale led to capital augmentation through improvement of processes and products, so the organizational skills
developed in pursuing joint production at the manufacturing establishment level led not only to improvement in
existing processes and products but also to the systematic commercialization of new processes and products. This is
particularly true in industries in which joint production rested on the systematic exploitation of chemistry, biology or
physics.”
85
Going further, the technique of just in time is now codified in management books, being transmuted into a
“product” with the characterizes of Kp. However, the specific way in which a firm applies this technique may
change a little bit from firm to firm, which still characterizes a type of Ko.
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the individual. She may even leave the organization and start up a business based on similar
organizational routines and processes and thus take this knowledge with her.
3. Ki Can Be Transformed Into Kp
As knowledge becomes formalized and standardized it becomes embedded in
physical objects. An idea for a tool is thus developed into a machine. In this case, the knowledge
that was embedded in the individual becomes embedded in the machine. This process of
embedding knowledge in the machine has important consequences: the other actors that
subsequently operate the machine do not need to know how the machine was conceived and
developed. They will merely need a specialized technical knowledge of how to operate it. The
result is that less educated employees are able to operate the machine in order to produce the
final product envisaged by perhaps yet a different inventor, without having to acquire the
knowledge sets of the machine’s inventor or that of the product developer. This knowledge
embedding process, therefore, effects a knowledge-substitution; it is therefore a highly
economizing process that permits the use of a highly complex knowledge sets by others who do
not possess them.
4. Kp Can Give Rise To Ki
Use of a product or a machine in the production process will give rise to large and
small improvements on the equipment itself. New and different applications for the technology
will be devised. Problems posed by the new product spur the development of knowledge to
improve it. Thus, Kp gives rise to Ki.
5. Kp Can Give Rise To Ko
The classical example here are the routines that were developed by Ford in order
to operate an efficient assembly line. A highly specialized organizational knowledge specific to
the production of cars was developed on how to operate many machines and tools efficiently.
This organizational knowledge is shaped by the characteristics of each machine and other
physical assets required to operate the assembly line. In this example, Kp thus gives rise to
routines and other organizational knowledge Ko.
6. Ko Can Be Transformed Into Kp
Imagine that the team operating the assembly line realizes that they can save time
by developing a specific tool to aid in their work. The tool will be a form of Kp that originated
from knowledge of the organizational routines of this assembly line, that is, from Ko. Moreover,
the development of the new tool presupposes knowledge of these particular organizational
routines.
7. Summary
The processes described give us a rough idea of how different types of knowledge
can transform over time. They provide a stylized picture of how firms can change together with
the nature of the knowledge they develop and deploy over time.86 A typical mass production
86

For discussions of the coevolution of technology and institutions, see also, RICHARD NELSON, THE SOURCES
100-119 (1996).

OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
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firm (mainly based on Kp) might engage in more knowledge intensive activities as the operation
of its machinery spurs research and development in order to maintain or improve its production
process.87 The level of Ki in the firm will thus rise. A high-tech firm (mainly based on Ki)
might develop a product and then engage in its mass production (mainly based on Kp) thus
eventually decreasing its reliance on Ki.88 Our thesis contends that in both situations the change
in the degree to which a firm relies on a certain type of knowledge (increased Ki in the first
example and increased Kp in the second example) will give rise to a change in the organizational
structure of the firm.
IV. LAW AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
The variables discussed so far reflect where the knowledge is embodied. We now
turn to the problem of how firms appropriate knowledge.
The easiest way to bind knowledge to the firm is structurally, by restricting access
to valuable knowledge to all but a handful of insiders who run the firm. This is one of the
benefits of family owned businesses.89 In its early years (just after 1800), the DuPont company,
for example, guarded most of the economically valuable knowledge about the chemistry and
manufacture of gun power by restricting it to DuPont family members and their close
associates:90 “The DuPonts managed the company and supervised its research throughout the
nineteenth century. Thus, the company’s approach to employee intellectual property depended
on close family control supported by informal sanctions and self-help.”91
Geographically isolating the firm provides another structural means to restricting
the unwanted dissemination of knowledge. Thus, DuPont’s Brandywine mills, for example,
were located in a remote and self-contained enclave along the banks of the river, which along
with power and water, supplied security from unwanted visitors.92
Companies still jealously guard their business methods and other secrets by
restricting access to information through a variety of structural means. But the drawbacks of the
above-described structural approaches are evident. Restricting access to business knowledge to
but a few members in the firm seriously restricts the potential improvements and innovations and
therefore the competitiveness and growth potential of the organization. Relevant knowledge is
centralized at the highest levels of the organizational hierarchy, leaving little room for
decentralized decision-making. Thus, learning and joint knowledge production among
employees at lower levels of the organizational hierarchy is diminished and the benefits of
knowledge sharing are decreased. Similarly, isolating the company geographically is often
undesirable. Economists have long recognized the importance of regional clusters for economic
and technological development.93 Regional agglomeration of firms can result in significant
87

See, e.g., CHANDLER, supra note ___, at __.
See, e.g., our discussion of IBM, infra, supra notes ___ & accompanying text.
89
Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trading Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise
of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L. J. 441, 442-443 (2001), at 469.
90
Id., at 468-69
91
Fisk, supra note 89, at 489.
92
Id., at 470.
93
See Michael J. Enright, Regional Clusters and Firm Strategy in Peter Hagstr[m & Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.,
Perspectives on Firm Dynamics, in THE DYNAMIC FIRM 2 (Hagstrom & Chandler, Eds. 1998), 315, 331 (“Spillover
88
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positive externalities, including knowledge spillover, causing input costs to decline. Thus
securing a firm’s knowledge from competitors by isolating its employees is likely to be a poor
strategic decision.
Powerful, alternative solutions for appropriating knowledge are provided by law
and contract.
Legal rules and contractual arrangements regulate knowledge appropriation
directly and/or indirectly and thereby affect firm structure by enabling, complicating or thwarting
the efficient allocation of knowledge resources. One obvious way in which law affects corporate
organization is by binding knowledge to the firm, thereby enabling the dispersion and transfer of
knowledge within the firm, while preventing, or at least containing, the threat of transferring
knowledge assets outside the firm to competitors.94
Knowledge can be protected by intellectual property rules (encompassing patents,
trade secrets, copyrights) but also by private contracts that are specifically designed to protect
firms’ knowledge assets, such as non- compete agreements, or confidentially agreements.
Protection of knowledge assets through such law or contract, however, is imperfect. As we will
see, intellectual property rules do not protect all types of knowledge. In addition, the protections
of knowledge rights are connected to the level of enforcement of intellectual property rights rules
and contracts. We argue that the nature of the legal protection afforded will cause firms to
develop specific governance structures and mechanisms to cope with the special hazards that
knowledge resources pose.
1. Law and Contract as Mechanisms of Knowledge Management
In the following we reinterpret the existing legal framework and show that its
development has affected the knowledge structure and thereby the organizational structure of
firms. Several bodies of law, which are generally not considered in the corporate organization
debates, have important consequences for corporate structure. For instance, the influence of
intellectual property laws and covenants not compete on firm structure has been implicitly taken
for granted by current corporate law literature. As we shall see, intellectual property law helps
firms address the problems of unwanted knowledge transfers that arise with the increased
diffusion of knowledge within the firm and also between firms. The connection between the
increasing importance of human capital and the expansion of intellectual property law has
become the object of increased attention.95 But the effect of such regulation on firm
organization, while it has begun to be recognized,96 has not been considered systematically.
of innovation from firm to firm is likely to be greater in regional clusters than among dispersed firms . . . . Local
suppliers, buyers, family members, friends and acquaintances can all become sources of industry and companyspecific information.”); Ronald Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 575 (1999), at 580-81 (arguing that “[k]nowledge as an input is subject to increasing returns as a result of
geographic proximity” in certain types of Marshallian agglomeration economies).
94
Binding knowledge is crucial, for otherwise firms would not invest in generation of new products nor in
training of employees. The capacity to bind knowledge to the firm is key to competitiveness, especially in a
knowledge intensive environment.
95
See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes of the Ownership of Human Capital in the
Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002) (Arguing that disputes over human capital have increased and
that courts should attend to the new “implicit contract” between knowledge workers and their employers when they
enforce intellectual property rights). Stephen L. Sheinfeld & Jennifer M. Chow, Employees’ duties and Liabilities:
Protecting Employer Confidences, 582 PLI/Lit 347 (1998) (detailing the “rapidly evolving” law of intellectual
property and the “veritable explosion in non-competition and trade secrets disputes in the employment area”);
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2. The Co-Evolution Of Intellectual Property Rules And Firm Governance

Intellectual property laws do not at first appear to be connected with firm
structure. Patent and copyright protections were already written into the U.S. Constitution at a
time when modern firms and corporations did not exist.97 Individuals can hold patents and
copyrights just as firms can. Patent and copyright laws address the public goods problems of
knowledge resources faced by all who would market such resources. These protections permit
the conversion of ideas or techniques or other intangible intellectual products into marketable
goods.
Patent and copyright rules, however, become more relevant to firm structure when
the law or contract specifies who holds ownership rights to economically valuable knowledge
gained at work – the firm or the employee. It is increasingly recognized that the tremendous
economic development experienced during the late 19th and early 20th Centuries was very much
fueled by technological development,98 and that the rise of modern corporations played a crucial
role in technological development.99 Intellectual property, conceived in its broadest sense,
accomplishes one of the most important tasks required to permit the effective use of knowledge.
It binds knowledge to its proper owner (presumably owners are those who have invested in
knowledge production or its purchase). Now consider the typology developed in Section III
above. The different types of knowledge, Kp, Ko, Ki, raise different kinds of challenges for
rules that would bind knowledge to its proper owner. Legal personality gave corporations the
ability to own intellectual property. And legal doctrine increasingly evolved to favor corporate
ownership of property over ownership by the employee. 100

William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in High Technology Industries,
17 LAB. LAW. 25 (2001) (examining the legal implications of accelerated job hopping by employees in the high tech
sector).
96
Gilson, supra note __, at __.
97
Such protections were seen as the hallmark of individualism. See, e.g., Lincoln’s pronouncement that “In
anciently inhabited countries, the dust of ages -- a real downright old-fogyism -- seems to settle upon, and smother
the intellects and energies of man.” But America had broken the “shackles” of the “slavery of mind” and had
established “a habit of freedom of thought” that was necessary to the “discovery and production of new and useful
things.” The patent law nourished this habit of free thought by allowing the ingenious to profit; it added “the fuel of
interest to the fire of genius.” Abraham Lincoln, Second Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (Feb 11, 1859), in
Roy P. Basler, ed, 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 356, 363 (Rutgers 1953).
98
See generally, RICHARD NELSON, THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1996) 100-119, supra note 86, at __;
HAGSTROM & CHANDLER, [NEED FULL CITE].
99
See, e.g., Chandler & Hikino, supra note __, at 26.
100
See Fisk, supra note __, at __ (“A foundation of the modern law of intellectual property is that firms own
some of the ideas that exist in the minds of their employees. Ownership of employee knowledge is a legal construct
that is now an accepted part of our culture and economy. Today’s practices and doctrines developed in the context
of radical changes in the American law and workplace culture, which were brought about by the nineteenth-century
industrial revolutions. The conflict between employee freedom and corporate control of intellectual property
sharpened as courts realized the importance of knowledge to economic development and began to recognize
workplace knowledge as an asset of the firm rather than an attribute of the employee. The invention of the trade
secret doctrine in the mid-nineteenth century enabled employers to enjoin revelation of secret information by current
or former employees. At the same time, courts expanded the permissible uses of post-employment covenants not to
compete so as to prevent dissemination of knowledge. Together, these doctrinal developments created a new
obligation – sometimes articulated as an express or implied contract, and sometimes expressed as a ‘duty of trust and
confidence’ – not to use knowledge acquired on the job elsewhere.”
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In the area of patent and copyright ownership the early nineteenth century rule
was that employees usually owned the entire right to their inventions.101 The rule evolved into
the later nineteenth century rule that employees owned their inventions but employers often had
a license to use them.102 This arrangement was known as a ‘shop right’.103 By the mid-1880s
courts thus began to award employers a license to use an employee’s invention where the
employee invented it on the job.104 Finally, in the twentieth century, the rule became that
employers own most employee inventions.105
Given our thesis that knowledge regulation influences firm structure and
vice-versa, it should not be surprising to learn that legal regimes governing patents and copyright
evolved significantly together with the development of new organizational forms of production
in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. Significant changes in the law occurred particularly
around the time that modern limited liability corporations were created by new laws, during the
1880s and 1890s.106
Modern trade secrets doctrine and the enforcement of covenants-not-to-compete
in the employment context only developed in the late 19th Century.107 In the antebellum period
patents and copyright protections were the only intellectual property protections available.108
Property in ideas was thought of only to the extent that it manifested itself in a physical thing,
e.g., as a machine, or a secret recipe or process. Moreover, copyright and patent protections
required that technologies were made explicit before they could secure protection. The concept
that property could be had in the intangible ideas and even in the tacit, not-explicit knowledge
embedded in another’s mind was not accepted by American courts in the antebellum period.
Enticement laws existed, imposing penalties for soliciting another firm’s employees. Such laws,
however, applied regardless of whether employees had any valuable knowledge and did not
prevent free employees from leaving after their contract term had expired and taking knowledge
acquired at work to a competitor.109
There was also a long history of restrictive covenants. But prior to the Civil War,
these were enforced only insofar as they concerned the protection of good will associated with
the sale of a business, not as post-employment restrictions. Finally trade secrets doctrine and the

101

Catherine L. Fisk, Removing The ‘Fuel Of Interest’ From The ‘Fire Of Genius’: Law And The EmployeeInventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1998).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 1151.
105
Id. at 1128. The Supreme Court’s decision in Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924), ended a period
in which courts would apply a set of presumptions in favor of employee ownership of inventions in a dispute, in
accordance with the “shop right” doctrine. Instead courts would now look to the intended terms of the employment
contract. At the same time, employers increasingly used pre-invention assigning agreements. Fisk, supra, note ___,
at 1179.
106
MORTON HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1992).
107
See generally Fisk, supra note __, at __.
108
See generally Fisk, supra note __, at __.
109
See generally Fisk, supra note __, at 450 (citing Boston Glass Manufactory v. Binney, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 425,
428 (1827)). See also John Nockleby, Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth
Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1514-15 (1980).
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use of contracts to control knowledge first emerged during the last two decades of the 19th
Century, together with the rise of the modern corporation.110
These developments in intellectual property law reflect radical changes in the
structure of workplace organization and workplace culture. They mark the dramatic shift from
artisanal modes of production to industrial and mass production in large firms.
In the artisanal model, it was possible for individuals or families to own their own
workshops. Craft knowledge was recognized as a prime resource and was transmitted from
master to apprentice. While the apprentice was not prohibited by law from exercising his craft
and using the knowledge so obtained at a later date, the apprenticeship indenture governed the
use and guarded the secrets of the craft knowledge during the apprenticeship relation. The duty
of the apprentice to guard the master’s secrets during the training period was a standard term of
apprenticeship agreements, corresponding to the duty of the master to instruct the apprentice.
The duration of the apprenticeship period can be seen to have performed a similar function to
that of a restrictive covenant, in that it permitted the master to recuperate the training invested in
the apprentice before the latter could leave and begin his own workshop.111 It thus secured the
explicit knowledge conferred in virtue of a confidentiality agreement, while it secured the tacit
knowledge for a time only by agreement to a limited, typically seven-year duration of the
relationship.
The governance structure of the apprenticeship agreement was thus designed to
preserve the knowledge (the master’s Ki) within the “firm” structure of the master’s shop. The
knowledge differential was also the criterion that determined the hierarchy between masters and
apprentices in the firm, thus reflecting an efficient allocation of knowledge resources. The
apprenticeship agreement, however, did not confer the same type of static property status on craft
knowledge as did the later trade secrets doctrine,112 which permits, at least in principle, the
indefinite exclusion of the employee or any competitor. Interestingly, the apprenticeship relation
did, however, also allow the growth of the “firm” to include a broader circle of initiates.113

110

See, e.g., MORTON HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 (1992) (“The first sustained
effort to reconceptualize the corporation in light of the triumph of general incorporation laws began during the
1880s.”).
111
See generally Fisk, supra note __, at 451.
112
According to the UTSA, which has been adopted by many states, including California, a trade secret is:
“Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program device, method, technique, or process, that: 1)
Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and 2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d). A court may enjoin “actual or
threatened misappropriation” of a trade secret. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426(a). A corporation misappropriates a trade
secret when (1) it discloses or uses the trade secret of another without express or implied consent, and (2) at the time
of the disclosure or use, it knew or had reason to know that its knowledge of the trade secret was derived from a
person who owed a duty to the entity seeking relief to maintain the trade secret’s secrecy or limit its sue. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(B)(iii).
113
“The secrecy of recipes and techniques that passed from generation to generation enabled a family or a firm to
gain a reputation and to retain exclusive control of production. Apprenticeship indentures recognized the value of
guarding secrecy while ensuring the passage of knowledge by specifying that the master was to instruct the
apprentice and to reveal his “mystery” to him, and, in return, the apprentice pledged to keep these techniques secret
during the term of the apprenticeship.” Fisk, supra note __, at __ (citations omitted).
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Industrialization changed the production process through new technology and
dramatically different organization. Work performed in the work shop in several steps
coordinated by the master was scaled up and mechanized. Craft knowledge previously
embedded in master and apprentice now became embedded in machines and work routines.114
Therefore, legal mechanisms were required that could make possible the
propertizing of knowledge embedded in physical assets (Kp). Such propertizing was achieved
through the development of intellectual property law. Entrepreneurs were thus able to rely on
the protection afforded by patents in order to bind technology and expertise to the firm.115 Such
propertization, however, also afforded toolmakers to sell their technology on the market thus
encouraging investment in such products and their ready supply.
Work on the factory floor required less skill and knowledge, substituting craft
knowledge for machine specific work routines. However, certain types of knowledge could not
be simply stored in a product. Mechanics and engineers with significant expertise were required
to build and maintain machines used in production. Chemists and other experts in the sciences
were needed to develop and oversee new production processes. And the coordination of
production required increased managerial and technical knowledge and experience.
Accordingly, the legal structure evolved to accommodate firms needs to bind organizational and
individual knowledge.
Trade secrets law originally recognized only the existence of property rights in
physical things, but not in intangible information. Until the mid-nineteenth century, there was no
standard legal protection that would allocate to firms the value of an employee’s knowledge.116
Courts were initially hostile to the enforcement of restrictive covenants, as a reflex of the
tradition of the guild system.117 Judges were reluctant to understand intangible knowledge to be
a firm’s asset. But seminal cases in the development of intellectual property law began during
the mid- to late 19th Century to recognize complaints by factory owners seeking to restrain
114

The industrialization changed the production process, permitting that the “master knowledge” (Ki) become
embedded in machines (Kp). After industrialization, the work that was coordinated by the master became largely
standardized, due to the application of scientific methods to the production process. With the division of work, nonskilled employees became able to operate machines that produced various units of the product which was previously
hand made. An unprecedented change in knowledge organization in the firm took place. The type of knowledge
necessary to be bound changed.
115
See id. at 447. “The expansion of scientific and technological research at universities and the first corporate
efforts to systematize the development of new technology through research and development also made their mark
on the law. These profound changes in the organization of knowledge both contributed to the new legal rules and
were made possible because judges and lawyers were prepared to regard knowledge as a business asset to be bought,
managed, and sold.”(quotation omitted).
116
See generally Fisk, supra note __, at 466 (arguing that: “The court’s belief that patent was the only legal
protection for technology reflects a widely held view during much of the nineteenth century”. Fisk discusses the
case of DuPont which as early as 1904 started to require employees to assign patents to the firm. The DuPonts were
one of the pioneers to realize that knowledge was a valuable asset and to engage in activities that would protect it.
DuPont’s attention to the value of maintaining the secrecy of its production methods is not typical of all nineteenthcentury firms. Fisk argues that “The difference may be attributable to the fact that DuPont’s chemistry-based
industry, as compared to an industry where employee skills are mechanical, used knowledge which was most easily
characterized as secret information rather than as general skill or technique. The difference may also be attributed to
the DuPonts’ view that they were more likely to be innovators than imitators, and thus they were generally likely to
be more at risk from others learning their methods than from being unable to learn methods of others.”))
117
Id. p. 455
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machinists, designers, engineers and chemists from taking their knowledge to competitors or
using it to set up their own factories in competition with their former employer.
For example, the first case in which a court articulated the duty of an employee to
protect the trade secrets of his employer, involved a machinist. In Norfolk v. Peabody (Mass.
1868), plaintiff shop owner sued defendant machinist whom he allegedly had employed to assist
in inventing and developing certain machinery. The machinist, Norfolk, had agreed in writing
not to reveal information about the machinery used in Peabody’s factory, which produced
gunnery cloth from jute. Norfolk, however, had quit his employment and had joined others in
building a factory. Peabody sought and obtained an injunction against Norfolk, restraining him
from revealing “any knowledge of said machinery or of the models and plans of the same, from
building any such machinery for any other person or persons, from communicating said secret
process of manufacturing Jute cloth from Jute butts as aforesaid, and from using said process in
company with any other persons or persons or by himself.”118 Norfolk had misappropriated
certain drawings, which he was also ordered to return.119
This development of trade secrets protections and the enforcement of restrictive
covenants beginning in the 1890s accompanied and reflected the new shape of industrial
organization in the modern corporation. The new legal protections and doctrines of contract
were directed at engineers and other experts with access to explicit and with tacit knowledge
critical to a corporation’s competitiveness. Drafts of machine designs and other knowledge
embedded in machines received protection in addition to patents and copyright protection. The
move to implying duties of trust, confidentiality and to guard trade secrets into employment
contracts “fit closely with the courts’ new understanding that firms, not individuals, had now
become pioneers of new technology and that firms hired employees precisely for their
knowledge . . .”120
Gradually, courts started to recognize a firm’s property rights to general
knowledge of its business activities.121 From 1890 to 1930, there were profound doctrinal
changes expanding trade secrets and accepting restrictive covenants doctrines as a means to
control the use of a broad range of workplace knowledge. The duty to protect trade secrets came
to be considered an implied term in employment agreements, where previously it depended in an
118

Fisk, supra note __, at 486 (citing Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) (internal citations omitted).
Norfolk’s new employer sought to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the confidentiality agreement was void
as a restraint of trade in that it prevented Norfolk from ever using his skill and knowledge acquired at work during
his life at any time or place. He further argued that the design and operation of the machinery was not secret
because it could be observed by anyone who visited the factory. The court here saw the injunction as solidly within
the tradition of patent law, given that theft of particular drawings was involved. Fisk, supra note __, at 484-85.
120
Fisk, supra note __, at 500. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, Co. v Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110, 116 (Sup Ct. 1892)
(finding that it was Kodak’s “exercise of much skill and ingenuity [that built the business,] the capital of which
consists largely in certain innovations and discoveries made by its officers, servants and agents”).
121
“The judges’ growing understanding of the alienability and the value of employee skill led courts to recognize
ever more legitimate uses for restrictive covenants. Courts eventually agreed that covenants could be used to protect
“trade secrets,” a concept that became more capacious over time. Some courts further recognized that covenants
could be used to protect an undefined category of “proprietary information” in addition to trade secrets. Similarly,
courts changed their assessments of which relationships with customers were business goodwill, and hence company
property, and which were simply an aspect of an employee’s personality or experience. Moreover, in applying the
Mitchell rule that a covenant must be reasonably limited, the scope of a permissible covenant expanded to keep pace
with the expanding category of knowledge that could be deemed as corporate asset.” Fisk, supra note __, at 458.
119
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express agreement. The type of knowledge to be protected by this doctrine expanded from
physical things to know-how embedded in the structure of the firm that had originated in
improvements made by employees. Employers were assigned ownership not only of drawings or
objects, but also of ideas and mental concepts expressed in them.122 Thus trade secrets came to
be applied to bind knowledge of organizational processes (Ko) to the firm. To the extent that
restrictive covenants prevented employees from using their own tacit knowledge in potentially
competing activities after leaving their firms, restrictive covenants now succeeded in binding
knowledge embedded in individuals (Ki) to the firm’s structure as well.
As this brief history suggests, intellectual property protections were not neutral
with regard to firm structure, but accompanied changes in firm structure. Modern intellectual
property protections, such as patents, copyright, trade secrets protections bind knowledge to the
firm. Patents and copyright protections mainly secure knowledge or technology embedded in
physical things or products (Kp). Trade secrets protections also secure knowledge embedded in
the organization (Ko), such as business methods, that are not amenable to patenting or copyright
protection, and knowledge embedded in the individual (Ki) but acquired during the course of
work . Finally, intellectual property protections based on contract, such as covenants not to
compete and confidentiality agreements are solely focused on securing knowledge embedded in
the individual (Ki). It is, further, worth noting that patents and copyright protections are only
effective in order to secure explicit or codified knowledge, but not tacit knowledge. In contrast,
restrictive covenants, especially covenants not to compete, are aimed at securing tacit
knowledge. Trade secrets protections lie somewhere in between.
The expansion of technological research and the increased use of different forms
of knowledge (Kp, Ko, Ki) in the production process made their mark on the law. Legal
developments have shaped the internal organization and governance of firms by assuring that
they could bind employee knowledge developed during the course of work.123 The development
of trade secrets, post-employment covenants not to compete, and non-disclosure agreements
contributed to preventing the dissemination of knowledge outside the firm. All these legal
developments have not only affected competition, as is frequently claimed by scholars, but also
internal firm structure. If the law had not permitted such extensive appropriation of knowledge
by the firms, we would expect to find different mechanisms to encourage employees to stay
longer in the firm, and to bind themselves voluntarily to the firm in order to prevent knowledge
losses or a different type of firm structure.
We suggest that not just ownership rights to intellectual property were implicated
by this shift in the law, but ownership of the corporation itself was implicated. Without the
122

Fisk, supra note __, at 493-494, 504.
Fisk, supra note __, at 445 (“In devising new rules to govern ownership of ideas and skill, judges, treatisewriters, and lawyers perceived the issue as one of economic policy and used the law to achieve certain economic
goals. In enforcing contracts -- at first, only if they were express, and later by recognizing such contracts as implied - to maintain secrecy of the employer’s methods, courts created a new species of “intellectual” property at the
expense of older notions of artisanal independence.” As courts became aware of the value of employee knowledge
to firms, they sought an expanded role for the law in facilitating economic development by allocating rights in that
knowledge. Contract was rapidly becoming the dominant legal construct for analyzing the rights and obligations of
all employment relations. At the same time, when the popularity of Frederick Winslow Taylor’s scientific
management made it seem imperative that firms rationalize and control every detail of employment and production,
contract provided the most powerful legitimating discourse for the significant loss of workplace autonomy that
Taylorism entailed. Id. at 503.
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ability to tie valuable knowledge resources to the corporation, the purchase of shares would have
been considerably less attractive to investors. Conversely, without the ability to pool financial
resources to acquire machines, technologies and physical assets, which provided a fertile
environment for further knowledge creation within the firm, technological advances could not
have been accomplished as rapidly, or perhaps at all.124
One effect of creating a legal presumption in favor of corporate ownership of
employee knowledge, however, and of enjoining employees from taking that knowledge with
them to create their own new firms, was to reduce the stake that knowledge workers could
demand in the corporate enterprise, thus favoring the separation of (stake) ownership and
control. Where the partnership model explicitly contemplated that a firm eventually would have
to make an employee into a partner, if it wanted to retain his skill and expertise, the corporate
model did not contemplate conferring such an ownership stake as an employee rose though the
ranks. For this reason, we suggest, firm structures would not have developed in quite the same
way had it not been for the development of the above described legal doctrines of intellectual
property that have helped bind knowledge to the firm. The fact that such a relationship between
intellectual property regimes and the separation of ownership and control obtains can be
supported with the help of the following example: the relationship between stock option grants
in Silicon Valley and California’s prohibition against restrictive covenants. We develop this
thesis in item VI.D.
Below we provide a quick summary of the intellectual property protections and
the types of knowledge that they bind according to our typology.
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Chandler & Hikino, supra note __, at 26 (“An understanding of how the large industrial firm came to play the
aforementioned roles requires an awareness of the complementary relationship between investment in plant and
equipment (physical or tangible capital) and the human skills and knowledge developed in their operation
(intangible capital). Extensive investments in large-scale plant and equipment created a fertile ground for managers
and other personnel to educate themselves about both the technical skills and the organizational process of new
technology.”). This was also recognized by courts in the late 19th Century.
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TABLE __: MECHANISMS AND RULES THAT “PROPERTIZE” KNOWLEDGE

Legal Rules And
Private Contracts
That Propertize
Knowledge
Structures

•
•
•

Kpr (“Propertized” Knowledge)
Kp
Ko
Patents
• Trade Secrets
•
125
Copyrights
• Corporate Law Rules
That Centralize
•
Trade Secrets
Control In A Board Of •
Directors126
•

Ki
Restrictive
Covenants
Trade Secrets
Copyrights
Confidentiality
Agreements

Source: authors’ elaboration

a) Patents and Copyrights bind Kp
Recall our distinction between codified (standardized) and tacit knowledge.
Codified knowledge is knowledge that has been expressed in mathematical formulas, graphics,
drawings, books, writing notes, or even by voice. When the knowledge is codified, it becomes
easier to transfer it: a person who has never studied or heard of that knowledge is able to
understand its basics by having access to the formal information regarding the knowledge.127
But, when knowledge becomes codified, it also becomes a public good.128 This means that
people may engage in free-riding, extracting benefits from the knowledge without paying its
value. One imperfect way to solve this problem is through intellectual property protection.
Patents and copyrights provide ownership rights to codified knowledge.
According to the statute, any person who “invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent,” subject to the conditions and requirements specified
in the law.
In order to obtain a patent, it is necessary to codify all the know how, knowledge
and processes. The right conferred by the patent grant is “the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the invention in the United States or “importing” the
invention into the United States. In exchange of making the knowledge codified, and available
to the public at large, the person receives from the government exclusive rights to use the patent
for a limited period of time. Patent law permits that codified knowledge embedded in new
products, Kp, is bound to its proper owner. Patent rights solve the appropriability problem that
come from the “impure public good” nature of knowledge, even in an imperfect way. As
125

Copyrights can both support Kp and Ki, depending on to whom the legal systems assigns property of
copyrightable assets. The American legal system assigns property to the firm while the German legal system assigns
property to the employee. These different legal rules may contribute to shaping different firm governance structures.
126
CHANDLER, supra note ___, at 73. Rules that centralize decision making in the board of directors can support
or undermine knowledge structures depending on the type of knowledge structure that exists in the organization. As
we have been arguing if KI is the predominant type of knowledge, a decentralized system of control is likely to
produce more efficient results.
127
Tacit knowledge is the knowledge which has not been codified yet. It can be embedded in the organization
and in the employee.
128
See below in section V..
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explained, any person, by having access to the codified knowledge could steal the knowledge,
without paying its value and use it. Patents provide a means so that the firm can bind the new
knowledge to its structure, and extract economic value. These intellectual property protections
enable the creation of a market for propertized knowledge.
b) Trade Secrets Bind Kp And Ko And Ki
The organization embodies knowledge of processes and routines. Specific know
how is protected by trade secrets doctrine. The courts increasingly prevent employees from
revealing the knowledge that they have acquired through learning and sharing knowledge while
part of a firm’s organization.129
As we explained, from a historical point of view the law of trade secrets has been
changing and is being interpreted more expansively by courts since the end of the nineteenth
century. Where previously trade secret law was concerned with the protection of technical
information, the definition now covers all commercially valuable information.130
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which now has been adopted by more than 30
jurisdictions,131 has broadened the definition of a trade secret to include “any formula, pattern,
device, or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives one the
opportunity to obtain advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.”132, 133, 134
Agreements to refrain from using or divulging trade secrets in competition are frequently made.
And courts will enforce such contracts if they are deemed “reasonable.”135
129

“The focus shifted from the drawings of a machine to the design innovations contained in them; from the list
of the customers to the knowledge of their identities, locations, needs and their goodwill; and from the precise
written formula for a substance to the general knowledge of the process and techniques for making it. Negative
knowledge (i.e., what does not work to achieve a particular purpose) came to be recognized for the first time as a
trade secret so that an employee could be restrained not only from using knowledge about what works to make a
product, but also from using knowledge of what does not work. Compilations of publicly available facts gained
protection. As the category of trade secrets expanded, the category of general knowledge, or even specialized skill
and experience, diminished.” Fisk, supra note __, at 504 (Emphasis added. quotations omitted.)
130
Stone, supra note __, 757.
131
114 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 13:14, n. 69 (4th ed. ____).
132
RESTATEMENT (____) OF TORTS § 757, comment b (____).
133
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 14 U.L.A. 50 (____).
134
According to the UTSA, which is adopted by many states, including California, a trade secret is:
“
Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program device, method, technique, or process, that: 1)
Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and 2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d). A court may enjoin “actual or
threatened misappropriation” of a trade secret. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426(a). A corporation misappropriates a trade
secret when (1) it discloses or uses the trade secret of another without express or implied consent, and (2) at the time
of the disclosure or use, it knew or had reason to know that its knowledge of the trade secret was derived from a
person who owed a duty to the entity seeking relief to maintain the trade secret’s secrecy or limit its sue. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(B)(iii). Courts may order affirmative acts to protect a trade secret in appropriate
circumstances.
135
Courts have used a variety of factors in determining whether information is a trade secret which a former
employee is not entitled to use when he leaves the firm. These factors include: “the extent to which the information
is know outside of the employer’s business; the extent to which it is known by employees and others engaged in his
business; the measures which have been taken by the employer to ensure the continued secrecy of the information;
Doc #:NY7:262178.1

Gorga & Halberstam

39

In order to be enforced a trade secret must be secret. When information is
deemed “general knowledge” available to outsiders then it cannot be property enforceable at law.
The requirements that should be met for the enforcement of trade secrets may restrict the
application of trade secrets doctrine in the task of binding knowledge to the firm. The diffusion
of knowledge throughout the firm that is needed for production vitiates to some extent the ability
of the employer to prevent the employee from transferring it outside the firm by the threat of law
suit. So, to the extent that trade secrets bind only “specific knowledge”, other methods are
necessary to bind more “general” knowledge to the firm, including structural solutions. These
will be discussed next.
It is interesting to observe that the “specialized knowledge” which the courts
aimed at protecting has been becoming more general knowledge in the sense that it is not
codified but tacit. Trade secrets protect the tacit knowledge developed in the organization (Ko).
Moreover, trade secrets doctrine aim nowadays at protecting tacit knowledge that an employee
acquired when he was sharing experiences inside de firm’s organization (Ki). To be sure, trade
secrets also protect codified knowledge, such as drawings and design of machines (Kp) which
don’t enjoy the benefits of protection by means of patents.
However, trade secrets still are insufficient to protect the type of tacit knowledge
that is embedded in the employee (Ki). Covenants to compete play this role. Trade secrets are
legitimate to protect business interests that can be enforced where there is a restrictive
covenant.136 So, when combined with a restrictive covenant, the threat of revelation of trade
secrets can very well allow an employer to restrain an employee from working for a competitor.
This connection between trade secrets law and restrictive covenants does not only expand
restrictive covenant law, but also the scope of the enforcement of trade secrets. Trade secrets
law complements and works together with restrictive covenants to bind knowledge to a firm.137
c) Covenants Not To Compete Bind Ki
When the firm contracts a covenant not to compete with its employee, it aims at
not only protecting the knowledge that is possessed by several members in the organization, but
also protecting the specific, tacit knowledge that each employee will develop while participating
in the firm’s organization, and which the firm is not yet aware of its content (Ki).138
the value of the information to him and to his competition; the amount of money and effort expended in developing
the information; the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly applied or duplicated by others.”
6 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §13:14 ([4] citing UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 14).
136
A potentially significant change in that general direction has been the acceptance of the “doctrine of inevitable
disclosure” by the 7th Circuit in Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond. The doctrine has prevented employees from taking their
valuable knowledge to a competitor, even where they had not signed restrictive covenants, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir.
1995). The case has received much attention and criticism, and the doctrine has been rejected by New York and
California courts, but it remains good law in many jurisdictions See, e.g. Bayer Corporation v. Roche Molecular
Systems, 72 F.Supp. 2d 1111, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (“The theory of ‘inevitable disclosure’ is not the law in
California and, at trial, plaintiff will have to demonstrate actual use or disclosure, or actual threat thereof”), is still
valid in other states.
137
Generally, in trade secret’s law and in restrictive covenants there’s been stronger enforcement in favor of
employers.
138
Much of the increasing critiques to covenants not to compete is that they are trying to transform tacit
knowledge embedded in the employee in codified knowledge. For a critique of current policy regarding covenants
not to compete see Stone, supra note __, at 271.
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In knowledge intensive environments a firm’s competitive edge significantly
depends upon highly knowledgeable and skilled employees.139 Firms compete fiercely to attract,
enhance and retain “talent.”140 To achieve this purpose, firms thus provide extensive employee
training, upskilling and networking opportunities, investing heavily in human capital. In this
regard, the R&D policy and the firm organization will pretty much depend on the ability that
these firms have to bind their employees (or restrain the employees from using this knowledge
outside the firm), and to bind the knowledge produced by them inside the firm’s structure.
Hence, the importance of laws that regulate ownership of employee inventions and the
compensation to be paid to these inventors.
Restrictive covenants now appear in almost every employment contract.141
Where previously non-compete clauses and other post-employment restraints were reserved for
high-level management, they are now written into the contracts of at will employees and litigated
much more frequently.142 While cases have proliferated, “courts have become increasingly
receptive to employer efforts to limit employee use of human capital.”143
Restrictive covenants fill important gaps in trade secrets law. They provide
protection where the information an employer seeks to protect is non-confidential information
relating, for example, to actual customers or prospective customers with whom the employee had
sustained contacts. Trade secrets law can, for example, be applied to protect customer lists that
have been kept confidential, but not to customer information which has not been kept
confidential. The most difficult problem with trade secrets law is the definition of what
constitutes a trade secret, and its identification. Restrictive covenants obviate this issue.144
However, with the relaxation of what type of knowledge can constitute a trade secret, there is
now a greater overlap.

139

“Information and knowledge are the thermonuclear competitive weapons of our time.” STEWART, supra note
__ at 3-4.
140
Stone, Knowledge at Work, supra note __, at 722.
141
Cavico says that “one now sees these non-compete clauses in practically every employment contract.”
“employers are fearful that their more ambitious, entrepreneurial, and mobile employees soon will be competing
against them. Employers contend that they need these restrictive covenants to cope with ever-escalating competitive
challenges. Moreover, the increasing amount of mergers and acquisitions, layoffs, bankruptcies, and concomitant
‘downsizings,’ ‘rightsizings,’ and ‘flexible’ staffing arrangements, including the increased use of ‘temporary’
employees, engenders a growing number of terminated, and very likely disgruntled, employees. These former
employees likely are sophisticated and knowledgeable, and were privy to sensitive information….Employers are
alarmed, and not without reason, that these ex-employees will possess, and offer a new employer, a significant
competitive ‘edge.’ This ‘edge’ is perceived as a real threat to a firm’s profits, and possibly even its existence. A
very volatile and risky business environment thereby is created, and a prudent firm must take care to guard its
competitive advantages. Restrictive covenants, therefore, have emerged as a prevalent and efficacious means for an
employer to protect its business interests and hard-earned competitive ‘edge.’” Cavico, supra note __, at 3.
142
ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE
SURVEY (Brian M. Malsberger et al. eds, 2d ed. 1996); ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYEE
DUTY OF LOYALTY: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian M. Malsberger et al. eds. 2d ed. 1998); See also Stone,
supra note __, at 739.
143
Stone, supra note __, at 739.
144
See, e.g., Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1969) (“[S]ince it may be
difficult to determine, as a matter of law, what is a trade secret, the covenant not to compete is a pragmatic solution
to the problem of protecting confidential information”).
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The enforcement of covenant not to compete depends on the observation of some
requirements. One example is the rule of reason, which most states came to adopt. Under the
rule of reason approach noncompete clauses are enforced if they (1) serve to protect and
employer’s legitimate business interest, and the restrictions are (2) temporally and (2)
geographically narrowly tailored to this purpose.145 As a rule, courts would strike down
noncompete agreements in their entirety, when they imposed restraints that were broader than
necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests, considering them unenforceable
contracts in restraint of trade, or unconscionable contracts oppressive to the former employee.
This has changed and courts now increasingly reform noncompetition agreements when they are
drafted too broadly.146 This means that post-termination restrictions are more likely to be
enforced.
The most common argument for the enforcement of noncompetition clauses is the
disclosure of trade secrets and confidential information.147 These are clearly legitimate business
interests courts deem worthy of protection when they assess restrictive covenants in employment
contracts. Even in California, where Business and Professions Code section 16600 generally
prohibits covenants not to compete, and public policy strongly favors employee mobility,
covenants not to compete are enforceable if “necessary to protect the employer’s trade
secrets.”148
The law of trade secrets (also state law) and restrictive covenants are thus
complementary. And in assessing whether to enforce a noncompetition agreement, courts will
therefore frequently discuss the factors that apply to trade secret protection. Accordingly, courts
will be more willing to enforce a noncompetition clause where an employee has acquired
confidential information that would afford a competitive advantage to another business, but less
willing where the employee could import only general knowledge of the business or industry.149
The law and economics literature of the adequacy of covenants not to compete is now numerous.
Many arguments pro or con the enforcement of covenants to compete have been

145

[Complete]
See, e.g., Solari Industries, Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 576, 264 A.2d 53 (1970) (adopting the judicial rule
that noncompetitive agreements may receive total or partial enforcement to the extent reasonable under the
circumstances).
147
See, e.g., Vender Werf v. Zunica Realty Company, 59 Ill.App.2d 173, 208 N.E.2d 74,76 (1974) (Legitimate
interests is only another term to describe those ‘special circumstances’ which render employee’s restraint necessary,
but protection against ordinary competition itself is not sufficient. The authorities indicate that the ‘special
circumstances’ which have been controlling and important in determining the reasonableness of the restraint
imposed generally involve elements of trade secrets and unfair dealings”).
148
Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. (1965), 62 Cal.2d 239, 242, 42 Cal.Rptr. 107 (Traynor, J.). See also
Metro Traffic Control, inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 22 Cal.App.4th at 859. California also does not invalidate a
noncompetition agreement that merely prohibits solicitation of the former employer’s customers. See generally,
Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal.App.4th 1443 at 1482, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 277 (2002).
149
See, e.g., Whitmyer Bros. Inc. v. Doyle et al., 58 N.J. 25, 28-30, 274 A.2d 577 (N.J. Supreme Court, 1971)
(“matters of general knowledge within the industry may not be classified as trade secrets or confidential information
entitled to protection nor will routine or trivial differences in practices and methods suffice to support restraint of the
employee’s competition”; referring to defendant’s argument that highway safety construction employee’s
knowledge of bidding procedures and constituent elements were general business knowledge in the guard rail
construction industry).
146
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advanced.150, 151, 152 However, we advance here a still unexplored connection of the law of
restrictive covenants and its impact to firm internal governance structure (see part VI.D below).
The enforcement of such restrictive covenants affects firm governance in the
sense that if these contracts cannot be enforced in courts, employers and corporations may have
to give employees greater incentives to stay in the firm, perhaps even ownership stakes.
3. Other Bodies Of Law And Types Of Agreements
While in this paper we only develop the idea of how law binds knowledge of Kp,
Ko and Ki type by means of intellectual protections and agreements such as covenants not to
compete, it is important to point out that other bodies of law do play a role in this regard as well.
Employment regulation, for instance, may establish employee rights, assure job security and
therefore help bind the knowledge embedded in an individual to firms structure. Rules that
affect co-decision procedures may also cause this effect to some extent. Rules of Professional
Conduct such as the ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct also can function as away to
prevent knowledge transfer outside the firm. Other types of agreements such as confidentiality
agreements are also largely used in business practice and they do play an effect in helping firms
bind knowledge to its structure.
V. KNOWLEDGE ALLOCATION AND TRANSACTION COSTS
A. Efficient Knowledge Allocation
In order to analyze firm structure, we develop the following theoretical
assumption: Firms will try to maximize the use of knowledge resources in the production
process. This assumption is similar to the assumptions underlying certain economic models that
firms will maximize profits and consumers will maximize their utility. In order to maximize the
use of knowledge resources, we now posit that firms should collocate decision-making authority
with the relevant knowledge available within or to the firm. A firm uses its knowledge resources
most efficiently when it allocates decision-making authority to those (persons or groups) that
have the relevant knowledge to make such decisions at the various levels of the firm hierarchy.153
150

Eric A. Posner & George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective,
John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 137 (2d series), University of Chicago Law
School, (arguing that the employers have incentives to overinvest in specific training, which is worthless to any
other employer, if a third employer is going to reimburse them. Therefore, employers will tend to expand covenants
not to compete to externalize the cost of worker training to as many prospective future employers as possible. To
prevent this from happening and to promote the design of efficient covenants, given the possibility of renegotiation,
the courts should investigate whether the restrictive covenant protects specific or more general training, enforcing
the covenants only in the latter case.)
151
Stone, Knowledge at Work, supra note __, at 271. (“the terms of new employment contract – specifically, the
promise of training and networking opportunities – are undermined when courts are expansive in their approach to
enforcement of restrictive covenants and the definitions of trade secrets.” )
152
Paul H. Rubin & Petter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. Leg. Stud. 93 (1981).
Rubin and Shedd consider efficient/inefficient the enforcement of covenants depending on the case.
153
See Jensen & Meckling, Specific and General Knowledge, supra note __, at 251-274 (“When knowledge is
valuable in decision-making, there are benefits to collocating decision authority with the knowledge that is valuable
to those decisions. There are two ways to collocate knowledge and decision rights. One is by moving the knowledge
to those with the decision rights; the other is by moving the decision rights to those with the knowledge. The process
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Knowledge resources are costly. All else being equal, knowledge resources are
wasted where decision-making authority is withheld from those with the knowledge required to
make certain decisions. There will be knowledge available in the organization without putting it
to its most value-enhancing use. Conversely, where a particular task or position within the firm
hierarchy can be accomplished by substituting the knowledge of a supervisor/manager for that of
an less knowledgeable employee, i.e. through direction of the employee, there is no need to pay
the higher wage for the manager, because (from an economizing perspective) the task could be
performed by a lower level employee. To put it differently, if a position in the firm is occupied
by someone who has more knowledge than is required to perform his work, knowledge resources
are being wasted through inefficient allocation of knowledge resources.154
From these observations it follows that: Decision-making authority should be
collocated with relevant knowledge within the organization in an economizing way.155 We call
this the Principle of Efficient Knowledge Allocation.
Relationships between decisional hierarchies and knowledge distribution within
the firm emerge in connection with this principle. The first is that the firm hierarchy should be
flatter and more decentralized, the greater and the more complex the knowledge distribution
among the firm’s personnel.156 In contrast, decisional hierarchies should be steeper, and
decision-making authority should be more centralized, the less knowledgeable the firm’s
personnel and the less complex the organization’s knowledge capabilities. In this situation, we
will expect to find people who are more knowledgeable exercising top executive functions and
therefore the pyramid of hierarchy will have a large base with few persons in the top positions.157
The principle of maximizing the use of knowledge resources is a valuable tool for
explaining how governance structures are shaped, from a positive perspective, or how
governance structures should be shaped, from a normative perspective.
Knowledge inputs in the form of human capital, as suggested by our discussion so
far, directly affect the governance structure of an organization in a way that other inputs, such as
physical assets, capital and raw materials, do not. The value of knowledge consists in solving
problems and making good decisions.158 Purchasing knowledge, but not making full use of it, or
for moving knowledge to those with decision rights has received much attention from researchers and designers of
management information systems. But the process for moving decision rights to those with the relevant knowledge
has received relatively little attention in either economics or management.” at 5-6)
154
This assumes, of course, that the employee is being fully compensated for her skills.
155
Jensen & Meckling, supra note __, at 19 argue: “The key to efficiency is to assign decision rights to each
agent at each level to minimize the sum of the costs owing to poor information and the costs owing to inconsistent
objectives.”
156
See, e.g., Stephen R. Barley, The Turn to a Horizontal Division of Labor: On the Occupationalization of
Firms and the Technization of Work, paper prepared for the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S.
Department of Education, January 1994, pp. 21, 32 (“As firms hire increasing numbers of professionals, as
professions spawn specialties, and as new technologies create work that requires esoteric knowledge, expertise
becomes more balkanized and firms begin to resemble confederacies of occupations rather than sleek pyramids of
control . . . When those in authority no longer comprehend the work of their subordinates, chains of command
should cease to be viable for coordination.”).
157
Demsetz mentions that those who are to produce but don’t have knowledge must have their activities directed
by those who possess more knowledge. Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, supra note __, at 171-172.
158
The most significant economic value of knowledge consists in its problem-solving potential. And problemsolving ultimately results in decision. Problem-solving capabilities, for the most part, are only fully engaged and
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relying on those less knowledgeable to make the relevant decisions, is inefficient, and may well
bring about failure in a competitive environment. The purchase of knowledge is efficient only if
it gets reflected in the governance structure or allocation of decision making authority of the
organization, just as the purchase of a physical asset only makes sense if it is used in a
productive way, or the borrowing of capital if applied to its best rate of return.159
However, knowledge resources are not allocated in the firm by the price
mechanism. Therefore, the efficient allocation of decision making authority within organizations
is subject to special difficulties that have to do with the nature of hierarchical organizations
themselves, that is, with their relative rigidity. As Jensen and Meckling point out, the fact that
intrafirm decision making rights are typically not themselves alienable may, over time, lead to
the inefficient allocation of knowledge resources:
[T]he internal organization of the capitalist firm is also an
instance of the absence of alienable decision rights. Indeed, we
distinguish activities within the firm from activities between the
firm and the rest of the world by whether alienability is transferred
to agents along with the decision rights. In this view transfers of
decision rights without the right to alienate those rights are
intra-firm transactions. While firms can sell assets, workers in
firms generally do not receive the rights to alienate their positions
or any other assets or decision rights under their control. They
cannot pocket the proceeds. This means there is no automatic
decentralized process which tends to ensure that decision rights in
the firm migrate to the agents that have the specific knowledge
relevant to their exercise, and that there is no automatic
performance measurement and reward system that motivates
agents to use their decision rights in the interest of the
organization. Explicit managerial direction and the creation of
mechanisms to substitute for alienability is required.160
Because there are no clear property rights in knowledge assets inside the firm, the
assignment of decision rights to promote efficient knowledge allocation faces special difficulties.
Problems of information or knowledge asymmetry make it difficult to evaluate knowledge
resources. In the case of tacit knowledge, the asymmetry problem is exacerbated: individuals
themselves may not have information about what and how much they actually know. Thus, one
sharpened when the problem-solver is confronted with real choices. Problem-solvers must therefore be genuinely
engaged in a decision-making process, even if they do not have the last word. While decision-makers do not need to
have a grasp of all the details of a decision, and thus can delegate some, or even much or the problem-solving, good
decisions require a good grasp of the alternatives, or on the reliance of those better informed. While formally a
decision might be ratified at a higher level of hierarchy, boundedness of rationality necessarily implies the diffusion
of actual decision-making within an organization if this is the approach that will efficiently allocate knowledge
resources. The contract-based explanation of the firm, explaining its transaction cost savings by the fiat relationship
between employer and employee as advanced by Coase simply ignore those considerations.
159
See Sherwin Rose, Contracts and the Markets for Executives in CONTRACT ECONOMICS, supra note __, at
184. “Scarce talents of the most capable managers are economized by assigning them to positions at or near the top
of the largest firms, where their ability is magnified to greater effect by spreading it over longer chains of command
and larger scales of operations.”
160
Jensen & Meckling, supra note__, at 14-15.
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of the most important, and perhaps most difficult, problems that a firm has to solve, and one
which can lead to its success or failure in a competitive environment is the one identified here:
the collocation of decision making authority with relevant knowledge. The use of knowledge is
not frictionless and will always generate a certain amount of waste. There are also costs due to
mistaken decisions. These are exacerbated where decision making authority is not collocated
with the relevant knowledge. These costs have to be taken into account in assessing the efficient
allocation of knowledge resources.161
B. Knowledge Hazards
In addition to the difficulties of efficient knowledge allocation already described,
there are additional hazards that may impede efficient knowledge use by the firm, even if proper
care has been taken to collocate decision rights with relevant knowledge. While traditional
moral hazards such as shirking will occur through an employee’s failure to apply her knowledge
with the expected effort, there are additional hazards that are specific to the use of knowledge
resources. These specific knowledge hazards are caused by the public goods characteristics of
knowledge resources, but also by the tacit nature of knowledge. This is because tacit knowledge
may not be observed at all if it is not communicated.
1. The Public Goods Characteristics of Knowledge Resources
Knowledge resources, as already indicated, have public goods characteristics. A
public good has two critical features: non-rivalrous consumption and non-excludability. Nonrivalrous consumption means that the consumption of the good by one individual does not
detract from the ability of others to enjoy its consumption. Non-excludability means that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to exclude an individual from enjoying the good.162
Thus, knowledge resources are subject to significant hazards in market
transactions. If a seller wants to sell knowledge in the market, she will have to disclose
something about what she intends to sell so that the buyer develops an interest in buying.
However, in this process, the seller already loses some of her property.163 Worse yet, once
revealed that knowledge may be used not merely by the transferee, but by others to whom it is
communicated, including potential competitors, thus undermining the ability of its proprietor to
extract rents from her ownership.
As we already discussed in section IV, while intellectual property protections are
directed precisely to solving the problems of knowledge transfer, they rarely confer perfect
161

Jensen & Meckling at 28. Thus, if knowledge valuable to a particular decision is to be used in making that
decision, there must be a system for assigning decision rights to individuals who have the knowledge and abilities
or who can acquire or produce them at low cost. In addition, self-interest on the part of individual decision-makers
means that a control system is required to motivate individuals to use their specific knowledge and decision rights
properly.
162
See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Public Good, Work Bank Lecture, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/knowledge/chiefecon/articles/ undpk2/ (“Knowledge of a mathematical theorem clearly
satisfies both attributes [non-rivalrous consumption and non-excludability]: if I teach you the theorem, I continue to
enjoy the knowledge of the theorem at the same time you do. By the same token, once I publish the theorem,
anyone can enjoy the theorem. No one can be excluded. They can use the theorem as the basis of their own further
research. The ‘ideas’ contained in the theorem may even stimulate others to have an idea with large commercial
value”).
163
Joseph Stiglitz, Public Policy for a Knowledge Economy, World Bank Lecture, January 1999, at 13.
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appropriability,164 and do not apply to all kinds of knowledge. Markets for knowledge and
information therefore depend critically on reputation, on repeated interactions, and on trust.165
It is easy to see the benefits of integrating knowledge production rather than
procuring such resources through market transactions when the knowledge used in the
production process is most susceptible to hazards – as, for instance, in the case of Ki. We
develop this latter point in sections VI.A and VI.F, below.
To avoid moral hazards, firms also must design other mechanisms, such as
compensation strategies, in accordance with the knowledge type that they deploy. In this
respect, we will discuss particular compensation systems used by high tech firms and law firms
in sections VI.D and VI.E.
Because such mechanisms ameliorate the hazards to which knowledge resources
are susceptible, even if imperfectly, knowledge is usually distinguished as an impure public
good.166

2. Leakage
Knowledge transfers are thus vulnerable to “leakage.”167 Leakage refers to the
unwanted transfer of knowledge by its proprietor, permitting a third party to benefit from the
knowledge without compensating the knowledge proprietor.
3. Hoarding/Failure to Share
Not only markets transactions, but also knowledge transfers within organizations
are subject to special problems, given that knowledge that is not actively communicated may not
be observed at all.
Actors may fail to share knowledge in order to secure their decision making
authority or to extract other advantages. Such hard to detect opportunistic behavior could
potentially provide very significant gains for the individual and lead to significant inefficiencies
for the organization. Hoarding or failure to share knowledge is potentially attractive to an
employee (including, or especially, managers), because the employee may establish a monopoly
over such knowledge and thereby extract rents. One form of such behavior is the withholding of
knowledge from the employer or other employees, because an actor wants sole credit for
possessing such knowledge. Whatever the motivation, hoarding or failure to share are hard to
detect or measure. As a result, knowledge resources existing within the firm may, therefore, be

164

Products are easily reverse engineered. Sidney G. Winter, Knowledge and Competence as Strategic Assets, in
THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, (____, eds., ____); see also, David J. Teece, Profiting
From Technological Innovation in ______________________ 186.
165
Id.
166
Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Public Good, (“because the returns to some knowledge can, to some extent, be
appropriated there is some degree of non-excludability, knowledge is often thought of as an impure public good.”).
167
We borrow this term from Merges & Arora. ______________________________.
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underutilized.168 Thus, even if decision rights are collocated with the most appropriate
knowledge, there are opportunism costs peculiar to the use of knowledge resources.169
Underutilization, however, may also occur in the absence of opportunism where
the knowledge transferor is committed to sharing his knowledge. This may result from
insufficient communication skills, insufficient knowledge on the part of the transferee,
insufficient organizational opportunities for knowledge exchange, lack of appropriate settings
within which to communicate tacit knowledge, etc.
VI. REVISITING SOME ASPECTS OF FIRM ORGANIZATION
FROM THE KNOWLEDGE RESOURCES PERSPECTIVE
A. Correlating Knowledge Structures and Governance (Decisional/Ownership) Structures
In this part, we apply our typology to different types of firm production. We
advance the hypothesis, for which we then produce evidence in subsequent sections, that firm
organizational structures are influenced by the knowledge types that predominate in their
particular production process.170
We argue that production will be organized within a firm (as opposed to the
market), as long as it can sell some kind of knowledge or expertise, or it can add some type of
knowledge or expertise to a product or service which is already being sold in the market.
Holding all the other variables constant, then, we argue that the level of
knowledge specialization will delimit firm structures.
Therefore, we advance the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The more the production relies on Kp/Kpr, the more we will
expect production to be organized by means of market mechanisms.
168

Note that we are not referring here to the problem of bounded rationality, which, per se, will generate constant
underutilization of knowledge. We refer a particular situation where the knowledge could be effectively used if
disclosed by its donor.
169
Jensen & Meckling, supra note__, at 24 argue: “Because all individuals in a firm are self-interested, simply
delegating decision rights to them and dictating the objective function each is to maximize is not sufficient to
accomplish the objective. A control system that ties the individual’s interest more closely to that of the organization
is required. The control system specifies (a) the performance measurement and evaluation system for each
subdivision of the firm and each decision agent, and (b) the reward and punishment system that relates individual’s
rewards to their performance.”
170
Demsetz, Comments on Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, supra note __, at 279-280. Demsetz has
advanced some of the relations between knowledge resources and firm governance structure: “Some firms, for
example, earn revenues by performing repetitive and routine activities most of the time. Others are preoccupied with
highly innovative activity. The difference in the tasks faced by these firms, I believe, dictates differences in their
organization structures and compensation systems. Less hierarchy can be tolerated by firms engaged in innovative
activity, and decision rights are probably dense in the middle of the hierarchy that exists. This is because the
problems faced by such a firm, relative to one engaged in repetitive activities, cannot be solved as easily as
routinizing procedures with rules and regulations. It should also be the case that a difference in compensation
methods is required because decisions must be more decentralized for firms that engage in, for example, genetic
research. Greater reliance on profit-based compensation is required to bring objective functions of dispersed holders
of decisions rights into closer accord.”
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Hypothesis 2: The more the production relies on Ko and Ki, the more we will
expect production to occur within the firm.
Thus if we imagine a continuum of knowledge inputs from purely Kp inputs at
one extreme to purely Ki inputs at the other extreme, we would expect to find production taking
place exclusively through market transactions in the first instance, but exclusively within firms in
the second instance.
FIGURE 1: KNOWLEDGE TYPE AND PRODUCTION ORGANIZATION
Market

Firm

+ Kp / Kpr

+ Ko / Ki

Assume now that some level of tacit knowledge or Ki is applied in the production
process. Production will thus take place in the firm. The structure of the firm hierarchy
governing the product process will then be more or less centralized depending on the level of Kp
that is added. Because tacit knowledge is embedded in an individual, and because the more the
knowledge is embedded in an individual, the less effective the management of knowledge
through centralized governance structures, it follows that:
Hypothesis 3: The greater the reliance on Ki, the more decentralized the firm
decisional hierarchies that will govern the production process.
Hypothesis 4: The greater the level of Kp/Kpr, and the less reliance is placed on
Ki, the greater the centralization of decisional hierarchies that govern firm production.
So on the continuum that describes the organizational structure of the firm, we
can expect that, if at one extreme we have a firm that predominantly relies on Kp, this firm will
have a centralized governance structure. At the other extreme, if a firm uses exclusively Ki, then
this firm will have a very decentralized governance structure, as follows.
FIGURE 2: KNOWLEDGE TYPE AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Market

Firm

Firm

(centralized)

(decentralized)

+ Kp

Ki +
Kp = Ki

Doc #:NY7:262178.1

Gorga & Halberstam

49

In the table below we distinguish some basic types of industries according to the
nature of the knowledge that they use. The knowledge type that is used (viz. Kp, Ko, Ki) varies
depending on the different production technologies/techniques in a particular industry, and the
organizational structure reflects the deployment of different knowledge types.171
TABLE __: THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE FIRM
Firm Structure
1. Taylorist Mass
Production

Example
General Motors

Knowledge
Structure
Kp +
Ko +
Ki –

2. High Tech
Engineering

Microsoft

Ki +
Ko
Kp –

3. Low level service
industry

McDonalds

Kp
Ko +
Ki –

4. High level
Professional Services

Law firms

Ki +
Ko
Kp –

6. Risk Management/
Venture Capital Firms

Venture Capital
Firms

Ki+
Ko +
Kp –

Of course there is a mixture of Kp, Ko and Ki in all types of firms. What change
is the degree to which these variables enter into each firm type as suggested above.
1. Centralization vs. Decentralization of Decision Making and Knowledge Location
Different and somewhat contradictory approaches have been taken with regard to
the impact that knowledge resources have on the organization of the production process.
Some scholars have proposed that the centralized organization of a firm is
conducive to knowledge transfer and diffusion within the firm. Kenneth Arrow, for example,
argues that “authority, the centralization of decision-making, serves to economize on the
transmission and handling of knowledge.”172 Similarly, Coase’s reliance on the superior
171

In future elaborations, we intend to rely on SIC codes for which it should be easier to identify existing bodies
of empirical data in the relevant specialized literatures.
172
KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 69 (1974).
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allocation of resources through the fiat-control of the entrepreneur within the firm hierarchy
appears to endorse the virtues of centralization for the efficient use of knowledge resources. As
one scholar contends, “Coase’s notion of authority” after all “assumes that a directing principal
is at least as knowledgeable about the relevant tasks as the agent being directed.”173
One of the ways in which firms economize in deploying knowledge resources is
by “knowledge-substitution.” If X and Y are independent contractors in the market, then Y’s
own knowledge is the final guide to his behavior. In contrast, if X and Y are coordinating their
productive activities within a firm, Y can act on the basis of X’s knowledge without internalizing
it. In the firm, “knowledge-substitution” can thus allow an employee to perform a particular job
relying on the knowledge of others without first engaging in laborious internalization.174 This
expands the employees’ productive capabilities.175
Knowledge substitution is even more important in the case of tacit knowledge,
which cannot be easily assimilated. “[D]irection substitutes for education (that is, for the
transfer of the knowledge itself).”176 In this way, a manager’s knowledge can leverage the
productivity of an employee. And more generally, it is possible “to generate more and richer
coordinative activity [within the firm] than can be accomplished in markets.”177
In contrast, Hayek argued that the market mechanism is superior and more
efficient in producing goods, because knowledge is distributed throughout society and there are
significant cognitive limitations faced by any set of decision makers in a centralized coordination
process. Hayek tried to explain the superiority of market production by reference to the
characteristics of tacit knowledge. He argued that the ability of the market to allocate knowledge
resources was superior to their allocation in a managed economy, because of the inherently local
and tacit character of much of the knowledge required in the production of goods.178 Tacit
knowledge is not easily communicable, but is locally specific and can only be acquired through
experience. Tacit knowledge, therefore, cannot be readily gathered by a centralized decision
making authority in the manner that data can be gathered and stored in a centralized computer.
173

See Nicolai J. Foss, Coase vs Hayek, Copenhagen Business School, 2001, at 22,
http://www.cbs.dk/staff/njf.html
174
Kathleen R. Conner & C. K. Prahalad, supra note _. There are instances where knowledge substitution is
performed by means of products. Suppose I am using a product that was built relying on the knowledge of a third
party. In this case, as the knowledge is embedded in a product (as we shall call Kp), knowledge substitution is can
be achieved in the market..
175
According to Conner & Prahalad: “knowledge substitution is a fundamental response to cognitive limitations,
having the effect on economizing on them . . . . A primary effect of firm organization – of the authority relationship
– is to cause an individual to use the knowledge of another before the former fully understands or agrees with it.
Conversely, a main effect of market contracting – of an autonomous relationship – is to oblige knowledge to be
internalized before the individual agrees to modify its actions on the basis of that knowledge.” Id., at 485.
176
Demsetz, supra note __ at 172.
177
R. P. Rumelt, Inertia and Transformation in (C.A. MONTGOMERY, ED.) RESOURCE-BASED AND
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF THE FIRM 124 (1995).
178
F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society. 35 AMER. ECON. REV. 519, 521-522 (Sep. 1945) (“It is with
respect to this that practically every individual has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique
information of which beneficial use might be, but of which can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left
to him or are made with his active cooperation. We need to remember only how much we have to learn in any
occupation after we have completed our theoretical training, how big a part of our working life we spend learning
particular jobs, and how valuable an asset in all walks of life is knowledge of people, of local conditions and special
circumstances.”).
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As a consequence, Hayek argues, decentralization achieved through the market is necessary,
because it assures that the knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place will be
promptly used by means of the price mechanism.179
Summarizing the discussion, some scholars such as Arrow and Coase seem to
point out the benefits of firm authority centralization in economizing knowledge resources by
means of a process that can be described as “knowledge substitution.” Other scholars such as
Hayek point out the benefits of a decentralized structure that relies on knowledge specialization
which occur in the market.
However, the relations between producers that are rearranged within the firm also
include a division of knowledge among different persons involved in a production process.180
Firms restructure the decision making procedures of a production process, centralizing certain
decisions and decentralizing others. Indeed, the decentralization achieved through specialization
in the firm is at least as important as the centralization of decision making achieved through
steeper hierarchies. The efficient use of knowledge resources requires decentralized decision
making under some circumstances – in markets or firms – and centralized decision making
under others.181
The degree to which knowledge-substitution takes place within a firm will
certainly affect firm organization. The potential for knowledge substitution is a necessary
condition for greater centralization and steeper hierarchies. But it is not a sufficient condition.
Where knowledge substitution is counterproductive or impossible, employees must rely on their
own knowledge and firm organization will tend to be characterized by greater decentralization

179

Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, at 528: “Though [the price system] not only a division of labor but
also a coordinated utilization of resources based on an equally divided knowledge has become possible.” However
Hayek does not explain why there is organization of production inside firms at all, and what implications firm
organization would imply for knowledge development. Hayek treats large firms, which do not use the price
mechanism to allocate knowledge resources in their internal structures, as individuals. We believe this is so because
Hayek, at the time he wrote, was concerned with pointing out the virtues of market allocations when compared to
centralized allocations performed by the State in the function of an economy planner. This was a current theme is his
writing, reflecting the debate posed by the Socialist regime at that time. See FRIEDRICK A. HAYEK, THE ROAD OF
SERFDOM.
180
Hayek was the first to point out the importance of the division of knowledge: “Clearly there is a problem of
the Division of Knowledge which is quite analogous to, and at least as important as, the problem of the division of
labour. But while the latter has been one of the main subjects of investigation ever since the beginning of our
science, the former has been as completely neglected, although it seems to me to be the really central problem of
economics as a social science . . . “ F.A. von Hayek, 4 Economics and Knowledge. ECONOMICA, NEW SERIES 33-54,
at 49 (1937).
181
Conner & Prahalad, supra note __: “An essential function of market contracting ... is to enable individuals to
specialize in different aspects of business activity. Each person need not possess the full range of understanding or
skills necessary to complete all aspects of the work by itself. The provisions of the market contract coordinate the
individuals’ efforts, so that a unified product (and hence specialization itself) can emerge. On the other hand, firm
organization also enables specialization, since it too provides a means for coordinating individual efforts. However,
unlike market contracting, the firm entails a second means for minimizing the impact of limited cognitive abilities.
Again looking at polar cases, because the employment contract creates the authority necessary for knowledgesubstitution, but a market contract does not, an employee need not internalize all the insights required to choose and
carry out an action, while an independent contractor must. The firm organization economizes on cognitive
limitations through two methods: specialization and knowledge-substitution. In contrast, market contracting
economizes through specialization alone.
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and flatter hierarchies.182 Law firms, architectural firms, and partnerships are, more generally,
examples of the latter, as we shall see.
So a question that should be addressed is, after all, when is centralization or
decentralization – in firms or in markets – the most desirable organization process so as to
promote efficient knowledge allocation in the firm structure.
2. The Nature of the Problem
Jack Nickerson and Todd Zenger argue that markets are best at handling one type
of problem (low-interaction/decomposable problems), whereas hierarchies are best at handling
another type (high interaction/non-decomposable problems).183
A problem is a low-interaction/decomposable problem, if its solution depends
very little on interactions among different knowledge sets. In searching for solutions to such
problems, groups of individuals can independently apply their knowledge. The aggregation of
their independent efforts with the independent efforts of others who possess different knowledge
sets can be expected to uncover a valuable solution to the problem. One example of such a
problem is the design of a higher-performing personal computer. Performance can be increased
by independently improving any number of subsystems, such as the disk drive, the monitor, the
CPU, etc. Such problems “can be subdivided into subproblems each of which draws from rather
specialized knowledge sets.”184 A method of “directional search” is appropriate to the solution
of such problems.
In directional search, individuals independently pursue trials and
independently observe performance. Individual actors perform multiple searches, altering design
features associated with their knowledge sets, and then observe whether performance is
increasing or declining as a result of the variation. This method of problem-solving is efficient
when there are low-interaction problems that are fully decomposable into subproblems.185
A problem is a high-interaction/non-decomposable problem, if its solution is
highly dependent on interactions among different knowledge sets. Such problems cannot be
separated into subproblems and therefore cannot be addressed by individuals familiar with one
particular knowledge set.186 In order to solve such problems, directional search is inadequate,
and instead, what Nickerson and Zenger call “heuristic search” must be used.187 Heuristic search
requires the development of heuristics about the patterns of knowledge interactions, which will
permit the selection of trials that maximize the probability of finding a high-value solution. Thus
extensive communication and knowledge transfer are required to solve such problems.

182

See Stiglitz, Public Policy for a Knowledge Economy, supra note __, at 19: “In the firm, moving from simple
repetitive work under central control (Taylorism) to more complex knowledge-based work requires a move
towards a more decentralized and participative workplace.”
183
Jack A. Nickerson & Todd R. Zenger, A Knowledge-based Theory of Governance Choice—A ProblemSolving Approach, __ (Working Paper No. __, October, 2001).
184
Id. at 4-5.
185
Id. at 6.
186
The design of a leading edge microprocessor circuit is currently such a problem that “demands numerous
knowledge sets that extensively interact in determining the value of solutions . . . . the value of any particular design
change will interact with a host of other potential design changes determined by actors possessing distinctly
different knowledge sets.” Id., at 5.
187
Id. at 7.
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The different types of problems identified above are handled most efficiently by
different knowledge sets and governance structures. Markets are ideally suited to conduct
directional search for the solution of decomposable problems. Markets support directional
search, encouraging specialists to pursue trials that exploit their particular expertise. This
division of knowledge could be used to explain why, for example, the personal computer is
produced from components created worldwide. In the computer industry, Chandler explains how
IBM outsourced the production of the components that would compose the personal computer:
“…Estridge completed contracts with suppliers of components. Tandom made the disk drives in
California; Zenith the PC power supplies in Michigan; the Silicon Valley division of SCI
systems (a contract manufacturer) the circuit boards; a Japanese firm, Sieko Epson, the printers;
IBM’s plan at Charlotte, North Carolina, the board assemblies; and its plant at Lexington,
Kentucky, the keyboards.”188
The costs of using markets increase, however, when problems become
increasingly non-decomposable.189 In this case, their solution will require a mechanism that
mitigates knowledge based exchange hazards that arise from the public goods nature of
knowledge. This mechanism is the firm hierarchy.190
The firm can apply distinct solutions to the governance of knowledge formation:
authority-based hierarchy and consensus-based hierarchy. Authority-based hierarchy is
consistent with centralized management of knowledge by individuals who supposedly are more
knowledgeable. It is appropriate to solving problems of relative complexity, while economizing
on knowledge transfer. In contrast, the solution of highly complexity problems requires greater
decentralization and thus consensus-based hierarchy, as no particular actor will be
knowledgeable enough to direct heuristic search.
Therefore firm organization will differ depending on the nature of the problem
that a firm needs to solve and its underlying knowledge requirements. The degree of interaction
among knowledge sets required for the solution of problems encountered during the production
process will influence whether firm production is more efficient than market production, and if
so, whether steeper or flatter decisional hierarchies are appropriate.
In the following, we discuss some characteristics of different types of firm
production, the different types of knowledge resources that predominate in each, and examine
organizational consequences that their respective knowledge structures have for the firm’s
internal governance structure.

188

Chandler, THE ELECTRONIC CENTURY, supra note __, at 137-38.
Nickerson & Zenger, supra note __, at __. The authors argue that markets exacerbate knowledge exchange
hazards, discouraging investments in co-specialized knowledge and development of a common language that are
essential to a heuristic search. Individuals don’t have appropriate incentives to deal with the public good nature of
knowledge.
190
Id., at 13. Markets are efficient when knowledge transmission is directed at solving decomposable problems.
When problems are decomposable, knowledge is embedded in products and services and knowledge transmission is
largely limited to that which can be contained in prices and bundled into products and services. However, bundling
knowledge sets within a single firm and exercising authority to direct search becomes efficient when problems
become complex and efficient search demands extensive knowledge sharing and coordinated action. Authority in
hierarchies economizes on the extensive and costly knowledge sharing and education that would need to occur were
the governance of solution search for complex problems organized through a market interface.
189

Doc #:NY7:262178.1

54

KNOWLEDGE INPUTS, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FIRM STRUCTURE

B. The Sole Proprietorship and Small Partnerships
The typical American enterprise before the Civil War, was the sole proprietorship
or small partnership. These forms of business organization had easily identifiable individuals
who were fully responsible for the obligations of the business.191
The system that was common in small factories prior to 1870 had certain
particular features: large investments were seldom required; there were no formal employment
contracts; work rarely required complicated or costly machinery; work was mainly done at home
by workers who owned their tools; workers had a considerable degree of personal autonomy;
timing and pace of work, within limits, were left to workers; there was no need to tie up capital
in expensive equipment.192
We attribute the fact that we observe personal autonomy and decentralization in
the production process to the type of knowledge required in the production process. Workers
were artisans who had command of their work. They had the tools and, most importantly, the
knowledge necessary to perform the work. As the knowledge required to perform the handiwork
was, relatively speaking, not very complex or technologically sophisticated, most of the
manufacturing process depended on the expertise and work experience embedded in each worker
(Ki). Because of this, the governance structure of the production process was significantly
decentralized and workers were assigned autonomy to control their tasks. This governance
structure was the most efficient considering that the artisans had sufficient knowledge to perform
their tasks independently.
There also existed at the time systems of apprenticeship, where an artisan
controlled and managed the production process and exercised decision-making authority. This
governance structure also can be explained in terms of the nature of the knowledge resources
necessary for the production. Here, the older artisan who had more technical knowledge (Ki+)
retained the decision rights as the apprentices were in the process of learning the skills and
abilities necessary to develop the product (Ki-).
C. Mass Production Firms
The governance structures typical of small manufacturing partnerships began to
change with the advent of new production technologies after 1870.193 These technologies
yielded significant inventions and new products.
Small factories gradually became
manufacturing companies; their focus changed to large-scale production. The ownership of large
amounts of immobilized capital in the form of special machinery located on the production floor
(Kp) thus became a key asset in the mass production system. We argue that this predominance
of Kp in the productive process determined many of the organizational features of the emerging
mass production corporations.
191

Richard Adelstein, supra note __, at 25, 29-30.
Id. at 31-32.
193
Id. There was a growth in the number of engineers, and a new emphasis on formal science. There were efforts
to rationalize the operations of the machine shop. The role played by engineers in the development of American
manufacturing became extremely significant. At this time there was a rationalization of the accounting processes,
necessity of coordination and scheduling, operational scale, monitoring and coordination by managers, creation of
formal procedures in a hierarchized structure. It is important to note that this is also the beginning of rationalization
of Ko. There was a development of professional management tools, development of the knowledge embedded in the
organization, knowledge of the organization process in the improvement of routines.
192
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Once knowledge became embedded in machines and work routines, workers
increasingly became more replaceable. Taylor’s system of scientific management perfected the
mechanization of the production floor, taking the logic of mass production further than anyone
had before. The goal of Taylor’s scientific management was to embed all of the decentralized
knowledge previously dispersed among employees into machines and production routines, thus
bringing it under the more perfect control of management:
Taylor’s alternative solution to the planner’s problem in the
shop was to break the worker’s monopoly with the hammer of
science and replace the decentralization of power based on craft
knowledge with a hierarchically organized workplace in which
expert managers told ignorant workers precisely what to do and
how to do it. Every task in the shop would be reduced it to a series
of minute “elementary operations” performed by a man on a
machine, and with the aid of a stopwatch and a strong, agile
worker, the time needed to complete each such operation would be
computed...
Management could gain possession of all the knowledge
needed to control the shop. It could then systematize and codify it,
and return it to workers in the form of detailed instructions.194
This “physical separation of thinkers and doers” required a separate class of
managers. At the top of the hierarchy were well-educated employees – the managerial class –
who planned, executed and controlled production and marketing with the help of scientific
knowledge. These highly skilled employees were responsible for the organization of the firm.
They were assigned most of the legal decision making rights. At this level of the hierarchy, the
new corporations of the 20th century thus dramatically increased the level of technical learning
and tacit knowledge – the level of Ki. In contrast, the heavy use of machines (Kp) and
organizational routines (Ko) permitted the deskilling of workers on the production floor,
requiring very little specialized knowledge of these lower-level workers, who thus became
readily replaceable without causing any measurable loss to the company.195
194

Id. at 41-42. See also at 46 [SOURCES MISSING] “The general principles of ‘working smarter” and the
practical core of scientific management - the institutionalization of systematic analysis in the workplace, the division
of mental as well as physical labor, the emphasis on planning and the separation of thinkers from doers, the
substitution of theory for intuition and rules of thumb quickly took root in American industry and formed the
conceptual basis for the nation’s emerging system of mass production.”
195
We are not necessarily saying the line worker will be less knowledgeable. Our argument is that the system is
designed in a way to reduce the reliance on knowledge embedded in the employee in the operation of the assembly
line. See William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Big Business And Skill Formation In The Wealthiest Nations: The
Organizational Revolution In The Twentieth Century, in ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., FRANCO AMATORI & TAKASHI
HIKINO, BIG BUSINESS AND THE WEALTH OF THE NATIONS 501 (1977) discusses the relative absence of skill
formation on the shop floor in American industry. “In contrast to Britain, however, American reliance on skilled
shop-floor labor to coordinate production activities was generally short-lived, as U.S. industrialists developed
technological and organizational alternatives to leaving skills, and the control of work, on the shop floor. By
employing unskilled immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, by investing in deskilling technological change,
and by elaborating their managerial structure to plan and coordinate the productive transformation, U.S. industrial
capitalists attacked the craft control that workers – typically of British and German origin - had staked out during the
1870s and 1880s.” The author describes that in the first decades of the last century, the top management positions
were occupied increasingly by university graduates in search of careers with the incumbency of applying science to
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As our theory predicts, governance structures become more centralized when Kp
predominates in the production process. This is necessary to achieve an efficient allocation of
knowledge resources: decision rights must be assigned where costly Ki is located, at the
upper-levels of the firm hierarchy. Conversely, decision making will be more decentralized the
greater the reliance is on Ki at different levels of the firm hierarchy, because, again, efficient
knowledge allocation requires that decision rights are collocated with costly knowledge
resources.
1. The Shift from C-Form to the M-Form Structure
Chandler distinguishes three main stages in the evolution of American
manufacturing firms. Between 1880 and the first World War, after the first wave of new
technologies, there was a period of capital accumulation, characterized by large investments in
physical assets and the expansion of production in order to achieve gains of scale in
scale-dependent technologies.196 During this period, a heavy reliance on Kp, i.e., the embedding
of technology in multiple machines, coincided with a rationalization of production processes that
lead to the centralization of decision-making. (C-Form corporation).
The second period, from 1914 to 1950, was dominated by the new internal
combustion engine and its applications in the motor vehicle industry. In this period too, firms
made large investments in tangible capital-accumulation and augmentation.
The third period, from the end of World War II to the 1980s, was characterized
by a shift from the accumulation of tangible capital to the predominance of intangible capital.197
Growth was increasingly more knowledge-intensive and science-intensive.
We argue that the historical development of American manufacturing firms
supports our theory that firms that rely heavily on Kp will centralize their decisional hierarchies,
but firms that increase their reliance on Ki and Ko will be inefficient unless they decentralize
decision-making at least to some degree. When American firms relied mostly on Kp, they
dramatically centralized their governance structures. (C-form). After the second war, when firms
deployed increasing levels of Ki and Ko in R&D for product improvement, innovation, and

industry. The shop-floor investment strategy has been to substitute machines and materials for the skills of workers.
Id. at 519
196
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The United States: Engines of Economic Growth in the Capital-Intensive and
Knowledge-Intensive Industries in CHANDLER, ET AL., BIG BUSINESS AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note __,
at __.
197
Id. at 64. Empirical evidence shows that since the 1960s the number of R&D scientists and engineers
substantially increased. The private business sector, mostly manufacturing enterprises played a dominant role. R&D
scientists represent full-time employees. The number increased from 348.4 thousands in 1965 to 726 thousands in
1989. Id. at p. 38-39 Chandler & Hikino, supra note __, at __.
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diversification, they began to decentralize198 and take on a multi-divisional structure (Mform).199
Chandler shows that after the 1890’s the great manufacturing companies
centralized their headquarters. The headquarters were responsible for the decisions concerning
nearly all the activities of the enterprise’s plants or marketing units.200 The embedding of
knowledge inputs in products and machines and the standardization of production processes
enabled economies of scale.201 According to industry insiders, the most important benefits of the
new unified form of organization included the utilization of machinery and equipments to their
fullest capacity, the ability to replace striking workers by switching operations to other plants,
and the benefits from skilled managers at the top of the hierarchy undertaking decisions and
supervising the enterprise in its entirety.202 Hence the major significance of Kp for such firm
organization and the diminished use of Ki, concentrated at the upper levels of the organizational
hierarchy.
After the first stage of centralization, firms began to make use of their existing
knowledge and skill-sets to diversify into related products and industries. This diversification,

198

Id at 42-43, see also at 45: “In those industries most affected by the new markets and new technology, growth
came more by going overseas and still more by diversification. Of these two strategies, diversification was far more
responsible for the adoption of the “decentralized” structure than overseas expansion. Diversification came when
leading companies in these technologically advanced industries realized that their facilities and the scientific knowhow of their personnel could be easily transferred into the production and sale of new goods for new markets. (…)”
199
According to Chandler’s definition, “An enterprise can be said to have adopted the new [M-] form if it came
to have a general office with executives whose primary tasks were general rather than functional and if it also had at
least two major multidepartmental, relatively autonomous divisions.” Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. STRATEGY AND
STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE at 325. Id., at 42. This pattern
of organization was gradually adopted by more industries as they started to expand their activities through
diversification after the Second World War. Chandler mentions the examples of Hercules Powder and Monsanto
(before 1940) and Celanese Corporation of America, Columbia Carbon, Carborundum, American Cyanamid,
Koppers, Pittsburgh Coke & Chemical, Glidden, Atlas Powder, ….Shell Oil and Phillips Petroleum. See also at 48,
discussing the effect of product diversification in oil enterprises. Shell, Standard of California , Phillips Petroleum,
Texaco, Standard (Indiana), Standard of Ohio, and continental Oil set up autonomous divisions to administer their
new chemical products.
200
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR. STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 31 (____).
201
According to Chandler, “The transformation of a loose alliance of manufacturing or marketing firms into a
single consolidated organization with a central headquarters made possible economies of scale through
standardization of processes and standardization in the procurement of the materials. Of more significance,
consolidation permitted a concentration of production in a few large favorably located factories. By handling a high
volume of output, consolidated factories reduced the cost of making each individual unit…” CHANDLER, SCALE
AND SCOPE supra note __, at 31.
202
See a comment from Charles R. Flint, organizer of the United States Rubber Co. in 1899, regarding the
benefits of consolidated management. “The following are the principal ones: raw material, bought in large
quantities is secured at a lower price; the specialization of manufacture on a large scale, in separate plants, permits
the fullest utilization of special machinery and processes, thus decreasing costs; the standard of quality is raised and
fixed; the number of styles reduced, and the best standards are adopted; those plants which are best equipped and
most advantageously situated are run continuously in preference to those less favored, in case of local strikes or
fires, the work goes on elsewhere, thus preventing serious loss (…); greater skill in management accrues to the
benefit of the whole, instead of the part; and large advantages are realized from comparative accounting and
comparative administration…” Id., at 33, 34.
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however, typically brought about a measure of decentralization, given the different expertise
required to run different types of businesses. (M-Form corporation).
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the leading enterprises came to face
increasingly complex administrative problems, because of the great technological advances and
the systematic application of science to industrial production.203 According to Chandler, these
developments exposed serious weaknesses in these centralized firm structures: there were too
few decision makers for the great number of complex decisions that needed to be made.204
We argue that this shift to the M-form structure was driven by changes in
knowledge requirements necessary to support production. The more bodies of knowledge a firm
needed to master, the more decentralized their organizational structure needed to become. A
single management team in the top of the hierarchy could no longer master the many different
bodies of knowledge needed to run different lines of business, especially in science intensive
industries. Different types of Kp deployed in the different production processes added
significant complexity. Supply lines and margins responded to different market conditions in
different businesses. Different organizational routines were required: getting quotes for the
price of raw materials differed significantly from one business to the next; so did the
establishment of supply lines and related logistics. Supply lines were subject to different
hazards, market fluctuations, environmental events, etc. for the different products, thus requiring
the creation of new and specialized organizational routines in each case, affecting both supply,
production, and marketing of the products in each line of business. This increasing complexity
required different types of management experience – with different types of Ki.205
Organizations evolved by devolving discretion and decision rights upon those
employees/managers who had greater specialized knowledge concerning the different products,
and within each division, upon department heads with functional responsibilities. This
decentralization process was conducted in order to optimize the management of knowledge
requirements according to an efficiency-enhancing knowledge allocation.
DuPont is an interesting case study that illustrates the theory we have proposed
above. DuPont built large research departments to generate new products and improve existing
ones. The application of science through institutionalized research resulted in diversification as
new products were developed.206 Diversification, in turn, resulted in increased complexity of
operational and entrepreneurial capabilities.207 Recognizing the centralized control placed
ultimate decision-making authority in the hands of executives who did not possess the relevant
knowledge in each case to manage the line of business, DuPont’s Chairman, Harry Haskel,
exempted DuPont’s dye business from centralized control, even as DuPont was concentrating all
decision-making authority concerning manufacturing operations in a single executive Vice
203

CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE, supra note __, at 42.
Id. at 41.
205
Chandler and Hikino argue that as capital-intensive and science-based industries grew entering in new product
markets, the initial centralized structure (unitary or U-form) became inefficient. “Senior managers became acutely
aware that they did not have the time or the competence to coordinate and monitor – or to devise and implement
long-term strategies for their units operating in different geographical and product markets.” They started to adopt
a decentralized structure to meet their organization necessities. (the multidivisional M-form) note __, at 35. The
large industrial enterprise and the dynamics of modern economic growth, in _______, supra.
206
Id. at 43.
207
Id. at 44.
204
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Presidency around 1919. Haskell explained, for example, that “it would be better for a few years
to carry on the dye business as a separate entity.... because it is a developing, unstandardized
industry and should merit independent attention just as the Parlin chemical mixtures business
was better by itself until standardized – when it was merged with the regular sales and operating
departments.”208
Haskel, who at the time was one of the leaders of American industry, thus
recognized both that standardized production techniques permitted centralized control, but that
decentralization of decision-making authority was necessary where complex non-decomposable
problems needed to be addressed by specialized managers with tacit knowledge in a specific
field.
When the government imposed antitrust restrictions on DuPont’s military powder
business, DuPont saw itself with idle capacity in one of its plants and intensified its strategy to
diversify its product lines. DuPont’s search for potential products was clearly guided by a
concern for making use of its existing knowledge sets. According to Chandler, the products that
DuPont chose were in “a field where the company’s technological experience, training, and
resources could pay off.”209
Seeking diversification based on its nitrocellulose experience with gunpowder,
DuPont bought the International Smokeless Powder & Chemical Company, a manufacturer of
both explosives and pyroxylin lacquers. Subsequently, DuPont set up a small pilot plant to
produce pyroxylin-based artificial leather. The operation proved successful upon which
DuPont’s Executive Committee decided to purchase one of the leading firms in the field,
Fabrikoid Co., to “learn more about the business” instead of building its own artificial leather
plants.210
DuPont also pursued the production of pyroxylin from nitrocellulose based on
short-staple cotton. However, upon investigation, it was concluded that DuPont would have
difficulty supplying companies with their nitrocellulose requirements, Firms would not buy
from outsiders, because they would not sacrifice control and supervision of their products. To
act as a supplier, DuPont would have to become knowledgeable about the details of
manufacturing or composition of their customers’ products. But firms regarded these details as
valuable trade secrets, which they would not share with a potential competitor.211 Because of the
close coordination required between supplier and manufacturer in the industry, DuPont instead
pursued a policy of vertical integration.212
DuPont’s increasing diversification resulted in inefficiencies in knowledge
allocations. According to Chandler, “[t]he development of plans and the appraisal of activities
were made harder because executives with experience primarily in explosives were making
decisions about paint, varnishes, dyes, chemicals and plastic products. Coordination became
more complicated because different products called for different types of standards, procedures
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and policies.”213 As a consequence, the company’s new ventures suffered from extremely poor
performance.214
Initially, DuPont stuck with its old centralized organization that concentrated
decision rights in the hands of executives specialized in explosives. Proceeding under this
familiar organizational structure, DuPont lost money on every product except explosives,
accumulating high deficits in the area of paints, varnishes and cellulose products.215 The
company studied the problem and, after a six-month investigation, concluded that a new
management structure was necessary.216 In a report that envisaged the restructuring of DuPont, it
was concluded that “no member of the Executive Committee should have the direct individual
authority or responsibility which he would if he was in charge of one or more functional
activities of the Company. His relation to such functions should be advisory only…”217 Further,
according to the new plan, “the head of each Industrial Department [would henceforth] have full
authority and responsibility for the operation of his industry, subject only to the authority of the
Executive Committee as a whole.”218
In the face of product diversification, DuPont thus decentralized its decisional
hierarchy.
The new General Managers would handle the day-to-day administration of the
divisions, whereas the Executive Committee would henceforth be responsible for over-all
DuPont thus established autonomous,
coordination, appraisal and policy planning.219
multi-departmental divisions and a general office with staff specialists and general executives in
1921. Each division had several departments and its own central office to administer them.220
The new multi-divisional structure – called the M-Form – promoted an efficient
allocation of knowledge resources.221 Chandler cites as one reason for the success of the
decentralized structure that it removed executives responsible for the destiny of the entire
enterprise from the more routine operational activities, providing them with more time,
information and psychological commitment for long-term planning.222 Senior executives of the
Company increasingly specialized, began to carry out entrepreneurial activities, and focused on
strategic decisions. Decentralization further resulted in the collocation of decision rights with
relevant knowledge in that General Managers of the divisions were granted authority to manage
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within the framework set and funds allotted by the Executive Committee, the most efficient ways to use the
resources at his command.” Id. at 11.
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operations in their own areas of expertise. Once the new structure was in place, losses were soon
converted into profits.223
DuPont’s development shows that the decentralization of decisional hierarchies
became necessary where the development and production of new products required mastery of
new knowledge sets that had not yet been standardized, as well as research and individual
expertise to find solutions to new and complex problems.
According to Chandler,
“[d]iversification … brought the new decentralized structure, not because it increased the total
output or size of operations, but because it so quickly enlarged the number and complexity of
both tactical and strategic administrative decisions.224 As discussed above, the nature and
complexity of the problems to be solved affects the degree of decentralization required by the
decisional hierarchy.
More complex and non-decomposable problems require more
decentralization. In the case of DuPont’s new product lines, the problems encountered were both
complex and industry specific, and thus could not be analyzed and processed in the same fashion
by a single management team. They required “the creation of a multidepartmental autonomous
division for the administration of each major line of products. (. . . .)”225
In the electrical (including electronics), power machines (including automobiles)
and chemical industries, nearly all the leading enterprises followed DuPont’s turn toward the
new multidivisional form. These industries devoted the most resources to systematic research
and development.226 Institutionalized research brought diversification, which, in turn, brought
decentralization of the organizational structure.227
The evolution of organizations in other, much less diversified industries did not
follow the same path.228 Among seventy companies studied by Chandler, those that did not
adopt the new multidivisional structure by 1960 were concentrated in the metals and materials
industries.229 In the areas of copper, nickel and zinc, moreover, major technological and market
223
224
225
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Id. at 362.
Id., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE at
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Not coincidentally, according to Chandler, the two major science-based industries were electrical equipment
and chemicals. “They led the way both in the employment of highly skilled non-production workers and the creation
of large research and development organizations. In chemicals (SIC 28), scientific personnel in 1921 accounted for
30.4 percent of total scientific personnel employed in the U.S. manufacturing, followed by primary metals with 8.2
percent and electrical equipment with 7.2 percent. By 1946 the figure for chemicals remained almost exactly the
same, 30.6 percent. Electrical had risen to 15.5 and metals had dropped to 5.3.” Chandler, The United States:
Engines of Economic Growth, supra note __, at __; Chandler, Amatori & Hikino, supra note __ at 80.
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CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE, supra note __, at 378. (“Those enterprises whose technological
potential rests on modern science, as well as few food companies, have been able to turn diversification into a highly
rational and systematic strategy of growth. Stimulated by institutionalized research, diversification in turn brought
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same personnel using much the same facilities using much the same supplies of raw materials were able to develop
new engines, new machines, new household appliances, new synthetic fivers, new films or plastics, or new electrical
and electronic devices. Since the enterprises in these industries required the highest of technological skills, their
administrators invested increasingly large amounts of their total resources in research and development. Such
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228
Id. at 327-328.
229
Id. at 326.

Doc #:NY7:262178.1

62

KNOWLEDGE INPUTS, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FIRM STRUCTURE

changes were absent.230 This permitted the standardization of operations and the routinization of
decision-making procedures.231 In these industries, the centralized structure remained the most
efficient one. The centralized structure was similarly the most efficient in the oil industry, where
“the fundamental purpose of structure [was] to unite all activities of the enterprise in meeting
changing market demand.” More generally, Chandler concludes that “[w]here a company’s line
of end products was produced by the same manufacturing process from the same supply of raw
materials for a relatively few sets of customers, the centralized, functionally departmentalized
form provided that essential coordination.”232 The centralization structure therefore fit well in
industries that relied on less diversified Kp, where problems were substantial less complex and
the standardization of routines enabled an efficient knowledge allocation.
A more recent example of a relatively hierarchical and centralized firm structure
is that of IBM in the 1980s and 1990s. While IBM initially defined the path of the computer
industry, its business strategy for the personal computer was to develop expertise on mass
production.233 Instead of developing all the required components, IBM decided to purchase most
components from outside suppliers in order to rapidly benefit from new inventions and products
available on the market.234 Thus IBM heavily relied on knowledge/technology embedded in
products (Kp) that it purchased from suppliers, while still adding their own know-how in
organizing the assembly, marketing and servicing of the personal computers it produced (Ko)
and (Ki). IBM created a service force to provide national support for its clients and developed a
worldwide marketing strategy, spreading its franchised dealers worldwide.235 Thus focusing on
mass production where profits largely come from increasing returns to scale and scope,236 IBM
also developed a highly centralized organizational structure similar in certain respects to other
mass production industries to manage its large structure. Important decisions were typically
initiated by Central Management Committee.237
Chandler argues that as “Compaq and Apple began to build their global
enterprises, IBM’s Entry Level System Division was becoming integrated back into the
long-established, relatively centralized operating structure of one of the world’s largest industrial
enterprises.”238 IBM’s focus on mass production and reliance on Kp, acquired from its suppliers
in the form of technology embedded in products, thus made a more centralized, hierarchical
structure the most efficient allocation of knowledge and decision rights.
IBM’s open system based on market outsourcing created a demand for other
companies to enter this market, in order to supply the components that IBM required. These
230
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high-tech companies had to master a demand for increasing innovation. Because these suppliers
of innovation and technology relied heavily on the scientific knowledge and skill of their
employees, they had to resort to a very different organizational structure in order to manage their
knowledge resources and remain competitive.
D. High-Tech Engineering
The organizational structure of firms engaged in constant innovation is different
from the one of mass production firms. These firms are concerned with solving problems, which
require high levels of interaction and knowledge exchange.239 The knowledge necessary for
achieving these tasks is mostly embedded in individuals (Ki) and therefore we suggest that these
firms should develop more decentralized business structures if they are to maximize their gains
from an efficient knowledge allocation. Employees will enjoy more autonomy in performing
their tasks.
Scholars have already studied the changes required in organizational structures in
order to stimulate knowledge creation and knowledge retention.240 The success of new
biotechnology firms, for example, depends on their ability to create rights over scientific
knowledge. These firms need continuous innovation to find valuable and patentable products.
The asset necessary for product development is an intellectual resource characterized by “severe
immobility,” because there are few star researchers who have made commercially valuable
discoveries, and many of them work at universities.241
In these cases, where scientific knowledge is critical, different organizational
arrangements are necessary. By permitting scientist-employees to maintain exchanges with
universities, new biotechnology firms have turned out to be flexible organizations where the
knowledge used is mainly managed in a decentralized way by its employees.
Knowledge production in the university structure to which such firms are linked is
itself characterized by a unique governance structure. This has influenced the structure of
biotechnology firms. In order to “attract and retain such scientists . . . each [New Biotechnology
Firm, or] NBF needed to maintain a ‘university-like’ organizational context as it developed.
That is, the NBF’s organizational policies had to support both the formation and maintenance of
boundary-spanning social network relationships as well as numerous other complementary
activities such as rapid publication of research results and freedom of scientific inquiry.”242
Not just the New Biotech Firms, but Silicon Valley firms more generally avoided
hierarchies, creating organizations with considerable dispersed decision-making and flat
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authority structures.243 Decision making and coordinating activity by managers is reallocated in
favor of self-coordination among experts.
1. Restrictive Covenants and the Structure of High Tech Firms
One example of the impact of intellectual property regimes on the ownership and
decisional structure of firms emerges from Ron Gilson’s comparative analysis of Silicon Valley
high tech firms. Gilson has tried to show that different patterns of economic development
between the high tech industrial districts of Silicon Valley, on the one hand, and Boston’s Route
128, on the other hand, are connected to differences in intellectual property regimes in California
and Massachusetts. While Massachusetts has a long history of enforcing covenants not to
compete and other post-employment restrictions, California’s civil Code prohibits them.
Gilson argues that the inability to enforce non-competes thus supported a high
velocity labor market in Silicon Valley, in which employees with significant technological
expertise could move rapidly between competitor firms or leave their employer to start up their
own companies in direct competition with their former employers.244, 245 Because employees
could not be prevented by contract from appropriating tacit knowledge resources, the resulting
knowledge spillovers permitted start-ups to thrive and allowed a greater number of smaller firms
to specialize in developing technology required for new products.246
In contrast, Massachusetts’s willingness to enjoin employees, who signed
noncompete clauses, from competing with their former employers, discouraged employee
mobility and knowledge spillovers, leading to the decline of the high tech industry along Route
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ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE
143 (1994).
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See also, in THE COMPANY OF OWNERS (Joseph Blasi et al. eds., 2003). Blasi describes how the Nobel
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turn, was stripped of much of its talent when it shed eight of its most promising researches, who went on to create
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valley. By 1970, forty-two new semiconductor companies had been founded by former Fairchild employees or by
the firms they had started . . .” Id. at 11.
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Gilson, supra note __, at 594 (“The web of knowledge spillovers, personal relations, start-up businesses, and
absence of vertical integration owes its existence to the ease with which employee move from employer to
employer, from established company to start-up, from customer to supplier, taking their employer’s tacit knowledge
with them and applying it in their new situations. Lacking the ability to prevent knowledge spillovers, Silicon
Valley companies adapted to their environment, and the characteristic Silicon Valley industrial organization
evolved.”) (emphasis added).
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Gilson’s explains the ability of the legal infrastructure to affect the price of knowledge inputs for firms in high
tech industrial districts by promoting Marshallian factor market externalities. A Marshallian factor market
externality is the propensity for an input’s relative price to be lower when the number of firms in a region that call
for that input is higher. Such a region constitutes an “agglomeration economy.” Applying the Marshallian theory of
agglomeration economies, and more particularly the principle of Marshallian factor market externality, Gilson
shows the standard law and economics position that firms should be allowed to capture the gains of their knowledge
investments, fails to appreciate the significance that knowledge spillovers played in lowering the price of knowledge
inputs for firms in high tech industrial districts. Gilson supra note __, at 581.
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128. “Route 128 firms, in contrast, developed in a more traditional fashion, imitating the
vertically integrated structures of the large mass-production company.”247
While Gilson’s focus is on explaining legal factors that contributed to the creation
of Silicon Valley’s regional agglomeration economy, we rely on his analysis to establish the
relationship between differences in internal governance structure of high tech firms in Silicon
Valley and Route 128 and the respective legal protections available to employers for binding
tacit knowledge embedded in their employees (Ki) to the firm. The traditional large, vertically
integrated and more rigidly hierarchical corporate culture in Massachusetts was supported by a
legal regime that bound tacit knowledge embedded in employees to the firm. IBM provides the
prime example of such a vertically integrated firm. In contrast, a less integrated and less
hierarchical firm structure was supported by a legal regime that did not recognize a firm’s
property rights over employees’ tacit knowledge (Ki).
We argue that the legal regulation of Ki had an effect on firm structure in an
industry, which relies heavily on this type of knowledge. Tacit knowledge plays a different role
in the different phases of innovation, product development and commercialization in an
industrial district’s production life cycle. Tacit knowledge is “critical to taking an innovation
from conception to commercialization.”248 But it plays a lesser role during later stages in an
industry’s life cycle once “most of the technical aspects of the product have become
standardized, and the nature of demand is well known.”249 In the initial phases of a high tech
industries life cycle, tacit knowledge is transferred from one firm to another through interfirm
employee mobility.
There is considerable evidence for the proposition that inter-firm mobility in
Silicon Valley is exceptionally high.250 But clearly Silicon Valley’s high tech firms also needed
to bind knowledge to the firm. Gilson’s account of Silicon Valley knowledge of spillovers
leaves us with a critical question: If employee mobility was so pervasive how did the firms
survive at all? Key employees must have been retained for significant periods because otherwise
most firms would have collapsed. Presumably firms did find a way to keep employees. Gilson
does not pursue this aspect of the problem. Firms’ adaptation to their regulatory environment
and business culture in Silicon Valley was not limited to supporting their employees’ transfer of
valuable knowledge assets outside of the firm to their competitors. Lacking certain legal
protections (viz. enforcement of covenants not to compete), firms were thus relegated to
employing alternative devices to bind Ki to the firm. While the threat of enforcing a restrictive
247
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covenant provided disincentives for employees to strike out on their own in Massachusetts, high
tech firms in Silicon Valley had to devise a new internal governance structure to provide
incentives for employees to stay. One aspect of this governance structure is compensation
packages. Firms employed the substantial incentive of employee stock option plans to bind Ki to
the firm. This device, in turn, encouraged and reflected a different type intrafirm decisional
structure and different modes of financing.
We argue that there is a reciprocal relationship between non-competes and
compensation – and ultimately ownership - structure. If there is no possibility to enforce a
covenant not to compete, that is, to bind Ki by means of private agreements, then firms are
forced to use other mechanism in order to retain these employees. But if firms can enforce a
non-compete, then essentially they can prevent a employee from leaving, and make it much
harder for him to take the knowledge and information elsewhere. In firms where the use of
covenants not to compete are widespread, we hypothesize that stock options should become less
common, because the two are related in this way. The necessity of the firm to bind knowledge
embedded in its employees can be managed in two ways: (1) through enforcement of these
restrictive covenants; or (2) through offer of special compensation packages and potential
ownership rights.
What is more, Gilson seems to attribute the performance deterioration of Route
128 high tech district in Boston to the lack of knowledge spillover effects that were associated
with employee mobility in Silicon Valley.251 While this should be a relevant factor, we believe
that this is not the whole story. The predominance of vertically integrated firms in Route 128
which were developed imitating the structure of the large mass-production company252 may well
be considered another key factor in this respect. According to our theory, the deterioration of
firms performance in Route 128 would be an example of how internal governance structures can
affect the creation of knowledge resources and innovation. Our hypothesis is that the
development of firm structures in Route 128 towards a mass production oriented structure, with
steep hierarchical and centralized knowledge, may well have constrained new knowledge
development and therefore affected innovation patterns. According to Saxenian: “Route 128’s
technology enterprises imitated the structure of the traditional mass production corporation.
While Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurs rejected the corporate practices of the large, established
East Coast producers, the managers along Route 128 saw the same corporations as their models.
One senior vice president at Data General (DG) commented: “I constantly study the way larger
companies organize themselves looking for ideas. I look at Texas Instruments, at IBM, at ITT,
and at GE and GM.”253 Relying on interviews with industry executives, Saxenian describes what
she calls “hierarchy and formalism” in the companies of Route 128. Managers conceived formal
decision-making processes, conservative workplace procedures and work styles.254 “Vertical
lines of decision-making authority ensured that flows of information and communications were
formal and hierarchically controlled. Corporate Divisions were generally subject to the final
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authority of a central office.”255 There was a system of corporate ranks where salaries, benefits,
and authority relations created barriers between functions.256
As we have suggested centralized structures tend to operate by means of
knowledge-substitution mechanisms, which may not be efficient to promote the diffusion of
knowledge in firm’s structure and to foster knowledge of Ki type. So the internal governance
structure of the firm may well have affected the generation and development of new knowledge
and products.
2. Employee Stock Option Plans As An Alternative Means to Binding Knowledge to the
Firm
Authors typically view stock option grants as a means for containing agency costs
and aligning the incentives of managers (the agents) with those of the shareholders (the
principals). Stock option grants, according to these proponents, is the “the best compensation
mechanism we have” for “getting managers to act in ways that ensure the long-term success of
their companies.”257 Thus critics of stock options plans in the wake of recent executive pay
scandals258 who focus exclusively on incentive alignment grouse that the spread of stock option
grants to employees “had the effect of transferring a growing portion of the future value of the
company from the hands of shareholders into the hands of employees and managers.”259 Such
critics single out especially the much higher percentage of outstanding stock devoted to stock
option plans in the high tech industry, as compared with general industry companies who
typically restrict stock options to executives: “the percentage of outstanding stock devoted to
stock option plans increased dramatically, rising from 3 to 5 percent in 1990 to 12 to 15 percent
among general industry companies in 2001. In high-technology companies the average is much
higher – 18 to 25 percent, with some companies as high as 30 to 40 percent.”260
When viewed from the knowledge-based perspective, however, the extension of
stock options to mid- and lower-level knowledge workers in the high tech sector serves the goal
of binding knowledge to the firm, as well as giving employees ownership-type stakes in the firm
that have the effect of flattening the organizational hierarchy in a manner suitable to the
knowledge-intensive environments of high tech production. Stock options for employees in the
high tech sector (in which broad employee stock options plans prevail)261 have a different
purpose and function than stock options for executives in other sectors, who rarely have any
255
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incentive to leave their positions voluntarily, and whose centralized power of the company is
only underlined by outsized compensation packages and huge stock options awards. Further,
there are ways for executives to side-step the incentive-structure of stock options awards, for
example, by accelerated vesting of their own awards (so long as the board agrees). Stock options
for employees in the high tech industry in which they prevail are aimed at retention of
knowledgeable employees.262 In addition they are viewed as a crucial tool for startups in the
high tech industry and smaller firms with limited capital to attract talent. These knowledge
management considerations were neglected in the wake of the recent executive pay scandals.
Employee stock options plans typically specify that the options only vest on some
future date (for a period of years) and can only be exercised while the employee is employed by
the company. Thus, stock options act as a mechanism to bind employees to the firm (and thus
avoid leakage). A recent empirical study by Oyer and Schaefer investigates alternative
explanations for stock option compensation in the high tech sector but concludes by rejecting the
agency cost explanation that has been broadly adopted. This study analyses three alternative
explanations for stock options:
1) Agency Theory Explanation. Stock options provide incentives to employees.
They attach the employee’s wealth to the value of the firm in order to overcome agency
problems and motivate the employee to perform according to the firm’s interest.
2) Sorting Explanation. Stock options induce employees to sort. Employees differ
in their beliefs regarding firm’s prospects. Options attract optimistic employees, willing to take
the risk, and reduce overall compensation costs for the firm.
3) Retention Explanation. Stock options help firms retain employees. Options
are a form of deferred compensation. They have a vesting period attached that increases the
costs to employees of departing from the firm. Options thus help firms retain employees.263
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The “retention” explanation better explains empirical evidence according to Oyer & Scott. Id. See, e.g., the
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The study sample encompasses firms that offer broad-based stock option plans.
The study focus is on options offered to middle-level executives. These plans tend to be adopted
at small firms knowledge intensive firms. Oyer and Schaefer remark that new economy firms
(that manufacture computers, semiconductors, telephone equipment, create software, or
computer-related products) make up a substantial portion of the firms with broad stock options
plans.264
Oyer and Schaefer reject the incentives-based (agency-cost) explanation for
broad-based stock option plans, because the risk premium stemming from option-based pay
dwarfs the cost to the employee of the associated increase in effort. If effort were contractible,
the employee would be willing to exert additional effort for a payment dramatically smaller than
the risk costs imposed on the firm by providing stock options.265 Given the existence of other
means to evaluate subjective performance and to reward employees for the value they create, the
authors conclude that stock options appear to be a very inefficient means to provide incentive to
employees.266
Interestingly, sorting and retention explanations are consistent with the data. The
authors regard sorting or retention first-order determinants of the decision to adopt a broad-based
stock option plan. They believe that “firms that adopt broad option plans are those where the
returns to cost effectively attracting and retaining employees is particularly high.”267 Skill-based
industries, such as new economy firms, which rely on the intensive use of knowledge to deliver
their services, are significantly more likely to grant stock options than other firms.268
New economy firms tend to face more difficulty in hiring enough talented
people.269 So firms need to pay special attention in designing incentives and compensation
packages that will be suitable to stimulate employees to stay in the firm. While firms may design
several packages of deferred compensation, granting options to workers that have higher skill
levels is certainly one mechanism that serves the purpose of binding knowledge to the firm.270
264

Id. at 9.
Id. at 23.
266
Id. at 23. Stock options-as-incentives could perhaps be a sensible explanation under a very limited set of
circumstances, where employees have the power to take actions that have large value implications for the firm, at
very limited cost to the employees taking such actions, and where it is extremely difficult for firms to monitor such
employees.
267
Id. at 43. In order for the sorting explanation make sense, it must be the case that employees strictly prefer the
observed salary plus options to all-cash package. At a expected return of 25% annual stock appreciation, the
employees at nearly all the firms of the sample value their options packages significantly more than they would
value comparable all-cash package. Authors believe this explanation to be significant. Cf. Hall, supra note __, at __.
(“Adobe Systems, Apple Computer, E*Trade, Netscape, PeopleSoft, and Sybase have all repriced their options in
recent years, despite the bad will it creates among shareholders. As one Silicon Valley executive told me, “You have
to reprice. If you don’t, employees will walk across the street and reprice themselves.”) This shows that retaining
employees is a first-order concern in Silicon Valley firms.
268
Id. “The fact that firms with higher volatility and in the new economy are more likely to have option plans
could also be consistent with the retention model if market wages vary more for volatile firms or firms in the new
economy.”
269
Id. p. 42.
270
See also Rebitzer & Taylor, supra note __, at 27. “In high technology firms, many of the key assets of the
enterprise are bound up in the brains of crucial employees. Property rights to some of these intellectual assets can be
secured through patents or copyrights. When adequate control cannot be attained through intellectual property
265
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Industry leaders believe that, in an environment of intensive competition for
highly mobile employees trained in hardware and software engineering, stock options in Silicon
Valley “act[ed] like financial magnets, binding employees to their companies for the long
term.”271 As John Chambers, the CEO of CISCO Systems recognized that “[n]ot long ago . . .
the output of machines was the fundamental driver of competitive advantage. We taught our
managers to focus on physical assets, the cost of capital, and the value chain. Successful
companies built more, for less. In the internet economy, the dynamics are radically different.
Intangible ideas – the output of people, in an economic sense – are the drivers of competitive
advantage.”272
CISCO’s extensive stock option plans were based on the understanding that
acquiring and retaining human capital was key to success in the high tech industry: “Each year
Cisco gives employees the right to purchase $25,000 worth of company stock at 15 % off the
opening or closing price of the previous six months, whichever is lower.”273 In stark contrast to
the confinement of stock options to executives in the more traditional public corporations,
CISCO’s stock options plan typically gives nonexecutives more than 90 % of all options handed
out.274
One analysis based on a benchmark group of the top 100 largest internet-based
companies by revenue shows that “[ninety-eight] of these companies handed out options to at
least 51 percent of their employees, compared with just six percent in a group of comparably
sized, mostly non-tech companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange.”275 So the
distinction between stock options for executives and stock options for employees deserves
particular attention for the use that high tech companies have made of stock options seems very
different from the way they were used mainly as an executive compensation tool in the rest of
the economy.
Employee stock option plans became a central feature of the high tech firm
culture in Silicon Valley. They resulted from a mixture of intense competition for talent, the
need to bind tacit knowledge to the firm in face of the regulatory regime, and a drive for
recognition on the part of talented scientists and other well-trained employees working in the
tights, one should expect to see innovations in the employment relationship that reduce the firm’s vulnerability to
losing valuable assets. In some instances, high technology companies reduce the incentive of key “knowledge
workers” to leave through the use of stock options and other forms of deferred compensation that become
dramatically less valuable when the employee exits the firm.”
271
BLASI, supra note __, at 42; DELVES, supra note __, at 40 (“Like many other technology companies, the chip
maker [Intel] has used options heavily as a recruiting and retention tool”) (citing The Wall Street Journal).
272
Speech of John T. Chambers, quoted in BLASI, supra note __, at 37.
273
Blasi et al., In The Company Of Owners 53 (2003).
274
Id. at 53-4. Chambers took over as CEO in the mid-1990s after working at Wang Labs and IBM, both
traditional corporate hierarchies with top-down cultures, which he regarded as imposing significant constraints on
creativity and innovation. At CISCO Chambers was committed to making the Silicon Valley business culture a
principal resource. Part of CISCO’s strategy under Chambers has been “to use stock options and a bottoms-up
culture of employee ownership to propel phenomenal growth in the late 1990s much of it stemming from the
acquisition of other small startups.” Id. at 52. Chambers said in 2000: “Our industry is not like the banking industry
where you are acquiring branch banks and customers. In our industry, you are acquiring people. And if you don’t
keep those people, you have made a terrible, terrible investment . . .” Id. at 54.
275
Stock Options Benefited Workers, San Jose Mercury News, 1/10/2003, available at www.mercurynews.com
(last visited 7/10/2004).
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private sector. The ownership stake afforded to workers in high tech firms supported
nontraditional, decentralized decisional structures.276 Such changes, in turn, promoted the
creation of fertile environments for knowledge production in an industry that required constant
and rapid knowledge innovation. Thus, stock options also served to avoid the knowledge hazard
of hoarding or failure on the part of an employee to fully disclose his knowledge at work.
The change in ownership structure due to the need to bind tacit knowledge to the
firm thus altered not only decisional hierarchies, but also information flows within the firm. |It
furthered bottom up decision making and innovation and frequently blurred the lines between
worker and management.277 Finally, giving employees a greater stake and voice in the
management of the firm can serve as an effective workplace monitoring device. Knowledge of
what goes on in the workplace is as crucial to monitoring as is the actual incentive to monitor.
But independent monitors don’t have the same access to everyday problems as do the employees
themselves.278
While such anecdotal evidence has its limits, and the alternative business culture
in Silicon Valley, to be sure, generates its own counterproductive tendencies,279 it is not in
dispute that quite different organizational structures and financial arrangements characterize the
276

See SAXENIAN, supra note__, at__; Stiglitz, Public Policy for a Knowledge Economy, (World Bank, Jan. 27,
1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/jssp012799a.htm, at 1 (“the shift towards a
knowledge-based economy involves a shift in organization away from top-down hierarchical structures to flatter
structures such as networks of semi-autonomous teams. Tayloristic vertical structures were designed to enforce and
coordinate certain physical behaviors while knowledge-based work organization involves greater recognition of the
autonomy and self-direction of the mind.”).
277
BLASI, supra note __, at 40, 45. The following anecdotal evidence describes what has been termed the new
“partnership capitalism” reflected in such high tech firm culture: “Employees come to see taking important issues
right to the door of management as appropriate, even to the door of the top executive. In fact, some companies
already have a term for walking problems and issues up to management. They call it escalation, as in “She felt she
had to escalate the issue, to bring it to the attention of the decision-maker who could sort the problem out.”
“Sometimes, if an issue is important enough and involves the broadest interests of the company, an employee may
even take it directly to the CEO. Jack, the Portal employee, told us how that very morning he had talked to John
Little, the company’s founder and CEO. His advice: Portal desperately needed a chief operating officer, someone
to take over the day-to-day job of running the company. Jack felt that the task had become too much for Little now
that the company had grown to 1,500 employees.” “My exercise price [on my options] is way lower than some of
the other people at this table. So I can make a lot of money even at $8.81 a share [the price Portal’s stock was
trading at that day]. But a fifty- or sixty- or seventy-dollar stock price to me means a hell of a lot. So I’m willing to
talk to the CEO and tell him things that might in any other job limit my career. I wasn’t afraid of doing it, escalating
it, because of my strong financial stake.” In early 2002, Portal did indeed create the position of President and Chief
Operating Officer.” Id., at 46. While Portal was one of the companies that suffered a melt-down in 2000 & 2001,
and is cited as an example of a “dark side” the late-1990s tech boom, workers below top management nevertheless
benefited. Stock Options Benefited Workers, San Jose Mercury News, 1/10/2000, at www.mercurynews.com (last
visited 7/10/2004) (“Even when tech stocks were melting down in 2000 & 2001, workers below top management
pocketed an estimated $25 billion – or an average of $125,000 – at companies that ranged from stalwarts such as
CISCO Systems and Yahoo to flame-outs such as Excite@Home and Portal Software.”); How Portal leaders reaped
a Huge Windfall, Dec. 9, 2002, at www.mercurynews.com (last visited 7/10/2004)
278
BLASI, supra note __, at 43. For example, at a Palo Alto, California, company named Tibco Software
Incorporated, a thirty-something events planner named Jennifer told us: “When you have ownership in the
company, you . . . watch costs. We’re going to Hawaii next week for a sales trip. Well, one person didn’t get their
travel [arranged] . . . so I called him and said: ‘What are you doing, book your travel, if you wait your ticket is
going to be so much higher.’ You’re constantly watching that stuff when you’re an owner.
279
See, e.g., DELVES, supra note __, at 40-41 (discussing the “skewed incentive system” set up by the get-richquick culture of high tech start-ups).
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Silicon Valley high tech firms.280 Employee stock options are widely regarded as an essential
component to the partnership-style organization of these firms. We suggest that this concern
with designing compensations packages in a way to retain key employees was knowledge-based
driven. But, it could be argued that the main reason why the firms were adopting broad stock
options plans was accounting-driven instead of knowledge-driven. In such reasoning, firms were
issuing stock options because they had accounting incentives to do it, because of the
non-expensing rule at that time.281 But then, if this incentive was the same for all the companies
why just a few companies really adopted stock options as a broad plan available to non-executive
employees as well? Most companies did give stock options to their executives – trend well
documented – as there was an explosion in stock options.282 But why some companies, instead,
gave options not only to managers, but also to other employees? The accounting-driven view
cannot explain why there was a difference in the pattern of stock options distributed – namely to
non-executive employees in some high tech firms.
While the accounting rules may well diminish the incentives for firms to adopt
broad stock option plans as a compensation mechanism,283 we conjecture that if stock options are
an efficient way of binding Ki, they should continue to be used by high techs regardless of the
expensing rule. Alternatively, managers may try to design alternative compensation plans based
on deferred compensation in order to substitute stock options. If our view is accurate, high tech
firms must employ some mechanisms to provide sufficient incentives in order to retain key
employees.
E. Law Firms
Several commentators have argued that human capital is the most important asset
of law firms.284 Based on our theory, we expect to find that key features of the internal
organization of law firms can be explained by the need to allocate human knowledge resources
efficiently. The literature, however, has so far underestimated the impact of knowledge
allocation on the structure of law firms.
280

Among the voluminous literature on the subject, See, e.g., SAXENIAN, supra note __, at 128.
Under rules initially published by the Accounting Principles Board (ARB) – the precursor to the Federal
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) – stock options did not need to appear as an expense on a corporation’s
income statement, so long as they met certain criteria such as having a fixed exercise price and a fixed number of
shares. DELVES, supra note 130, at 44 (citing APB Opinion 25). This meant that they were essentially free.
Allowing companies to take the expense of stock options off their expense sheets to be sure, inflated earnings thus
making such companies look much more profitable than they actually were. This in effect created a significant
subsidy in the form of the correspondingly lower cost of capital available to high tech firms.
282
See e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE. THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION _[(__).
283
After years of fruitless attempts to change the rules to require expensing of stock options in order to correct
for the distortion of firm values, the FASB, in the wake of the dot.com bust and corporate compensation scandal in
2001/2002, presented Congress with a rule require expensing since in 2005. In addition to the new accounting rules,
the SEC signed off on new stock-exchange rules (passed by the NYSE and the NASDAQ), that will require putting
stock options and other compensation plans to a shareholder vote. Representatives from Silicon Valley firms
strongly argued that the new accounting rules would harm their ability to recruit and retain employees.
284
Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: an Economic Inquiry into the
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 324 (1985), Ronald J. Gilson &
Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: the Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41
STAN. L. REV. 567, 570 (1989).
281
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Gilson and Mnookin’s portfolio and agency theory approach to law firm structure
provides an example. Gilson and Mnookin argue that diversification provides an explanation for
the existence and structure of large law firms. On their theory, law firms eliminate unsystematic
risk by diversifying the areas in which they provide legal services.285 From this perspective,
when an individual lawyer is admitted to partnership he exchanges his human capital for
participation in a diversified portfolio with respect to the personal characteristics of lawyers and
their expertise in the firm.286 The diversification will be achieved by sharing the future income
of the firm equally between the partners according to a seniority system.287 Gilson and Mnookin
argue that law firm organization is shaped by the effort to diversify and the difficulty of doing
so.288
Gilson and Mnookin further posit that “it is striking just how well diversified the
portfolios of established firms are,”289 although they do not provide evidence for this claim.
Whether law firms are really diversified is a question that can be answered only by the empirical
evidence. In a recent empirical study, sampling all law offices in the United States, Garicano
and Hubbard analyze confidential office-level data from the 1992 Census of Service on the
hierarchical organization of law firms and on field-specialization by attorneys and firms. Their
results show that “[l]awyers are more likely to work at the same firm with lawyers in the same
field than in any other field.”290
Garicano and Hubbard find evidence that a firm’s boundaries narrow as lawyers
specialize in ex-post fields (resolving disputes):
We also find that lawyers in ex ante fields that serve business
demands tend to work at the same firm as lawyers in any of the ex
ante business fields, and tend not to work at the same firm as
lawyers in either ex post business fields or fields that serve
individual demands. For example, specialists in corporate law tend
285

Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: an Economic Inquiry into the
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STANF. L. REV. 313 (1985). The authors argue that a
portfolio composed of a sufficient number of assets will neutralize the effects of an event that lowers the value of
one asset by a favorable impact of the same event on the value of other assets. If the portfolio is fully diversified it
will not be subject to unsystematic risk. Therefore, a law firm that can diversify the areas in which it provides legal
services, can reduce its exposure to unsystematic risk. Equity owners of a law firm thus can achieve gains from the
diversification of their human capital, just as securities investors can achieve gains from the diversification of their
securities portfolio.
286
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: an Economic Inquiry into the
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STANF. L. REV. 313 (1985), p. 342.
287
See id. ibid., p. 339– 343.
288
Id., p. 322-323. Gilson and Mnookin argue that “… the creation of a full-service law firm – an agreement
among lawyers that each will make human capital investments in different specialties and that the return to those
investments will be shared on a predetermined basis rather than in accordance with actual outcomes – can be
understood as an institutional innovation that allow lawyers to take advantage of gains from diversification.” (p.
329). The authors give an example of a securities and a bankruptcy lawyer, arguing that when there is a bear market
the lack of business in the securities area will be counterbalanced by the increase of work load in the bankruptcy
area and vice-versa.
289
Id. ibid., p. 342.
290
Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor Within and
Between Law Firms, Univ. Chic. Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 213, available at 213. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=404280, at 2.
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to work at the same firm as specialists in real state law, but not
specialists in insurance or criminal law.291

This evidence is contrary to Gilson and Mnookin’s explanation of law firms’
organization based on diversification and risk-avoidance. The evidence suggests that the typical
law firm has a very imperfectly diversified portfolio at best. Law firms may diversify across
specializations with a given legal field. This occurs, for instance, in the area of business law.
Even in business law, however, firms seem to specialize in either ex-ante or ex-post legal
services, that is in either consulting or litigation, but not both.292 A firm that provides services
in securities law for the purposes of performing an IPO is less likely to also provide securities
litigation services for the same client than a different firm. This decreases the explanatory power
of the diversification theory, because a well-diversified firm would want to offer the right
balance between ex-ante and ex-post legal services. In times of recession, litigation tends to be
more profitable than consulting and other ex-ante transaction fields. One would thus expect an
optimum mix between ex-ante and ex-post areas if law firms aimed at portfolio-type
diversification. But such a business mix is not borne out by the average practice.
The fact that ex-ante and ex-post legal services are mostly provided by different
firms seems to point to a story based on knowledge specialization. This is also consistent with
the existence of law firms specializing in different types of litigation. Litigation work requires
mastering a body of legal knowledge and interactional skills (litigator vs. negotiator of
transactions vs. regulatory compliance counselor) which are very specialized, producing gains
from knowledge specialization.
The data also reveal that specialists in patent law tend not to work together with
specialists in any other field.293 They tend to work in firms specializing solely in intellectual
property. Garicano and Hubbard conclude that “[b]roadly, these patterns provide no support for
the hypothesis that law firms’ field boundaries strongly reflect the risk-sharing benefits of
revenue-sharing arrangements. Lawyers in the same field or fields where demands are closely
related tend to work at the same firm more than lawyers in fields where demands are less closely
related.”294 Portfolio theory may provide an explanation – albeit a very incomplete explanation –
for the organization of a small number of large law firms that service large corporations. But it
does not explain why the average law firm is specialized rather than diversified.
A final piece of data derived from the research conducted by Garicano and
Hubbard is revealing. According to the study, 28 percent of law firms are specialized in a single
field.295 The fact that such a significant number of law firms operate in one single area clearly
points to specialization as an important factor in the structure of law firms. The empirical
evidence available on boundaries of law firms thus suggests a knowledge-based explanation.
Garicano and Hubbard advance a knowledge-sharing explanation of law firm structure and
develop a model of hierarchy in which increasing returns are associated with the utilization of
291

Garicano & Hubbard, supra note ___, at 2.
Specialists in ex ante business law tend to work in the same firm as one another. According to the authors’
definition, business law includes banking, corporate, governmental, environmental, tax and real state law, but at 27.
293
Garicano & Hubbard, supra note ____, at 27. The only exception found by Garicano and Hubbard is that
specialists in probate law tend to work in the same firm with ex ante business specialists. Id.
294
Id., at 27.
295
Id., at 14.
292
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knowledge. Specialization and hierarchical organization, according the Garicano and Hubard,
reflect an optimal use of costly knowledge resources.296 Lawyers are more likely to work
together within the same firm when knowledge sharing provides added value. Knowledge
sharing can take the form of collaboration and referrals.297 When knowledge sharing is less
valuable, lawyers may opt to work separately and cooperate where desirable through market
exchanges.

1. A Knowledge-Based View Of The Organizational Structure Of Law Firms
The data supports our theory that firm structure is influenced by the efficient
allocation of knowledge resources.
We have hypothesized that when firm production relies more on Ki, the
organizational structure of a firm will be less hierarchical. Because law firms rely primarily on
human capital, or Ki, we should expect that law firms will have flatter hierarchies compared to
firms in other industries.
This is indeed the case. According to Garicano and Hubbard’s data, 73% of law
offices have no associates. These “non-hierarchies” include single-lawyer offices and offices
where there are several lawyer partners.298 The authors report that associate/partner ratios are
low, even when the analysis is restricted to law firms that serve primarily business clients and
have at least one associate.299 Nineteen percent of all law offices have associate/partner ratios
greater than zero and less than or equal to one. Only eight percent of all law offices have
associate/partner ratios greater than one.300 This shows that law firms have very flat hierarchies,
a consequence that we infer from the predominant type of knowledge used in its production
process, that is, knowledge embedded in individuals (Ki).
An interesting finding from this vantage point is that a law firm’s level of
hierarchy correlates with the degree to which its lawyers are field-specialized.301 In other words,
hierarchical organization reflects the human capital that lawyers bring to the table. The share of
lawyers who field-specialize is directly proportional to the associate/partner ratio of the firm.
The level of field-specialization tends to be higher at offices where the associate/partner ratio is
greater. According to the data, it increases from 45% at offices where the associate/partner ratio
is zero to over than 80% at offices where the ratio is at least one.302 When the lawyer
specializes, she is expected to be more knowledgeable in her field of expertise, an important
296

Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard. Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge: Theory
and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry, (March 2004). Univ. Chic. Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper
No. 214, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=533183, at 2. (“Hierarchies enable individuals to increase the
utilization of expert knowledge by shielding experts from simple problems and allowing them to specialize in
problems they have a comparative advantage in addressing.”)
297
Garicano & Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and Markets, supra note ___, at 9.
298
Garicano and Hubbard, Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge, supra note ____, at 5.
299
Id., at 6.
300
Id.
301
Id. Field-specialization occurs when a lawyers work primarily in one of the thirteen fields defined by the
Census (e.g. corporate, tax, probate law).
302
Garicano and Hubbard, Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge, supra note ___, at 6.
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condition for her to be a partner held responsible of the quality of the service provided. The
augmentation in hierarchical levels is thus explained by the increase in disparity of knowledge
that individuals possess.
So the data shows that even within the flatter hierarchies of law firms we can
identify gradations of knowledge among employees and a corresponding hierarchy of decision
making authority. Accordingly, our typology can accommodate the fact that law firms, which
rely predominantly on Ki, have hierarchies too, by distinguishing among individuals with
varying degrees of technical or context specific knowledge (Ki -, Ki , and Ki+). When applying
the principle of efficient knowledge allocation, we would expect to find the most knowledgeable
employees (Ki +) in top positions of a firm’s hierarchy, and less knowledgeable employees (Ki;
Ki-) at lower levels. We would expect individuals with greater expertise to engage in significant
“knowledge substitution”, guiding the behavior and decision making of those less
knowledgeable, while conserving their own time by allowing those less knowledgeable to make
judgments that are appropriate for them to make without the involvement of more senior
personnel.303
Law firms that follow the “Cravath system” fit this pattern. They have
traditionally had partners and associates.304 This distinction marks the attorney’s position in the
firm hierarchy the relative distribution of knowledge and experience, and corresponds to a
division of labor.305 Partners direct, guide, coordinate, train, and monitor the quality of
associates’ work. Partners exert decision making authority in law firm matters and get (most of)
the residual claims. Associates engage in tasks requiring less knowledge and experience, that are
also more routine.306 Further, the associateship functions as a kind of apprenticeship.307 At the
time of the initial hiring decision, the law firm does not yet foresee which associates will develop
enough knowledge and personal attributes that the firm requires in a partner.308 The associate’s
legal skills, ability to deal with existing clients and attract new ones is judged during the
associateship period to determine whether he or she has the qualities necessary to become a
partner. In our framework, the associate thus has Ki- or Ki, whereas the partner, who is more
knowledgeable, has Ki+.
While law firm hierarchies are flat when compared with firms in other industries,
there is thus nevertheless a hierarchy based on observed differences in Ki among the various
303

Another example of flatter hierarchies would be universities. The distinction between tenure and untenured
professors is also based on the amount of knowledge and personal experience that professors have. In order to
manage this knowledge in an efficient way universities shaped their organizational structure by creating a system in
which tenured professors are guaranteed stability through the privilege of tenure as well as greater decision rights
than untenured professors.
304
Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin. Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: the Economics of Associate
Career Patterns. Stanf. L. Rev. 567 (1989). P. 567
305
Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard. Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge: Theory
and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry. (March 2004). U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper
No. 214. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=533183, p. 5.
306
Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: an Economic Inquiry into the
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STANF. L. REV. 313, 359 (1985).
307
Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin. Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: the Economics of Associate
Career Patterns. 567 STANF. L. REV. 574- 577 (1989).
308
Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin. Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: the Economics of Associate
Career Patterns. 567 STANF. L. REV. 573 (1989)..
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knowledge workers in the firm, as our theory predicts. Because the firm must allocate
knowledge resources efficiently, it will give decision making authority to the partner who is
more knowledgeable, able to make better decisions, and to coordinate the work of associates.
When associates gain knowledge their decision making authority increases, they are gradually
less supervised, afforded greater autonomy, and are charged with supervising the work of lowerlevel associates.
To summarize, the “Cravath system” gives greater decision making authority and
greater residual claims to the lawyers who have the greater knowledge and experience. The
partners retain control over client relationships, they concentrate the most complex work in their
own hands and they train, supervise and monitor associates. Partners have a surplus of human
capital. They lend this surplus out and monitor associates (human capital sharing). Younger
associates borrow knowledge distributed by senior partners until they develop their own
professional expertise. Partners who concentrate greater knowledge in their hands are the
residual claimants of the partnership. In contrast, associate lawyers with less knowledge tend to
receive a fixed salary.309
More associates are hired than can be promoted to the partnership, and many
associates will be dismissed before they acquire sufficient client knowledge to “grab and leave”.
Rebitzer and Taylor argue that organizational features such as the use of "up-or-out" promotion
contests and the practice of having winners become residual claimants in the firm, emerge as a
consequence of the knowledge intensive setting in which these firms operate.310 The winners of
the promotion contest become partners, with residual claims, because this solves the problem of
binding knowledge assets to the firm.311
Associates tend to be promoted into the partnership or dismissed, in order to avoid
their acquisition of a key knowledge asset, the long-term client relationship. This practice
reduces the risk of leakage of client knowledge. Associates tend to leave the firm as soon as they
find out they will not be promoted, and law firms even help their associates find new jobs.
However, if the firm can limit direct contact between clients and associates (and limit associate
work experience) by restricting their work (and learning) to small pieces of more complex

309

See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: an Economic Inquiry
into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Exploit Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 (1985). See also, Ronald J.
Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm. The Economics of Associated Career
Patterns, 41 STAN. L REV. 567 (1989).
310
James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure
of Large Law Firms, September 2001, at 3. Working Paper on file with authors. (“Attorneys are "knowledge
workers", who differ from other employees because they carry around many of the firm's assets in their brains. The
knowledge assets these lawyers control - an understanding of the needs and interests of clients - are obviously of
greatest value when used with specific clients. This specificity gives individual attorneys considerable leverage over
their employers. By threatening to "grab and leave" with an important client, attorneys can leverage an increased
share of their firm's revenues. The up-or-out partnership system found in large law firms has evolved over time as a
workable resolution to this particular problem. By forming partnerships and firing experienced attorneys who are not
promoted to partnership positions, law firms limit the opportunity for experienced attorneys to grab and leave with
the firm's valuable clients. Grabbing and leaving is more important in legal partnerships than in conventional firms
because law firms cannot readily establish property rights over the knowledge essential for serving particular
clients.”).
311
Id., at 4: ("net worth is tied to the knowledge of it's senior employees.").
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operations, the length of the associate period can be increased. If client contact could be
eliminated entirely, associates could be employed indefinitely by the firm.312
Another organizational feature that can be explained from a knowledge efficient
allocation perspective is the law firm’s sharing model of compensation. Gilson and Mnookin
defended the view that the sharing model serves the purposes of risk-sharing by splitting the
profits on a predetermined basis to allow attorneys to take advantage of a “diversified portfolio’
in their law firm’s equity.313 We propose a different explanation. Knowledge considerations
suggest that profits are split so as to provide attorneys with the necessary incentives to pass on
cases or clients they acquire to other attorneys within the firm who are more knowledgeable in
the areas in which the services are being demanded; or share and consult with other more
knowledgeable attorneys in the firm on such cases and clients. Where profits are shared,
attorneys will direct clients to other attorneys within the firm who have more expertise in solving
a particulate legal problem. Moreover, other attorneys in the firm will be more willing to devote
their time and efforts to applying their knowledge in assisting another partner’s clients where
profits are split. This arrangement thus enhances efficient knowledge allocation within the firm
in that each lawyer will have the proper incentives to perform those services for which she is
most qualified. Otherwise lawyers would have incentives to supply services to clients regardless
of expertise.
2. The changing organizational structure of law firms
The structure of law firms has been changing during the past 15 years. Law firm
structure was characterized by only two categories of attorneys, partners and associates, but is
expanding to include new non-equity partners,314 special counsel, permanent or superannuated
associates, staff attorneys, and contract attorneys. This expansion of different levels of personnel
is in addition to the increase in different levels of paralegals and other layers of professional
staff, such as word processors, IT personnel, practice support,, etc. that have increasingly
augmented large firm practice. These new professionals add new layers of hierarchy to the
organizational structure of law firms.
What is striking from our point of view is that this expansion of law firm
hierarchy is occurring in conjunction with the increasing reliance of law firms on a different
knowledge type, that of knowledge embedded in products and machines (Kp) capable of being
claimed or held by the firm as a kind of property.
Law firms have increasingly been storing knowledge in precedent information
systems, client databases, and other sophisticated knowledge management systems. Thousands
of drafts contracts, legal opinions, briefs and client specific data are stored in the larger law
firms’ proprietary electronic storage systems by the large corporate law firms. Departments of
“Knowledge Management" have emerged to maintain internal databases and to train the
professionals who will operate and use them. The knowledge base of large law firms has
therefore been transforming from knowledge embedded almost exclusively in individuals (Ki) to
knowledge embedded increasingly in information systems (Kp).
312

Id., at 18.
Supra note __, at__.
314
Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: the Economics of Associate
Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV 567 (1989).
313
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While record keeping devices have always been used in one form or another, the
new transformation of knowledge through internal precedent systems and other database
resources special and internal to the firm increasingly accomplishes the separation of knowledge
from the attorney. Knowledge is thereby standardized and made available to the next associate
who can take up the case two years down the line to perform a particular task (e.g. write a brief,
or summarize a past transaction, or prepare a term sheet based on client precedents), without
prior experience in a particular case, or even firm style or format. All that the associate needs to
know is how to use the precedent system in order to apply more general professional knowledge
to the replication of a typical firm product by following the example. This dramatically reduces
the need for partner involvement not merely in the initial stages of any project, but at every stage
that can be sufficiently routinized and standardized. The separation of the knowledge through
codification and standardization thus turns the work of attorney’s into more of a production
routine, and permits partners to assume a more managerial role with regard to their associates.
According to our theory, when Kp’s importance increases in the productive
process, the organizational structure of the firm will become more centralized and display steeper
decisional hierarchies. This shift from Ki to Kp has indeed brought about a corresponding
change in law firm decision making structures. In the new corporate law firm, low-level
attorneys become more replaceable, as they increasingly rely on Kp to do their tasks. Thus large
firms now hire large numbers of staff attorneys who, for example, organize documents and
databases, retrieve documents, and help prepare document reviews. Staff attorneys can attend
depositions, take notes and record information where necessary. But they perform only a limited
number of specific tasks and exercise judgment – though perhaps very expert judgment -- only
within limited parameters. Staff attorneys are directed by partners and associates or senior staff
attorneys (who in turn are directed by partners) and tend to have no client contact at all. Staff
attorneys also tend not to do any legal research at all. In order to provide the client with
competitively priced services while maintaining high quality, large corporate law firms thus
employ professional staff attorneys as assistants to associates. Such staff attorneys perform
certain routine and standard tasks that do not require the knowledge and judgment demanded of
an associate, in order to lower the cost of legal services by conserving more expensive associate
and partner time. Staff attorneys are not on a partnership track. Thus their use has the added
benefit of a potentially much more long-term relationship without the need to share residuals.
In addition to staff attorneys, large law firms also hire so-called contract attorneys
to fill fluctuating demand for additional legal work that is much more mechanical even than the
work completed by staff attorneys. In the litigation setting, for example, contract attorneys are
hired as document “coders” to assist in processing the mammoth document productions
characteristic of large, complex multi-party commercial disputes. Such coders are given specific
instructions on identifying and coding documents in order to load them onto a database and
render them searchable. Such work is mechanical work done at a computer terminal and
controlled by software templates that permit only certain types of inputs.
We therefore observe that the hierarchy of law firms is becoming steeper and
more centralized in those firms in which the ratio between partners and other professionals
(including staff lawyers, contract attorneys and paralegals) is higher than it used to be. The
embedding of knowledge in products has made many of these professionals who now perform
more standardized routine work more easily replaceable, increasing the similarities between the
structure of contemporary law firms and mass production firms. It is in this context, that many
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of the large law firms have changed their business form and have moved from a partnership
structure to the form of a limited liability corporation.
F. The Implications of Knowledge Transfer for the Choice of Business Transactions
A variety of motivations have been recognized for mergers and acquisitions,
including for example such drivers as operating and financial synergy, portfolio diversification,
and other strategies based on finance theory. 315 But traditional mergers and acquisitions theory
does not make knowledge considerations central.316 A knowledge based perspective, we argue,
can provide important insights on why firms engage in a range of transactions, such as mergers
and acquisitions, joint ventures and licensing agreements.
The literature has identified strength of intellectual property protections as a
crucial variable in determining whether companies will purchase knowledge inputs (primarily in
the form of Kp) through licensing agreements or whether they will produce them, either jointly
or though integrating the activity. Anand and Khanna have argued that licensing occurs in
industries with strong intellectual property protections, but that joint ventures “should be more
likely to occur in industries with weak IPRs [intellectual property protections] to the extent that it
is easier to monitor and control the activities of partners in such arrangements than via armslength licensing contracts.”317 Arora and Merges argue that if there are strong patent protections
related to a technological input, spin-offs would be more likely, because the benefits from greater
customization afforded by the independent research firm would outweigh rent dissipation by the
spin-off.318 According to this literature, markets for technology depend significantly on
intellectual property protections. Thus, it is only because technological innovation can be
protected, even if imperfectly319, that markets for technology can develop and flourish.320
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RONALD GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, 259ff.
(discussing the theoretical sources of operating synergy such as economies of scale, economies of multiplant
operation, economies of scope and others).
316
Generally knowledge problems are indirectly treated under the more general heading of “synergies,” or
“economies of scope”. Problems of knowledge hazards have been developed by studies mainly in the management
area. See e.g, the excerpt by David Teece, Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise, in GILSON & BLACK,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 288 (discussing how intrafirm transfers of know how
ameliorate the hazards of opportunism because transactions become more idiosyncratic).
317
Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna, The Structure of Licensing Contracts, 48 J. OF INDUST. ECON. 103, 128
(Mar. 2000).
318
Ashish Arora & Robert Mergers, Property Rights, Firm Boundaries, and R & D Inputs. Working Paper,
2001, at 17.
319
See David Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration,
Licensing and Public Policy, in David Teece (ed.), THE COMPETITIVE CHALLENGE: STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRIAL
INNOVATION AND RENEWAL.188 (1987), (“Rarely, if ever, do patents confer perfect appropriability although they do
afford considerable protection on new chemical products and rather simple mechanical innovations. Many patents
can be “invented around” at modest costs. They are specially ineffective at protecting process innovations. Often
patents provide little protection because the legal requirements for upholding their validity or for providing their
infringement are high.”).
320
ARORA, ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY (__).
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The traditional corporate R&D strategy was to retain technologies in-house.321
But markets for technologies offer technology-based firms and high-tech start-ups the
opportunity to specialize in technology development without having to invest in costly
downstream assets.322 The development of downstream markets for technologies, permits the
existence of smaller, specialized technology producers.323 At the same time, greater
specialization in the production of technological inputs upstream benefits downstream users of
technology. With the increased development of markets for technology, integrating down- or
upstream therefore becomes less attractive. In this manner, markets for technology – and by
extension legal mechanisms for appropriating innovations – “can imply a fundamental
reconsideration of the appropriate boundaries of the firm.”324
The knowledge taxonomy we have discussed can be helpful to generate
hypotheses about when vertical integration or market contracting will take place. For instance, it
can explain which type of transaction will be chosen according to the knowledge type that is the
main object of the transaction. Not all knowledge can be propertized.325 The ability/inability of
the firm to bind a particular type of knowledge and avoid knowledge hazards, given the
intellectual property regime available, thus shapes business transactions and contractual
arrangements.
We hypothesize that, holding all the other variables constant, when knowledge is
more perfectly embedded in the product (Kp), and no tacit knowledge (in the form of Ki or Ko)
needs to be exchanged to render the product functional at the manufacturing plant, the buy
decision becomes very attractive. If there are gains from specialization, the manufacturer will not
vertically integrate, but each company will focus on producing a product it has a comparative
advantage to produce. Therefore, manufacturers will try to buy the complementary assets
necessary to their business by means of market transactions, so that they do not have to incur
costly learning (Ki) or acquire the human and organizational resources (Ki, Ko) necessary to
produce the input. The decomposable nature of Kp also accounts for the ability to outsource and
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Chandler, SCALE AND SCOPE; see also the management literature on rent dissipation. Leavy (1996:50): “Even
in the closest of outsourcing relationships, the partners will always remain potential future competitors.” (from
Arora and Merges).
322
Arora, et al., supra note ___, at 224.
323
DAVID C. MOWERY & NATHAN ROSENBERG, PATHS OF INNOVATION: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN 20TH
CENTURY AMERICA 41 (1998).
324
ARORA et al., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY 224; see also, ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S
GUIDE TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTIONS, VOL. I (2005) § 5.007.
325
Tacit knowledge frequently cannot be rendered specific enough in order to be codified in the form of a patent.
See Teece, supra note__, at 189 (arguing that codified knowledge is easer to transmitted and to be subject to
imitation. Tacit knowledge is harder to be transferable because of its difficult to articulate nature). Sidney Winter
classifies knowledge continuums that have the following polar dimensions tacit vs articulable, not teacheable vs
teachable, not articulated vs. articulated, not observable in use vs. observable in use, complex vs. simple, an element
of a system vs. independent. He argues that a position close to the left dimension of each continua is indicative that
the knowledge may be difficult to transfer, while a position close to the right dimension is indicative of easy
transferability. Sidney Winter, Knowledge and Competence as Strategic Assets, in DAVID TEECE (ed.), THE
COMPETITIVE CHALLENGE: STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION AND RENEWAL, 170.

Doc #:NY7:262178.1

82

KNOWLEDGE INPUTS, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FIRM STRUCTURE

license codified technologies.326 Thus where production requires increased Kp-inputs, a firm
will tend to rely more heavily on market transactions to procure such inputs.
However, if the technology is such that a great deal of tacit knowledge needs to be
exchanged between the producer of the technology input and the manufacturer in order to render
the product functional at the plant, the buy decision becomes less attractive, and integration or
other forms of joint production become more attractive, ceteris paribus. This is so, because tacit
knowledge is more difficult to propertize, increasing the risk of exposure to hazards.327 The
ability to capture the gains from investment in the production of tacit knowledge requires a
variety of strategies.328 Therefore, the relative quantity of tacit knowledge a given business
transaction affects the choice of the form of the transaction.
Mergers and other forms of joint production such as joint ventures or R&D
partnerships, are particularly appropriate to the development of innovations that rely on the use
of Ki. Mergers and joint ventures also allow the transfer of organizational knowledge (Ko)
which cannot be easily blueprinted or packaged in licensing or market transactions.329 These
integrated or quasi-integrated structures diminish the risk and decrease the cost of knowledge
hazards.
Looking only on the strength of intellectual property rights regimes does not tell
us anything about the inputs required for production. Even when there are strong intellectual
property rights for the manufactured products (Kp), if the knowledge required in the production
process is mostly Ki/Ko, then we will expect that joint production will occur anyway. The
development of hybrid automobile designs, currently the object of intense competition among
car manufacturers provides an example. Toyota was the first to dominate the technology. This
technology is now embedded in a product (Kp) and it is well- propertized so that Toyota can sell
the hybrid cars and retain ownership of the technology via its patent(s). GM and
DaimlerChrysler have recently announced a hybrid engine joint venture. Even if the property
326

To the extent that the production process can be broken down and compartmentalized into decomposable
problems, outsource can occur. In the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, outsource has been increasing due to
the availability of strong intellectual property regimes (and other factors). ARORA, ET AL., MARKETS FOR
TECHNOLOGY 231 (__)..
327
Costs derive from the public nature of knowledge and include the possibility of leakage and problems of
underutilization as described above.
328
Each firm chooses the strategy of knowledge management according to a wealth maximization perspective. A
firm may want to hinder involuntary transfers of knowledge, and therefore try to keep its knowledge sets as much
non-codified as possible to avoid imitation by competitors. On the other hand, a firm may want to share its
technological and organizational capabilities in order to benefit from licensing agreements, joint ventures or
mergers. In this case, it may pursue a strategy in order to articulate it knowledge and make it teachable. Sidney
Winter, supra note ___, at 174. Harbir Singh & Maurizio Zollo, The Impact of Knowledge Codification, Experience
Trajectories and Integration, Strategies on the Performance of Corporate Acquisitions, 27-29 Working Paper, The
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. The authors analyze knowledge management strategy in acquisitions.
They measure codification by the number of post-acquisition processes developed in the organization to address
several areas such as financial evaluation, due diligence, information systems, human resources and sales/product
integration. Their results suggest that the high codification of post-acquisition processes have a positive effect on the
performance of highly complex post-acquisition processes. On the other hand, high codification of post-acquisition
processes can harm performance in the context of non-complexed processes, because it can lead to excessive
bureaucratic load. These findings suggest that there is an optimum level of codification of knowledge necessary to
make knowledge transfer effective.
329
Kogut, Joint Ventures.
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rights are strong enough to assure that the product likely to be generated by the joint venture will
be marketed, these companies decided to engage in a type of joint production, that can be viewed
as quasi-integration. They did so because of the type of knowledge required in the production
process, and not because of the weakness of intellectual property type of rights in this industry,
which, as the case of Toyota reflects, provide significant protection. In this case, the nature of
the knowledge input (and not the output) helps determine which type of transaction will take
place.
This discussion suggests that the stage of the technological cycle may impact the
business form. Knowledge generation that relies mostly on Ki is more suitable to jointproduction arrangements in opposition to market arrangements.
There are at least two reasons for this. First, there are special moral hazards
associates with knowledge transfer contracts. Leakage of knowledge resources both on the side
of the producer, but also on the side of the manufacturer can occur. Hoarding or failure to share
knowledge may be enhanced in market transactions.
Second, transfer of tacit knowledge is costly, because it involves costly
knowledge exchange and learning on the part of employees of the manufacturer and the producer
of the technological input. If a firm must spend a great deal of time learning about how to use a
knowledge input, then producing the input inhouse becomes more attractive.330
The analysis of knowledge inputs, we suggest, is a very important variable
influencing the form of business transactions. While a thorough development of these
relationships goes beyond the scope of this paper, we note the promising avenues for further
inquiry.

VII. CONCLUSION
The present article seeks to provide a new approach to corporate organizational
structures, by focusing on knowledge inputs, an important variable that has remained largely
neglected by legal scholars.
We presented a typology that identifies the types of knowledge resources that
firms employ in their production processes. We further analyzed how legal institutions impact
firm organizational structure by showing how they bind these knowledge types to the firm
structure. With respect to law and knowledge management we showed that the development of
intellectual property protections has deeply affected the internal structure of business entities.
We then discussed how important characteristics of firm organizational structure are influenced
by the predominance of each knowledge type and the legal and contractual mechanisms used to
protect it.
330

Arora et al., Markets for Technology 115 (“[T]here is a greater cognitive distance between organizations,
which raises the cost of transferring tacit and context dependent information. Different units within an organization
are more likely to evolve a common shared understanding and a common code for communicating the knowledge
than different units in separate organizations. The shared context lowers the relative cost of transferring tacit
knowledge inside an organization.”).
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Firms will try to maximize the use of knowledge resources in order to maximize
profits. Firms will also try to diminish the occurrence of knowledge hazards such as leakage and
hoarding. To cope with the problems of achieving an efficient knowledge allocation and
preventing the occurrence of knowledge hazards, firms will create particular organizational
arrangements. These organizational arrangements include, for example, the existence of steeper
or flatter hierarchies, the adoption of particular compensation systems, and the engagement of
certain types of business transactions. Our article analyzed such features in the cases of mass
production, high tech, and law firms as well as in business transactions.
Hierarchies can be seen as a mechanism to provide knowledge-substitution so that
a firm can efficiently use its costly knowledge embedded in individuals. The adoption of steeper
hierarchical organization systems in mass production firms and of flatter hierarchies in high tech
and law firms have been explained in such terms. Based on our principle of efficient knowledge
allocation, we proposed that these different organizational structures result from the necessity to
maximize the efficient use of knowledge resources.
In our analysis of the development of American manufacturing firms, we argued that the
change from the C-form structure to the M-form structure was largely driven by changes in
corporate knowledge requirements.
In high tech companies, the necessity to retain employees and deal with knowledge
hazards such as leakage and hoarding has lead companies to adopt broad stock options plans in
their compensation packages. Therefore, knowledge considerations enable the distinction
between the standard agency cost view in which stock options are used to incentivize the top
management team and a retention view according to which stock options are assigned to other
employees as a means of stimulate them to stick with the firm and share their knowledge. As a
normative conclusion, our analysis would warn against the current one-size-fits all approach in
the debate of the use of stock options.
Knowledge considerations also have a strong explanatory power concerning the
organization of law firms. These firms are organized so as to achieve increasing gains of
knowledge specialization. The hierarchy among partners and associates is designed so as to
efficiently allocate decision and residual rights to those considered more knowledgeable. Client
relationships are usually conducted by those who already share the residuals in order to avoid
leakage from associates. The sharing model of splitting profits, also promotes an efficient
distribution of client cases among those most capable of handling them. Recent changes in the
organizational structure of law firms such as the increasing number of staff and contract
attorneys, and the consequent increase of hierarchy levels are also explained by a change in the
type of knowledge used in these organizations.
In the case of business transactions, we suggested that deals that rely on different types of
knowledge will assume different legal forms. Market transactions will occur when knowledge is
mostly embedded in products and arrangements of joint-production will tend to occur when
individual knowledge is more important for a given transaction.
Our paper initiates a new
resources for firm organization.
empirically investigated and
the challenges posed by
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theoretically modeled.
We hope scholars accept
the ideas set forth in this article which is
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At the same time, we hope to contribute to the development of the knowledge based
theory of the firm in the economics literature. Organizational economics has already recognized
the importance of legal rules to the knowledge structure of firms in the case of patents. The
impact of law on knowledge management, however, is much more extensive and will hopefully
continue to be of increasing interest to economists.
We believe that the typology we have developed for distinguishing different types of
knowledge in the production process provides an important new perspective on the development
of different types of firms. It enables us to reframe some of the standard positive explanations
for firm structure. The principle of efficient knowledge allocation is also an interesting guide for
normative proposals. Policy makers should analyze the impact that intellectual property rights
exert over internal knowledge management. They should also consider and promote efficient
knowledge allocation in corporate reforms.
Crucial to successful coordination and
decision-making is the collocation of relevant knowledge with the decision-making
rights/authority at the various levels of hierarchy within the business organization. An
interesting avenue would be to discuss whether the recent governance changes of SarbanesOxley promoted this rationale. We leave this endeavor for future publications.
E.G.
M.H.
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